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GRECIAN HISTORY

AN OUTLINE SKETCH

BY

JAMES RICHARD JOY, M.A.



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P R E F A C E .

THE author of this little book has not much to say in preface. The cordial reception of his earlier effort to afford to busy Americans a concise narrative of English history brought to him a pressing request to apply the same method to the history of Greece. The task was accepted, though encumbered with restrictions of time and limits of space whose effect the reader will scarcely fail to discover. It is hoped, however, that clearness and accuracy—in so far as those qualities may inhere in the modern history of an ancient race—may not be lacking in this outline sketch of Grecian affairs. For information upon Greek art, letters, and social life the reader is referred to other volumes,* in the course of reading of which this work is a part. Their ampler treatment there must explain their omission from their proper place in these pages.

It remains for the author to return thanks for many favors and suggestions to Professor Thomas Dwight Seymour, of Yale University, and to append a list of works consulted in the preparation of this volume: *A History of Greece*, by Ernst Curtius; *A History of Greece* (vols. i, ii), by Evelyn Abbott; *Griechische Geschichte* (vols. i, ii), Georg Busolt;

* *Callias*, by A. J. Church; *Classic Greek Course in English*, by W. C. Wilkinson; *Greek Architecture and Sculpture*, by Smith and Redford.

Grecian History, by George W. Cox; *A History of Greece*, by C. W. C. Oman; *Schliemann's Excavations*, by Carl Schuchhardt; *Physikalische Geographie von Griechenland*, Neumann und Partsch; *Manual of Mythology*, by Talfourd Ely; *Pharaohs Fellahs and Explorers*, by Amelia B. Edwards; *Manual of Greek Archæology*, by A. S. Murray; *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, by Guhl and Koner; *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, by Jane Harrison; *Seyffert's Dictionary of Classical Antiquities*, edited by Nettleship and Sandys; *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*, by S. H. Butcher; *Pericles*, by Evelyn Abbott. The maps generally follow H. Kiepert's *Atlas Antiquus*.

JAMES RICHARD JOY.

PLAINFIELD, N. J., May 28, 1892.

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GRECIAN HISTORY.

CHAPTER I.

THE GREEK LANDS.

ABOUT ten centuries before Christ a new race appeared—the first in European history. It was not the earliest of civilized nations. Already twenty centuries looked down from the pyramids upon the populous valley of the Nile; the Israelites were safely established in the “Land of Promise;” the ships of their Phenician neighbors traded in every Mediterranean lagoon and river mouth, and the region of the Euphrates and Tigris had been for ages the cradle and the tomb of empires. But this fresh people, the Hellenes, or, as the Romans have taught us to call them, the Greeks, differed widely from all previous or contemporary races. Among them developed a unique and splendid civilization, the source of half the ideas and institutions which rule the modern world. So many of the distinguishing traits of the Greek national character sprang from the natural conditions under which they lived that the wise student of Grecian history must ever preface his studies with some inquiry into the geography of Greece.

Greece proper, or Hellas—the name which its people loved—is the southern extension of the Balkan peninsula, the easternmost of the three land masses which Europe lets down from its southern rim into the Mediterranean. The westernmost, or Iberian peninsula (Spain and Portugal), is a mountain-ribbed plateau; the second, Italy, is a slender body with an alpine spine; Hellas is a huddle of mountains with a

ragged and isle-girt coast. No spot in all Greece is forty miles from salt water, or ten miles from a considerable summit. Its situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean subjected the early Hellenes to Assyrian, Egyptian, and Phœnician influences, the best obtainable tuition for this precocious race, which lived to teach its tutors.

Ancient Greece was included between the parallels 40° and 36° of north latitude, the former crossing the Cambunian mountains, the latter passing to the south of the Greek island Cythera. From north to south its length was about two hundred and fifty miles, and its greatest breadth one hundred and eighty miles. In area it slightly exceeded the State of Maine.

The natural boundaries of Greece were islands and seas. The Cambunians formed the northern partition wall, fencing off the peninsula from Illyria and Macedonia, two states which responded tardily to the civilizing influences from the south. The Greeks reckoned these neighbors, with all other non-Hellenic tribes, as "Barbarians." Of the surrounding seas the *Ægean* was the most important and influential. It is beautifully blue and almost tideless. Scores of islands rich in woods and minerals and lifting vine-clad shoulders to the sun rise from its bosom, like the summits of a submerged Hellas. The islands were not only rich in themselves, but of the greatest value to the early navigators, whom they tempted by easy stages across the sea to the coast of Asia Minor, the seat of the first Greek colonies. North of the *Ægean* was Thrace, rich in mines; and through the Hellespont (Dardanelles), Propontis (Marmora), and Bosphorus the mariners had entrance to the Pontus Euxinus (Black Sea), whence they fetched the grain of Russia and the wealth of Asia. A genial air bathed the whole *Ægean*, and the Etesian winds, like the modern trade-winds, favored navigation. South of Greece was the Sea of Crete, separating the peninsula from the great island of that name. On the west

was the Ionian Sea, fringing the coast with the great islands still called Ionian, but to the westward rolling an open expanse to the shores of Italy and Sicily.

The line of coast deserves a closer scrutiny. Its encroaching bays and far out-thrust promontories distinguished Greece from all other countries of Europe. Commencing at the north-eastern angle, the coast is first broken at 39° north latitude, where the Gulf of Pagasæ, the starting-point of the naval expeditions of prehistoric times, makes up into the land. A navigable strait connects its entrance with the Maliac Gulf. South-easterly from these waters the rocky island of Eubœa lies along the coast of the main-land through one degree of latitude, protecting the Eubœan Gulf, or Sound, which at one point, the Euripus, contracts to sixty-five yards, and was spanned by a bridge. The triangular projection known as Attica, tipped by the promontory of Sunium, separates the Eubœan waters from the wide, island-studded expanse of the Saronic Gulf, which almost severs Hellas. The Corinthian Gulf, entering the land from the west, approaches within three and a half miles of the Saronic waters. The northern and southern mountain systems here drop abruptly, leaving the Isthmus of Corinth (four miles broad and about two hundred feet above the sea-level) famous as the path of armies, as a line of defense, and as a mart, for here grew up the city of Corinth, which with a port on either sea became the commercial emporium of Greece.

Peloponnesus (Pelops' isle) was the name given to the sprawling five-fingered peninsula south of the Isthmus. The first finger is Argolis, washed by the Saronic and Argolic Gulfs. The second is Laconia, whose southern promontory, Malea, tormented by conflicting winds and sea currents, had all the terrors of Cape Horn. The Laconian and Messenian Gulfs inclose the mountainous peninsula which terminates in Tænarum, a wave-beaten cliff nearly two thousand feet in height, famous as the most southern point of Europe. The

fourth and the blunt fifth fingers are Messenia and Elis, a noteworthy feature of the former being the historic Bay of Pylus on the western coast, blocked by the island of Sphacteria.

North of the Gulf of Corinth the west coast has but one deep indentation, the Gulf of Ambracia, which with the Gulf of Malis on the opposite side marks a second division of the peninsula. Above the two gulfs is Northern Greece; between them and the Isthmus is Central Greece, or Middle Hellas.

It is difficult, and indeed not always possible, to detect any system in the arrangement of the mountains of the Greek peninsula. The northern ranges retain a degree of regularity, which grows chaotic in Middle Hellas, and disappears altogether in Peloponnesus.

Olympus is the corner-post of Hellas, lifting its crest ten thousand feet into the clouds. The highest and most inaccessible of their mountains, the Greeks fancied Olympus to be the abode of the greater gods. To the south-east of this mountain-king lies a coast-range, whose chief summits, Pelion and Ossa, the giants were said to have piled together when they made war upon the gods of high Olympus. Westward from the sacred mountain are the chains (Cambunians, etc.) which fence Hellas from the barbarian countries. Midway of the peninsula is the knot of Mount Lacmon, whence the trunk range of the Pindus penetrates the heart of Greece. West of this midrib rocky ridges alternate with river valleys to the shore of the Ionian Sea, while in the east is the Thessalian plain, the basin of the river Peneus. The Pindus sends two ranges eastward from its southern extremity, Mount Tymphrestus. These are Othrys ("the brow") and Ceta, which palisade the regions about the head of the Maliac Gulf. West of these two ramparts of Central Greece is a wildly confused tract of mountainous country, abounding in wood and water, but so secluded that its in-

habitants make no figure in history. Below Cæta the central range loses its coherence, though its direction may still be traced in the mountain masses which are scattered as far as the promontory of Sunium. These are Parnassus, Helicon, Cithæron, and the mountains of Attica—Parnes, Pentelicus, and Hymettus. Parnassus was at the very heart of Hellas, and the shrine of the god Apollo. At Delphi, on its south-western spur, overlooking the Corinthian Gulf from the height of fifteen hundred feet, was the most honored sanctuary of the Hellenic world. The waters of the Castalian spring, sacred to Apollo and the Muses, gush from a rocky cleft near by. Mount Helicon (8,000 feet) was the especial home of the Muses, the nine goddesses of poetry, art, and science. Of the Attic mountains, which were less imposing, Pentelicus is memorable for its quarries of that yellowish marble used by Athenian builders, and the wild thyme of Hymettus furnished famous honey for the Attic hives.

Gerania, the isolated mountain which spans the Isthmus from gulf to gulf, is four thousand feet high, and so rugged and abrupt as to present no mean obstacle to an invading army.

The mountains of Peloponnesus have nothing in common with the Pindus system. The principal chain, which has no general name (Erymanthus, Aroania, Cyllene, etc.), is in the north, whence short spurs jut out toward the Corinthian Gulf. Other ranges strike off southward, filling the center of the peninsula with a net-work of ranges, with high plateaus and kettle-valleys between them. Two ranges, Parnon and Taygetus, emerge from the welter of the hills and push far out into the Cretan Sea.

Even this brief survey must have impressed the reader with the importance of sea and mountains as formative influences upon Greek life. The Greek mountains are not single dominating and awful peaks. (Olympus alone exceeds

ten thousand feet in height.) Nor do they form an almost impassable wall like the Andes or Himalayas. A relief-map of Hellas shows that ranges of moderate altitude intersect each other in every direction, checking off the country in a great number of districts or cantons, many of which open upon the sea. So it happened that each canton early became a separate state. Peaceable communication with neighbors by sea or land was easy, but in case of war the ports and passes were readily barred. Thus the natural tendency of the Greeks was toward local independence, and in these petty states was nourished a system of local self-government which was at once the blessing and the curse of the race. The benefits sprang from the active participation of all citizens in the public business, and the spirit of emulation which was kindled between adjoining commonwealths. But Greece suffered from a "particularism" which made the citizen prefer his own city's weal to the common good. City feuds were frequent and lasting; jealousies kindled by some fancied wrong were fed and fanned until they led to war. Even when foreign enemies threatened, "look out for number one" was the usual policy of the city community, and but once did all Greece make common cause against an invader. The brilliant success of that struggle against the Persians should have taught them their strength; but their next enemy, Philip, had studied the Hellenic character, and by playing upon local jealousies was enabled to march the Macedonian army unopposed into the very heart of Greece.

In another way the physical formation of the country kept alive the separatist tendencies to which it had given birth. The relation of sea and mountain raised a series of natural barriers against an invading land force, and the iron-bound coast with its skirmish line of reefs was the terror of foreign fleets. Five successive lines capable of easy defense confronted an invading land army. The first was

at the extreme north-east, where the road threads the Vale of Tempe, a long gorge whose width at one point is less than thirty feet. The alternative paths over the mountains are extremely difficult. Sixty miles to the southward, at Mount Othrys, a moderate garrison might withstand a host, and a few leagues farther on the road to Central Greece lay on a narrow shelf between Mount Ceta and the Maliac Gulf, the famous "hot-gates," or Thermopylæ. The paths over Cithæron and Parnes were guarded by strong forts, constituting the fourth parallel. The fifth was the Isthmus, a triple barrier: (1) The tracks over Gerania were proverbially difficult, (2) an artificial rampart was constructed across the lowlands, and (3) the Acrocorinthus, or citadel of Corinth, was an almost impregnable outpost of the Peloponnesus.

In case of danger from abroad the northern Greek demanded that troops be stationed at Tempe; Middle Hellas urged that the stand be made at Thermopylæ, while the Peloponnesians, secure in their own impenetrable peninsula, were reluctant to send troops to these northern outposts, advising their fellow-countrymen to take refuge south of the Isthmus. Hence sprang injurious dissensions and inharmonious action; but these natural fortifications, though never properly manned, had their utility, for though the foreign foe might pass one outwork after another he was not master of Hellas until he had passed all. Greece was like some modern ship of war, which rides the waves until the last bulkhead is shot through and the last compartment flooded.

Wherever Greeks settled—and we shall find that they overspread the coasts of the Mediterranean—they preserved the trait of independence which had been forced upon them by their home conditions. Their characteristic "*polis*" or city-state was a self-governing community including the farmers and villagers about a central citadel and market-town. If advantages of constitution or situation gave it wealth and

power these were used to subject its neighbors, for a Greek city-state coveted a hegemony, or leadership of allied states, as eagerly as it cherished its own autonomy. This individualizing tendency was carried to great lengths. At one period the small island of Amorgus held three sovereign states, and it is said that one, traveling slowly after the manner of the country, might pass through twelve independent states of Greece in a single day.

At the dawn of the historic period the old order of independent communities was changing, giving place to new. Individual cities were establishing their leadership over weaker sisters, and forming larger states on the same model, between which the old jealousies and rivalries survived. The number of these states was constantly fluctuating like their boundaries, for the stronger preyed upon the weaker and swallowed them in larger or smaller gulps. Twenty of these countries deserve mention here, and half that number merit careful attention.

Northern Greece is cut in two by the main chain of Pindus. The halves contrast strangely. Epirus, on the west, is a land of mountainous ridges, the valleys drained by considerable streams, among them the Aous, the Arachthus, the Achelous, "father of waters," and the Cocytus and Acheron, the namesakes of two of the rivers of Hades. In one of the mountain folds lies Pambotis, queen of the Greek lakes, and in its neighborhood, among the oak forests, was Dodona, the most ancient and, until the rise of Delphi, the most revered oracle of Greece, consulted by all who desired to know the will of Zeus. Epirus was upon the "back side" of Hellas, removed from the current of progress, and save for a few thriving colonies upon the coast it has no part in the history of the classical period.

Epirus is gridironed with mountains, but its neighbor, Thessaly, has none except as a rim. The arms of the Peneus River radiate over the country, receiving the drainage of the

hills and fertilizing the plains. For pasturage and agriculture these lands were the best in Greece, and on them the great Thessalian families, like the Aleuadæ, Scopadæ, and others, founded their authority. Thessaly is one of the largest of the Greek countries, but was a frontier state which had much to do with the myths and legends of Hellas, and little with its history.

The nine countries of Central Greece were Acarnania, Ætolia, Malis, Doris, Locris, Phocis, Bœotia, Attica, and Megaris.

Acarnania lay between the Ambracian Gulf, the lower course of the Achelous River, and the Ionian Sea. Its chief towns were on the sea-shore, and were colonies from other Greek states. Its larger eastern neighbor, Ætolia, is crowded with mountains. These countries, like those of the north, were little involved in Greek affairs.

The lowlands about the head of the Maliac Gulf (the alluvial plain deposited by the winter floods of the Spercheus), as well as the heights of Mount Œta, are included in the little country called Malis. Its scant territory contains one rood of ground which is illustrious above all other Greek localities—the Pass of Thermopylæ, where Leonidas and the three hundred Spartans gave their lives for the honor of their country.

Locris, once an integral state, was so dispersed by later intrusions that we find it in three parts, two—the Epicnemidian and Opuntian Locrians—holding ground on the Eubœan Gulf, and one, the larger, skirting the Corinthian. Naupactus, at the entrance to the latter gulf, was a port of importance.

The least of these nine states bore the great name of Doris, and was the reputed birthland of the Dorian tribe, which conquered the Peloponnesus and sent colonies to Sicily and Asia. In its pent-up valley are the springs of Cephissus, the chief river of Central Greece. In historic times it had shrunk to three or four small cities, whose people, having

no fisheries and few orchards or vineyards, and not enough grain to supply them, were jeered at as "hungry Dorians" by their better favored brothers.

Phocis fronts on both gulfs. The northern half is the fertile plain of Cephissus; the southern is occupied by Parnassus (eight thousand feet high). The holy city of Delphi ranks first in fame among its towns. Below the temple of Apollo the "sacred plain" extended to the sea at Cirrha, which was the port of Crissa.

After traversing Phocis the Cephissus enters Bœotia by a defile near the town of Chæronea, in whose neighborhood Plutarch wrote the "Lives" and Greece lost her liberties in battle with Philip of Macedon. Ranges of hills subdivide Bœotia into numerous smaller regions, each of which showed the true Greek spirit of independence. Orchomenus, in the Cephissus valley, was among the first Bœotian cities to take the lead. Thebes afterward gained the hegemony, but the minor towns Coronea, Tanagra, Haliartus, Lebadea, Thespiaë, and others were continually tugging to get loose from her leading strings. Plataea was for many generations the friend and ally of her neighbor, Athens. The Cephissus empties into Lake Copaïs, a shallow sheet of water which has no visible outlet, but whose waters finally reach the Eubœan Gulf by the subterranean passages, or "swallows," which are common in countries of limestone formation. From works which still exist it would appear that in very early times the people of Orchomenus reclaimed large tracts of the Copaïc marshes by enlarging the mouths of these tunnels and clearing their courses. The channels became choked again, however, and the vapors from the marshes made the atmosphere of Bœotia proverbially dull and heavy—qualities which the Athenians also detected in the people of this region. The soil of the plain was fertile and well watered, beyond any other in Greece, save Thessaly, and the necessarily frugal Athenians affected to jeer at the Bœotians as epi-

cures, because white bread and eels from the fens were their common articles of food.

The wooded heights of Cithæron formed the natural boundary between Bœotia and Attica, the terminal triangle of Central Greece. The latter country, half as large as Rhode Island, was a region of dry upland plains, diversified by hills and low mountains. Its streams, though full in winter, dwindle away in summer to almost nothing. The battle-field of Marathon was on the eastern coast; Eleusis, the holy-city, was in the west. South-east of Eleusis, and a few miles from the sea, a series of rocky summits rise a few hundred feet above the level. The highest of these was the Acropolis or citadel of Athens, and about its roots lay the most wonderful city of Greece. A few miles away on deep water grew up the port towns of Phalerum and Piræus, afterward united with the metropolis by a system of fortifications.

The small state of Megaris occupied the northern portion of the neck which connected Attica and Peloponnesus. It contained but a single large city, Megara, which had harbors, Pagæ and Nisæa, on both gulfs, and grew rich in foreign trade. The island of Salamis, a stepping-stone from Megara to Athens, cost both cities many struggles, and in its sheltered bay the Persian fleet was defeated in the most famous sea-fight of ancient times.

Off the north-eastern coast of Central Greece, from Malis to Attica, the island of Eubœa rose like a breakwater, sheltering the sounds and straits behind it. It presented an inhospitable face to the Ægean, but Chalcis and Eretria, on its western coast, were centers of colonial enterprise.

The leading countries of Peloponnesus were Arcadia, Achæa, Corinthia, Argolis, Laconia, Messenia, and Elis, with such minor states as Sicyonia, Phlius, Cleonæ, and others.

Arcadia, a land of mountains, river-fountains, lakes, and woods, occupied the heart of the Peloponnesus. Mantinea and Tegea, situated in one of its isolated valleys, were the

chief towns. The tribes of the interior were too rude and unorganized to give or take much from the high civilization of their kindred. At a comparatively late date an attempt was made to strengthen Arcadia by uniting several rural tribes to found the city of Megalopolis. The Arcadians were a peasant people, devoted to the breeding of horses and cattle. They had a taste for war, and, having no common country to fight for, they frequently turned an honest drachma by serving as mercenaries in the armies of other Greek states, or of foreign kings.

Almost equally shut off from the turmoil of Greek affairs were the cities of Achæa, the strip of alternating mountain and valley which filled the gap between Arcadia and the Gulf of Corinth. Of its twelve cities, Patræ and Pellene became noted for their fabrics, and at Ægium was the national shrine of Zeus.

Between Achæa and Megaris lay two small states, Sicyonia and Corinthia. The former flourished during a brief period of splendor, the latter was the forerunner of Athens, and for many years its rival in trade and naval power. Its chief city, Corinth, with its impregnable citadel, the Acrocorinthus, and its port on either gulf (Lechæum and Cenchreæ), was the early scene of luxury and magnificence unknown elsewhere, for its situation controlling the Isthmus insured its importance both as a fortress and a mart.

The two petty cantons, Phlius and Cleonæ, which lay south of Sicyon and Corinthia, were at times independent, but may here be reckoned as parts of Argolis. This extensive region of north-western Peloponnesus acknowledged the supremacy of Argos, a city on the Inachus, at the head of the beautiful alluvial plain formed at the mouth of that stream. In the same region were Mycenæ and Tiryns, towns whose ruins are among the most ancient in Greece, and on the peninsula Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermione. In the Saronic Gulf, equidistant from Argolis and Attica, was Ægina,

the home of an enterprising and warlike people, and scores of smaller islets fringed the Argolic coast.

Laconia included the slopes of Parnon and Taygetus, with the island of Cythera, just off shore. Between the ranges is the secluded valley of Lacedæmon, "hollow Lacedæmon" of Homer, fertilized by the mountain streams which swell the Eurotas. Midway of this river's course was Sparta, the inveterate antagonist of Athens.

Beyond Mount Taygetus lay Messenia. Its climate is warm and moist and its soil so responsive to cultivation that the worst ravages of war could never long retard its prosperity, although its early subjection to Sparta deprived it of significance in history. Its upper plain was overlooked by the citadel of Eira, and the peak of Ithome (twenty-six hundred feet) guarded the valley of the Pamisus, which led to the lower or coast plain. The ruins of its capital, Messene, are still visible upon the western slope of Ithome. The one harbor of the west coast of Peloponnesus is the Bay of Pylus, in Messenia, famous for a disaster which there befell the Spartans in their war with Athens and for the modern naval battle of Navarino (1827).

Elis occupies the north-western angle of the Peloponnesus. Besides Elis proper, or "hollow Elis," the productive valley of the Peneus, the Eleans won and ruled Pisatis, in the lower valley of the Alpheus, and Triphylia. With Pisatis they acquired the plain of Olympia, and so became masters of the Olympic games, which assembled the flower of Greece to this holy ground every fifth year for competitive trials in feats of physical strength and skill in honor of Zeus, the father of gods and men.

There were Greek lands outside of Greece. To the Hellenes of the best period "Hellas" was the rightful name of any territory occupied by men of their race. To them the Ægean islands were "patches of Hellas," and the country beyond, which swarmed with their colonies, was equally Hellenic. The

era of colonization afterward carried the Hellenes westward over the Ionian Islands, filled southern Italy with Hellenic cities, and contested with Phenicia and Carthage for the possession of Sicily and Spain.

The western islands of importance were Coreyra (Corfu), off the coast of Epirus, and Leucas, "the white island," almost touching Acarnania. Massive Cephallenia lay in front of the Corinthian Gulf, protecting rocky Ithaca, the home of the wandering Ulysses and his constant wife, Penelope. Zacynthus (Zante) was due west of Elis, some ten miles out to sea.

The student has already noticed how Greece opens toward the east; its harbors are on that side, its bays open in that direction, and three well-defined bands of islands seem to float out across the *Ægean*. This physical fact was of prime importance in the development of the people, for whatever progress the world had yet made was represented by the eastern nations toward which Greece thus opened her doors and stretched her inviting arms.

Cythera, Crete, Carpathos, and Rhodes form the southern bound of the Greek seas. The first named island was a fabled haunt of Aphrodite (Venus). Crete, the home of Minos and the Minotaur, was long, narrow, and mountainous; its situation probably brought it into early contact with Egypt and Phenicia. Carpathos filled the gap between Crete and Rhodes, which nestled close under the promontories of Asia Minor.

The second bond between the two continents is woven of many strands. The rocky chain of Eubœa and the summits of Central Greece are continued beyond the coast-line by a numerous group of islands called the Cyclades, because they seem to encircle the barren granite rock of Delos, the birth-place of the god Apollo. At Delos was his shrine, at which the island folk were wont to gather at stated intervals, making festival in honor of their tutelar divinity.

South of the sacred isle were Naxos and Paros, the former the largest and most populous of the group, the latter still scarred with the quarries which furnished the Greek sculptors with the snowy Parian marble, the most perfect material for statuary. Another island cluster, the Sporades, united the Cyclades with the coast of Asia Minor. Samos, the most noted of the Sporades, was for several centuries a powerful and wealthy state, the worthy rival of Chios and Lesbos, its northerly neighbors on the same side of the sea.

The third and less distinct island band leads from the south-eastern angle of Thessaly to the Hellespont. Its western members are small and crowded; but its eastern representatives are large and scattered; here were Lemnos, on which (according to the myth) the god Hephæstus fell from heaven, and Imbros and Samothrace. In the Thracian Sea, which these summits mark off from the Ægean, is Thasos, standing sentinel over the gold-coast of Thrace.

From the configuration of the Greek lands we turn briefly to their climate and natural resources. Stretching through four degrees of latitude, Greece shares in most of the climatic variations of the warmer half of the temperate zone, although the ameliorating influence of the sea is ever present, save in the Bœotian trough and in the Arcadian highlands. Athens is colder in winter and hotter in summer than Spain or Sicily, which lie under the same parallels. Sudden changes are frequent, and in winter the thermometer often indicates a freezing temperature. Light snow-falls are not rare in the Attic winter, and the peaks of Cithæron and Pentelicus are often capped with white. The snow lingers half the year on Olympus; and in the glens of Parnassus and Helicon, of Taygetus and Arcadia, the drifts do not disappear until the advent of summer.

The rainfall on the western side of Greece is plentiful, and rivers and springs abound; but the eastern coast-lands are parched in summer. Attica, the driest of all, has only some

twenty-nine cloudy days in the year, and the gray and rainy skies of the north are quite unknown. The occasional rains come suddenly and copiously, turning dry streams to torrents. The summer of Attica is practically rainless; most of the rivers are spent in irrigation; some dry up. A white dust settles on the withering vegetation. No wonder the ancient peasant farmers were ever praying for rain, and paid their choicest vows at the altars of the rain-sending Zeus and the gentle goddesses of the dew. In countries so devoid of moisture springs were highly prized. Spring water was almost holy water, and in the myth each spring was the home of a nymph. The presence of these fountains often determined the location of cities. Loving words were carved above them. The art of later times delighted to embellish these blessed pools with rich basins and statuary. Thebes boasted of her two springs; Corinth had one of note; Castalia was one of the attractions of Delphi, and Callirrhoë was the pride of Athens. "As good as spring water" is a common similitude of the modern Greek, whose Godspeed to the traveler is, "A pleasant journey and sweet water." There were bright waters in Hades, the abode of dead Hellenes, and that the wayfarer thither might not thirst on his long journey a crock of spring water was buried with him.

The plains and mountains of eastern Hellas are now nearly devoid of forest trees; and in numberless places the thin soil has slipped from the declivities and disclosed the barren rock. Never within historic times has the peninsula been so thickly wooded as was Britain when the Romans landed there, or as the Pilgrim Fathers found the shores of Massachusetts Bay. The principal forest trees of northern Hellas, and of the highlands generally, were ash, beach, and pine, and many species of oak; but ax and fire made such depredations among them that ship-timber was sought abroad as early as the fourth century B. C. Pine was preferred to oak for ship-carpentry, a fact to be borne in mind by the

student who wonders at the short life of Greek war fleets. The cone-bearing trees also furnished the fuel, except the charcoal, which was burned from hard wood. From the coniferæ, too, came pitch, tar, and turpentine, valued for naval stores, for pottery-glaze, and for medicine, while pitchy knots served the poor for candles. Acorns and chestnuts were part of the simple diet of the peasantry. In the lowlands grew tamarisks, the myrtle, sacred to Aphrodite (Venus), and on the hill-sides the laurel, Apollo's favorite shrub. The ivy, the plant of Dionysus (Bacchus), clambered every-where.

Mowing land was rare in Greece; the cattle remained all summer in the upland pastures, and in winter were driven to the low plains. Sheep and goats were the most numerous stock, but horned cattle were prized, and the wealthy indulged their love for fine breeds of horses. To win the four-in-hand chariot race at Olympia was an achievement to be cherished in a family for generations. Wheat and barley were cultivated, but the supply had to be re-enforced from Asia, the Euxine, and Sicily to meet the demand. The Greeks were famous eaters of vegetables, and beans, lentils, cabbages, turnips, beets, and, above all, onions were the commonest of foods. Fruits were not abundant. The fig-tree was widely cultivated, and its dried fruit was an article of commerce.

The smaller fruits and berries were of slight importance or value in comparison with the olive and the vine. The Greeks claimed that the olive-tree was the direct gift of the gods to Hellas. They ate its fruit—many ate little else, except barley bread—they expressed its oil for the most diverse uses, for food, ointment, and light. The Attic olives were the best, and olive oil was among the few exports of that state. The government of Attica controlled the trees, and no one might fell one without a license. Some of these gnarled old-time trees still live at an age of fully two thousand years. Pliny, writing in the first Christian century, noted two

sorts of moisture for the body—wine within and oil without. “Together they are the monarchs of the plant world; but it is oil which is indispensable.” Hellas had much of both, for the vine thrived wherever a hill-side faced the sun, and the *Ægean* islands were terraced with vineyards. We hear little or nothing in antiquity of raisins and currants, but wine figures in every story and poem which has come down to us out of Greek lands. Each country counted its own vintage best, but it is believed that the first honors belong to the island wines—to those of Chios, Lesbos, or Samos. The ordinary wine of the country was plentiful and cheap. Every body drank every day, diluting the potation with two or three parts water. Drunkenness was rare.

The mineral wealth of the Greek lands was small. Limestone for the earlier and ruder structures, white and colored marbles for the finer public buildings and statues, and clay for pottery, bricks, and terra-cotta are among their most abundant resources. With the profits of the Attic silver mines of Laurium the first Athenian war fleet was built. The same veins yielded lead. Copper was found on Eubœa, but most of the bronze and copper used in Greece was brought from Cyprus. Gold was found in minute quantities in some of the islands, but most of it came from Mount Pangæus, on the Thracian gold coast, and from the sands of Pactolus and other Asian rivers. Iron was plentiful and widely used for keys, armor, utensils, and even cutlery, although steel and cast iron were unknown. Laconia was the chief seat of the iron manufactures.

This rapid survey of the physical characteristics of Hellas, its situation, extent, contour, people, climate, and natural resources, throws some light upon its influence as the nursery and training ground of the Greeks. Its situation placed them in the track of the civilizing tendencies which streamed out from the older empires and cities of the Orient, while its walls and intricate channels kept out invading enemies. Its

narrow limits nurtured the sense of racial unity, which they jealously preserved despite their countless tribal feuds and civil wars. The irregularity of the coast-line brought nearly every state in contact with the sea, opening it to outside influences, enlarging the scanty food supply, and smoothing a high-road where road-making was peculiarly arduous. This ever-present sea fixed some bound to the provincialism of the valley communities, which developed political independence and separatism, isolated in the meshes of their mountain net.

The Greek who had ventured to cross the bay which stretched before his dwelling was tempted to the islands always visible from the shore, and so by many safe routes and easy stages across the *Ægean* to Asia and Thrace, or westward to Italy and Sicily. All these countries were washed by the same beautiful Mediterranean, one brilliant blue arch spanned them all, and the climate of all was home-like and hospitable. Their timber and mines and grain supplied the deficiencies of Hellas, and thus persuaded the Greek to settle abroad as a colonist and make his fortune in trade with the mother-city. At Athens, and to some extent at Argos and Sparta, special conditions were at work. Slave labor relieved the citizen of domestic occupation, and even of private business. His house remained a plain and cheerless dormitory, while he passed his days in the streets and public places under the smiling sky. No other canopy but the blue was needed for theaters and legislative halls, and even temples were in some cases left open to the sky. The loveliest creations of art stood in the temple grounds, the highways, and market places, where the humblest citizen might feel their spell, and the transparent air gave a fresh and almost unearthly beauty to the mountain forms which rose on nearly every side. Indeed, the sense of form and color which distinguished the Hellenic mind may have owed its perfection to the perpetual loveliness of this landscape. There were no unapproachable summits to overawe the dwellers of the

plain, no boundless plains to blast life with their dull monotony. But every-where was diversification, the land and water intermingled, the upland rising from the meadow. The palm-trees of Messenia were visible from the oak-clad Arcadian mountains, and the brooks which dwindled in the sun of Laconia were fed by snow-water from Taygetus.

Whether or not it be true that it was this complex environment which kept the Greek mind from extravagance, made it many-sided, and quickened its appreciation, it is true that it forced the Hellenes to their multiplicity of occupation. They were not a nation of traders, or of farmers, or of stock-breeders, or of fishermen, or of artisans, but each pursuit had its followers in every little commonwealth. Nor was there any royal road to wealth, for the early Greek must collect his living from vineyard, olive orchard, barley-field, pasture, mine, and fishing-ground by unremitting toil. For nature was no indulgent nurse to her Greek children, and it was after the discipline of centuries that they came from her hands to take a man's place in history, brave, resourceful, self-reliant, versatile, enterprising, with qualities of intellect which have set all modern thought in order, and with an artistic sense which was not wholly born again in the age of the renaissance. But we must turn from our study of their surroundings to consider the first faint outlines of their history.

CHAPTER II.

PREHISTORIC GREECE.

THE Hellenes were probably not the first inhabitants of the peninsula which their genius made immortal. They were the latest of the ancient Eastern nations to reach their prime. Chaldea, Assyria, Egypt, Persia, Phenicia, Lydia, Israel had already passed their flower when, in the fifth century before the Christian era, the Greek civilization burst its bud. It is possible, moreover, to trace the development of the Greek race back from this point some five centuries farther into the prehistoric gloom, where the materials of history become involved in fanciful legend and lost in poetic myth. We may at considerable hazard assume the year 1000 B. C. as an approximate date around which to group the tribal migrations which resulted in the formation of the later historic states.

The traditions of the historical period shadow forth some such migration, but they contain little or nothing concerning the original inhabitants whom the first Greek settlers found in Greece. That they did find a race before them is hardly to be disputed, and scholars have cross-examined the traditions, language, religion, and monuments in search of a clew to the nationality of the pre-Hellenes. The aggregate number of facts which have been collected is large, but no scholar has yet been able to make them yield a consistent theory. Since every fresh discovery has necessitated a remodeling of old hypotheses, and since it is altogether probable that excavations now in progress will still further alter present views, it is obviously futile in a volume of this nature to champion any of the current suppositions. The reader

will be more grateful for a brief sketch of the evidence, and a succinct statement of the chief deductions from it.

Greek tradition held that the first Hellenes entering Greece from the north found the land occupied by an aboriginal race called Pelasgi. These were in most cases conquered, but the Athenians, Arcadians, and some others who became the best of Hellenes counted themselves aboriginal Pelasgi. There was a feeling that the Pelasgi were barbarians, that is, that their speech was non-Hellenic, but all attempts to identify any Pelasgic element in the Greek language have hitherto failed. Their speech was probably kindred, at least, to that of the new-comers, belonging to the same Indo-European or Aryan group of tongues, quite distinct from the Semitic languages, Hebrew, Phenician, Assyrian, etc.

The religion of these shadowy Pelasgi was probably a simple worship of the powers of nature, Zeus, the god of the sky and storm, being their chief divinity. Their idols, if any, were stocks and stones, possibly bits of meteoric iron, and their temples were bleak mountain-tops, high places where they seemed to escape from their kind to the presence of the god of heaven.

At many points in Hellas, notably in Bœotia, on the shores of the Copaïc Lake, and in Argolis upon two hill-tops, Mycenæ and Tiryns, a few miles back from the gulf, were ruins as inexplicable to the Hellenes as to us. There were boundary walls twenty feet thick, and still rising many feet above the debris which covered their base. They were built of rough-dressed stones of great size and mostly of irregular shape, though some of the structures are of squared masonry. Ignorant of their origin, the Greeks attributed them to certain four-armed giants, the Cyclops (round-eyed), whom a mythical king of Argos had brought from Lycia, in Asia, to do the work. Such ruins, wherever found, were called Cyclopean. Near some of them were vaults of stone of a higher grade of workmanship. With their entrance, passage-way,

and domed chamber they resembled on a large scale the Eskimo snow-houses. The ancients termed them "treasuries," but from their form and better information we call them the "beehive tombs." The best-preserved specimens of these structures are the "Treasury of Minyas," at Orchomenus in Bœotia, and that of Atreus, at Mycenæ in Argolis. Recent excavations within and about these walls and tombs have disclosed ruined fortifications, palaces, temples, and graves. These and the objects found in them not only differ greatly from the later forms of Greek art and architecture, but display a condition of civilization far in advance of that which the Pelasgi were supposed to have attained.

The six graves at Mycenæ contained an immense number and variety of objects, besides the bodies of men and women. The faces of the dead were covered with thick masks of beaten gold; around them lay golden ornaments of great value and cunning workmanship—brooches, hair-pins, buckles, rings, clasps, sword-hilts, ear-rings, belts, beads, and diadems. With these were fragments of painted pottery, rude terracotta figures of women, sword-blades of bronze beautifully inlaid with hunting-scenes, men, lions, deer, etc., in metals of many colors. Beads of amber and crystal were found, arrow-heads of flint, and spear-points of stone. There were cups of gold, silver, and alabaster graceful in form and carved in curious designs. Of even greater suggestiveness was the discovery of an ostrich egg and the scarabæus of an Egyptian queen. The lotus of Egypt was painted upon some of the vases, on the wall of an excavated palace at Tiryns, also, and the ceiling of a tomb at Orchomenus bore a beautiful design which could only have been derived from Egyptian models. But no known period of Egyptian art could have produced all, or even a large part, of these objects. Other nations certainly contributed a share, and there is a residue which is thought to have no counterpart in the artistic remains of any ancient Oriental people.

Dr. Schliemann, who discovered the treasures of Mycenæ, had already dug through the hill of Hissarlik, in north-western Asia Minor, in search of ancient Troy. Here, layer upon layer, he found relics of five successive cities. The second from the bottom was the citadel of a walled town which had been destroyed by fire at some very ancient day. Many curious objects rewarded the search—rudely decorated vases, terra-cotta figures—and in one spot was found a tangled mass of gold and silver plate and jewelry of great weight and considerable beauty. The sanguine discoverer was convinced that the race whose relics filled the graves of Mycenæ had come in contact, conflict probably, with these of Hissarlik, and that it was the veracious story of one episode in this intercourse which the Homeric poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, have made immortal as the “Siege of Troy.” The zeal and enthusiasm of the excavator, and the remarkable success of his undertakings, won over many distinguished scholars to his views. But the full acceptance of these conclusions involves difficulties which have kept them from prevailing.

Prehistoric buildings and pottery have been unearthed elsewhere in the Greek lands, in Rhodes, in Crete, and in Thera. The latter island (the modern Santorin) is a part of the crater rim of an ancient volcano, the central cone of which has sunk beneath the Ægean. The best grapes in the Levant grew on its warm slopes, and there a prehistoric people made their homes. An eruption overwhelmed them more than a thousand years, perhaps two thousand, before our era, preserving their ruins to this day as the Vesuvian ashes embalmed Roman Pompeii. The Santorin pottery resembles that of Hissarlik and Mycenæ, and is unlike that of Egypt and Phenicia.

No written or engraved word has been discovered on any stone or plate in these excavations, and without such assistance we cannot go far. Yet from the evidence of tradition, of the Homeric poems, of the language and religion of the

later Greeks, and from the monuments scholars have reached the most various conclusions.

Dr. Schliemann and his disciples hold that the prehistoric Greeks, the builders of Mycenæ and Orchomenus and Tiryns, were the Achæans of Homer.

Other investigators believe that the ruins and relics in eastern Greece betoken settlements of the Carians, Phrygians, or other tribes from Asia Minor.

According to another popular view there is no break in the continuity of descent from Pelasgian to Hellene. The Pelasgi were simply the Greeks of the unknown epoch; the same race, centuries later, is called the Achæan, and builds cities, has foreign trade with Phenicia, and wages foreign war perhaps with Troy. Still later a branch of the same race, but having tendencies which are highly developed by a new set of circumstances, mature as the Hellenes or historic Greeks, and after a series of migrations form the states and cities which we are about to study.

Without entire assent to any of these theories of prehistoric Greece, we may safely conclude from the evidence : that before the Greek race began its career the Greek lands on both sides of the Ægean were the theater of a considerable civilization, measurably advanced in the arts of war and peace, and trading through Phenicia with Egypt. The prehistoric Greeks, whatever their name, Pelasgians, Carians, Phrygians, Leleges, or Achæans, were, almost without doubt, of the Aryan stock, kinsmen by blood and language of the Romans and of the Celtic and Teutonic races which peopled Western Europe. We are taught that somewhere, perhaps in Central Asia, at some time not known, the original Aryan or Indo-Germanic fountain-head began to send out streams of nations. Those who went south and east occupied India; those who went west settled in Europe. One rill of population, flowing across the Ægean or through Thrace, filled the valleys of Hellas and the island fringes of its coast.

The position of the Greek peninsula exposed it, as we have already seen, to foreign influences, and indeed we find in the religion of its people and the traditions of their early days much that is Phenician and something that is of Egypt. Phenicia occupied the narrow northern coast-strip of Palestine, hemmed in by Mount Lebanon and the Mediterranean. Sidon first, and afterward Tyre, its two chief ports, were the earliest commercial cities in the world. Their people were of Semitic race, closely akin to their neighbors, the Hebrews, and sharing the Hebrew aptitude for trade. They wove and dyed fabrics, worked cunningly in metals, and had made progress in architecture before the year 1300 B. C. For the raw materials of their industries they scoured the sea, the chief objects of their quest being the *murex* shell-fish, which yielded the Tyrian purple dye, and the metals—gold, silver, copper, tin—fine woods, and ivory. It is claimed that the amber beads of Mycenæ were brought from the Baltic Sea by Phenician traders, and it is not now disputed that the Sidonian fleets went regularly to the tin-mines of Britain. All along shore from the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar) to the Pontus Euxinus (Black Sea) these indefatigable navigators rowed their long black vessels and founded their trading-posts. Cyprus, its mountains richly veined with copper, lay at their threshold. The purple-fish which they coveted was most abundant in the sound of Cythera, in the Gulf of Argolis, and in the Eubœan waters. The silver of Sunium and Thasos and the gold of the Thracian mountains were alike attractive. The light-skinned, delicate-featured, finely formed men and women of the coasts and islands fetched high prices in the slave-marts of Assyria and Egypt. The grain of Thessaly, Bœotia, Thrace, and Messenia was needed to fill the mouths of the handicraftsmen of the Phenician cities. To Cyprus was an easy voyage from Sidon, and thence across to Asia Minor, and up and across the Ægean the

strong-oared ships might slip from cove to cove with almost perfect safety. Disembarking, the traders held fairs, bartering their stuffs and hardware for the produce of the country, and if possible kidnapping a cargo of the natives. Near the mines and corn lands, on beaches by the mussel-beds, and where the shoals of tunny-fish made inshore the Phenicians established more permanent settlements, not attempting to conquer and rule the inland territory, but as trading colonies. On all the Ægean coast-lands such colonies were planted. The new settlers followed strange gods. The simple Pelasgi, worshiping the powers of nature and the Aryan heaven-god, Zeus, were introduced to Astarte and Melcarth, the horrid Syrian gods. In later times, when Aphrodite, the goddess of love and beauty, was a chief divinity of Greece, the myths reported that she had sprung from sea-foam at Cyprus and had first come ashore on Cythera. In these two islands were her oldest Grecian temples, and beneath the graces of her character may sometimes be traced the harsh features of Astarte, the Sidonian goddess of lust. Thus the Greeks owed the coarser features of their Aphrodite-worship to their contact with the East; from the same source Heracles (Hercules), the strong man, city-builder, dragon-slayer, and civilizing force of Greek mythology, probably derived his origin. His mythical birthplace was Thebes, a Phenician colony, as we shall see, and many of his temples were at points where the Syrian colonists were likely to have raised altars to their Moloch and Melcarth.

The Phenicians, moreover, had improved the alphabet which an earlier nation, perhaps Egypt, had invented, and though they made little use of it in their own literature, yet it is to their lasting glory that they taught the Greeks their letters.

Few of these interesting facts relating to the early contact of Greece and Phenicia were noted by any ancient historian. We pick them cautiously from Greek mythology and

legends, from Greek religious rites, and from scattered historical allusions.

Each Greek city had an elaborate story to tell of its founding. Some noble foreigner, usually of royal blood, or some very god or canonized hero was revered as the leader of its first settlers, the builder of its walls, or as its greatest king. The fanciful legends of Thebes and Argos will exhibit this characteristic, at the same time showing what the Greeks believed concerning their early intercourse with the East.

The Theban legend was briefly this: Cadmus, prince of the Phenician blood royal, sought his sister Europa (stolen by Zeus) over sea and land. The Delphic oracle bade him cease from his wanderings, and, following a cow, which should meet him, to found a city where she should lie down. The heifer led him through Phocis into Bœotia, and where she first lay down he laid the corner-stone of the Cadmea, afterward the citadel of Thebes. Near by he killed a dragon, from whose teeth, sown in the soil, sprang up fierce armed men, Sparti, who helped him build. He married Harmonia, the daughter of a god and a goddess, who bore him four daughters and a son. The Bœotians learned agriculture and mining from him, and the first Greek alphabet, or "Cadmean letters," was of his invention. The misfortunes of his children ultimately drove him from Bœotia, though they remained behind.

The truth of this legend is probably the bare fact that Phenicians from Eubœa for once broke their rule of colonizing the coast, tempted inland by the strength of the Theban citadel, the loveliness of its springs, and the fertility of its fields. The Greeks acknowledged their debt to Phenicia for the art of writing by attributing the invention of letters to settlers from that land.

Argos looked back to Egypt for its city heroes, and even Athens was proud to trace its founder, Cecrops, back to an

Egyptian origin. This was the Argive legend : Hera, queen of heaven, jealous of her lord Zeus's fondness for the princess Io of Argos, transformed her into a heifer (or a cow-headed woman), and sent a gad-fly to drive her out of Greece. She crossed the strait at the entrance of the Black Sea (hence called Bos-porus, "Ox-ford"), and finally recovered her shape in Egypt. The prolific brothers Ægyptus and Danaüs were of her descendants. The fifty daughters of the latter were loved by the former's fifty sons. Danaüs and his family fled to their ancestral Argos, where the father became king. He dug wells and the princesses found springs in "thirsty" Argos, bestowing benefits for which their race was always held in honor, and the Achæans of Argos took the name of Danai. Under them Argos became the chief state of Peloponnesus, and Mycenæ and Tiryns were offshoots of its greatness.

The ancient Egyptians were not a colonizing people, their caste system had no toleration for foreigners, and for ages their land was shut against trade by sea. In the sixth century a revolution opened the Nile country to the outside world, and especially to Greek settlements, but it is still a mooted question whether prehistoric Greece dealt with Egypt directly or through the Phenician markets. Egyptologists believe that they find the Greeks mentioned upon a tablet of Sankhara, who reigned in the African Thebes twenty-five centuries before Christ. A dozen centuries later a poet celebrating the deeds of King Thotmes III. wrote in stone, "The isles of the Danai are in the power of thy will," and who are these if not the Danai of Homer, the Greeks of the main-land? Repeatedly at intervals of a few decades down to the twelfth century the Egyptian monumental inscriptions mentioned the Greeks, calling them by names equivalent to Danai, Achæans, or Ionians. But there is a closer link than a name, for on the sculptured tombs of Beni-Hasan, in Egypt, we find the same decorative designs of spirals, rosettes, and lotus which Schliemann dug up at Orchomenus and Mycenæ. The Beni-Hasan

tombs are over two thousand years old, and the lotus is an original African design. It follows, therefore, that the builders of these old Greek towns had certain intercourse, however indirect, with the valley of the Nile. The story of Io, moreover, has been variously interpreted. Some will have it that she is the horned lady-moon, which wanders aimlessly, watched by the stars as the distracted princess was guarded by Hera's hundred-eyed sentinel, Argus. Others see in her the cow-headed Isis of Egyptian mythology, and a third party, by the same token, identify her with the horned goddess of Phenicia. It is not supposable that Egyptians founded colonies in Greece. It is possible that men from Greece may have sojourned in Egypt, and returned like Danaüs, bringing with them deep impressions of Egyptian art. But until additional facts have been secured it is probably safe to believe that whatever of Egyptian art or thought reached Greece in the earliest times came by way of Phenicia, and was imported in Sidonian or Tyrian bottoms.

CHAPTER III.

LEGEND AND TRADITION.

BEFORE we can pass to a consideration of the probable course of events which led to the organization of the historical states of Greece, we must sketch briefly the legends which anciently did duty for the history of these states. They are not wholly true—for the greater part they are such stuff as fairy-tales are made of—but in some instances they doubtless contain truth, and more frequently their romance, pathos, or poetic form has made them famous in literature.

The rich plain of Thessaly was the home of many tribes and a nursery of legends. The fabled Centaurs, rough, fierce men with the limbs of horses, ranged the slopes of Pelion and Ossa, and fought battles with the Lapithæ, a tribe which afterward dwelt in Attica. Some explain the Centaurs as personified mountain torrents, others as savagery in combat with civilization.

In Thessaly, too, where the Gulf of Pagasæ breaks through the mountain girdle of the plain, was the port of Iolcus, whence the hero Jason sailed for the far East to fetch the golden fleece. Fifty chosen heroes of old Greece rowed the ship *Argo*, which was built of Pelion pines, with a prow of the sacred oak of Dodona. This "Argonautic Expedition" was dated a generation before the Trojan War, and the legend abounded in mariners' tales of far countries, floating rocks, and enchantment. The adventures of the return voyage, and the black arts of Jason's wife, Medea, were a favorite theme of dramatic poets. The story was old in the time of Homer. Some modern critics suspect that it originated in solar phenomena, personified and expanded by the

imaginative Greeks ; but the Greeks themselves related its incidents as matters of actual occurrence. Perhaps they enfold some memory of early voyages to the strange waters of the *Ægean* and *Euxine*.

In the earliest form of the legend the Argonauts were chiefly *Minyæ*, the tribe which was said to have dwelt in southern Thessaly and in northern *Bœotia*, about *Orchomenus*. This city was the neighbor and rival of Thebes in legendary as well as in historic times. We are already familiar with the story of Cadmus up to the time of his departure from the Theban *Cadmea*, which he had founded. The lower city, Thebes, was fortified by twin hero-kings, Zethus and Amphion, the notes of Amphion's lyre availing to raise the heavy blocks to their places on the walls. Laius, a descendant of Cadmus, succeeded these city-builders. But the curse of his ancestor, the dragon-slayer, was upon him and his son *Œdipus*, whose terrible history was frequently presented on the tragic stage of Athens. The later legend perhaps glosses over an invasion which ended in the subjection of both Thebes and *Orchomenus* by tribes from the north.

In later times, when intercourse with Egypt had impressed the Greeks with the mystery and magnificence of the Nile country, they remodeled some of their legends, endeavoring to re-enforce the Egyptian element in their own early history. Thus *Cecrops*, the legendary founder of Attica, had long been accounted a native when the tradition was amended so as to make him an immigrant from Sais in Egypt. The rocky height, which eventually became the *Acropolis* or citadel of Athens, he first fortified, the settlement being called from his name, *Cecropia*. To him were credited the organization of Attica into twelve communities (the better to ward off foreign invaders) and the introduction of law and religion. The worship of *Athena* was among his innovations, and when *Posidon* (*Neptune*) competed with that goddess

for the city, the king pronounced for Athena, the giver of the olive-tree, against the sea-god, whose gift was spring-water, or, as some will have it, a horse. His sons, the Cecropidæ, were for generations the kings of Attica, which remained a scantily populated and insignificant state. Among them were a Pandion (father of Procne and Philomela), Erechtheus, who waged war with the Thracians of Eleusis, and Ion, the mythical father of the four Attic tribes. But the greatest of all was Theseus, an Ionic hero, whose exploits rank with those of the Dorian strong man, Heracles (Hercules). This hero subdued giants, captured the bull of Marathon, and by slaying the Cretan Minotaur in his labyrinth released Athens from her tribute of maidens and boys. He represented his country in the Calydonian boar-hunt, pulled a laboring oar on the *Argo*, and fought with Heracles against the Amazons, a race of warlike women. For these and other exploits he was highly esteemed, and when Athens became a ruling city she brought his reputed bones from Scyros, re-interred them with civic honors, and raised above them a temple—the Theseum.

Like Thessaly, Ætolia lies outside the theater of Greek history, but is the scene of some of the most famous traditions. There was Calydon, which was devastated by a boar sent in anger by a slighted goddess, Artemis (Diana). According to the early legends, the king's son, Meleager, an Argonaut, slew the brute, but perished himself by the arrows of Apollo. The story, as embellished by the poets, implicated all the heroes of the age—Theseus, Jason, Peleus, the Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux), and many others, not to forget the fleet Arcadian huntress, Atalanta. She was the first to wound the beast, and Meleager, who killed him, relinquished the trophies to her. In defending them he also slew his mother's brothers, and she in turn caused his death. It was Deianeira, the jealous wife of Heracles, who killed her hero husband with the poison which the Centaur Nessus

had bidden her to use as a love-charm. There is so little of tangible history in these tales that many scholars attribute the whole to mere atmospheric disturbances dressed in the Greek poetic style. Others think they yield evidence that in early times these western regions were not wholly severed from such civilization as existed in eastern Greece.

Augeas, king of the cattle-raising Eleans, is the most noteworthy of the legendary figures of Elis. It was his stables that Heracles flushed with the river Peneus. Pelops, a prince from Asia Minor—Lydia or Phrygia—also came hither and gave new honor to the Olympian games. His descendants afterward ruled Argos, and his name was given to the entire southern peninsula, Peloponnesus.

The descendants of Neleus, of Iolcus, are the chief legendary figures in Messenia. They settled, by the invitation of the natives, at Pylus. In the Trojan war Nestor, the son of Neleus, contributes ninety ships to the allied fleet, and is himself the most valued counselor of Agamemnon. The legend further said that the Nelidæ, expelled by the Dorian invaders, sought a home in Attica, where several noble houses of a later date were proud to trace their descent from Nestor.

The Laconian legends are somewhat meager. Many names of monarchs are given, but few facts of significance are related until King Tyndareus is reached. His wife Leda bore four children—Helen, the most beautiful woman in the world; Clytemnestra, wife of Agamemnon; and the Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux), the twin gods, who watch over mariners. Menelaus, husband of Helen, and brother of the great Agamemnon, succeeded to the throne of Tyndareus, and the abduction of his queen by the Trojan prince Paris is the cause of the ten years' war with Troy, which is the most famous undertaking of Greek antiquity. Tisamenus, the son of his nephew Orestes, is King of Sparta when the Dorians come down.

The relationship of Menelaus and Agamemnon points to a close connection of Laconia and Argos. In our examination of the early Egyptian influence upon the Greeks we have already followed the Argive legend to the return of Danaüs and his fifty daughters, the Danaïds, to Argos, where he reigned as a beneficent king. It was his grandson Prætus, King of Tiryns, for whom the Cyclops built the famous walls of that city. Of the same line was the hero Perseus, a son of Danaë and Zeus, who slew Medusa of the serpent locks and rescued Andromeda from the sea-monster. Perseus was honored as the founder of Mycenæ and the great-grandfather of Heracles himself, whose parents, Amphitryon and Alcmena, were in exile at Thebes when the hero babe was born. Meantime the Argive throne had descended to Atreus, son of Pelops and father of Agamemnon and Menelaus. Of the two latter, Agamemnon, "the shepherd of the people," as the most powerful monarch of Greece, led the allies in the Trojan war. On his return he was foully slain, and in the reign of his grandson Tisamenus the descendants of Heracles came back from their exile in Thebes, and claimed their inheritance.

Sisyphus, son of Æolus, was honored as the founder of Corinth, and Bellerophon was its most heroic figure. He performed many feats like those of Perseus and Theseus; he captured the winged horse Pegasus, slew the fire-breathing monster Chimæra, and successfully opposed the Amazons. Then, on the threshold of ease and prosperity, he attempted to scale heaven on the back of his steed, but was thrown and killed.

Not only had each state such a legendary history as these, but there existed two great bodies of legends which were common national property. All Greeks, wherever settled, could tell something of the wonderful career of Heracles, and recounted with pride the achievements of their race in the Trojan War.

Heracles, the son of Zeus and Alcmena, the wife of the banished King of Argos, was born at Thebes. Hera, queen of heaven, angry with her lord for his love of a mortal woman, sent serpents to slay the babe, but he gave earnest of his career by strangling them in his cradle. She then subjected him to his kinsman King Eurystheus, of Mycenæ, at whose command he performed the twelve labors which the poets have celebrated : (1) He strangled the lion of Nemea. (2) He slew the Hydra, the seven-headed sea-serpent of Lerneæ. (3) He caught alive the roaming boar of Erymanthus, and (4) the gold-horned, brazen-hoofed hind of Ceryneæ. (5) He abated the nuisance of the man-eating birds of Lake Stymphalus, and (6) cleansed the filthy stables of King Augeas. (7) He brought to Mycenæ the wild bull of Crete, and (8) the man-eating mares of Diomedes. (9) He secured for Eurystheus the divine girdle of Hippolyte, Queen of the Amazons, and (11) the golden apples from the garden of the Hesperides, or nymphs of the west. As the tenth labor Heracles fetched the fat oxen of the giant Geryon ; and for the last he stole the three-headed Cerberus, the watch-dog at the gate of the under-world.

Before he became the servant of Eurystheus the hero had, like a young David, slain a lion upon his native mountains, and helped his Theban countrymen liberate their city from Orchomenus. In addition to the twelve labors he killed the Centaurs, choked the "swallows" which drained Lake Copais, and clove a channel for the Mediterranean at the Pillars of Heracles (Gibraltar). Afterward, having sinned against the god Apollo, he was condemned to slavery to Queen Omphale of Lydia, where arose strange stories of his effeminacy. On his return he was poisoned by the fatal love-charm of Deianeira.

The latest and greatest of the legends is that of the siege of Troy. It was universally accepted by the Greeks as the crowning event of their early history. The *Iliad*, the great

poem of Homer which treats of its closing scenes, was familiar to every Greek, and the episodes of the war were the favorite theme of sculptor and rhetorician. Modern criticism has cast doubts upon the whole story, and if any Greek should revisit the earth he would be amazed to find the most splendid achievement of his race explained as a solar myth. More to his taste would be the theory of Dr. Schliemann, whose researches on both sides of the *Ægean* have convinced many sober scholars that the tale of "Troy divine" is mainly true.

It is impossible here to give more than the merest outline of a legend of such length and complexity. The Dardani, descendants of Zeus, founded Troy, or Ilium, on the plain of the Scamander, in the north-western angle of Asia Minor. Zeus left a wooden image of Athena, the Palladium, with the founders, as a sign of divine protection. The gods Posidon and Apollo built the walls of the citadel. After good and evil fortune Priam became king. His son Paris, favored by Aphrodite (Venus), to whom he had adjudged the prize of beauty, the apple of discord, seduced from Menelaus, King of Sparta, his queen, Helen, the fairest of women. Menelaus aroused all Greece to avenge him. Nearly twelve hundred ships came to the rendezvous at Aulis, in Bœotia, and thence crossed the *Ægean* under Agamemnon of Mycenæ. The bravest of the allies were the hero Achilles of Thessaly and his friend Patroclus; Nestor, the sage of sandy Pylus; the experienced Odysseus (Ulysses); Ajax of Locris; and Ajax of Salamis with his brother Teucer; Idomeneus of Crete; and Diomedes. The beleaguered city held out for ten years, the sons of Priam fighting as bravely as the Greeks, and the gods being divided in their support. At length Achilles met his death, smitten by an arrow in his vulnerable heel. But where bravery had failed craft won. Odysseus the wily invents the wooden horse whose belly is filled with warriors. Leaving the horse on the shore, the Greeks embark and sail away.

The Trojans, despite the warnings of Laocoön and his sons, drag the effigy within the walls. At night the Greek warriors pour forth from its caverns and open the city gates to their returning comrades, who kill and burn until the city lies in blood and ruins.

The remainder of the legend is swollen with wonder-stories of the adventures of the Greek heroes homeward bound. The wanderings of Odysseus are the subject of the second great Homeric poem, the *Odyssey*. Agamemnon returned to Mycenæ to be slain by the paramour of his queen, Clytemnestra, leaving a son, Orestes, who avenged his death by matricide, and was dogged by the Furies until purified by Apollo. After long delays Menelaus brought the faithless Helen home to Sparta. The other heroes came home to various adverse fates, but Odysseus, after ten years of perilous sea-faring, reached his island home at Ithaca to find his wife Penelope constant amid many trials.

Of the great number of Greek poems which treated of the Trojan War only two of importance, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, have been preserved. These are still called the "Homeric poems," and the Greeks accepted them unquestioningly as the works of Homer. It is impossible to fix the date of the events which they describe, and it is scarcely easier to determine when the poems were composed. Belligerent scholars are engaged in a longer war than Priam's upon these points and upon the general trustworthiness of the narrative. Some incline to admit its substantial truth. The skeptical or agnostic view of recent critics warns us that we cannot give the dates with any approximation to certainty, and we cannot argue, either, that the poet was ignorant of facts which he did not mention, nor that he spoke truth when he did speak. But no critic has yet dissented from the ancient verdict which pronounced these works unsurpassed and unsurpassable. The present view of their date and origin—if it be possible to generalize from the

diversity of opinions—is that they are older than any other extant Greek compositions, that the *Odyssey* is probably by a different hand from that which wrote the *Iliad*, and that some portions even of the latter poem have been interpolated since some master-mind molded its legendary materials into a form of grace and strength.

The Homeric poems being the oldest literary documents bearing upon the early life of the Greeks, the historian must search them through and note the features of the picture which they draw of the Greek nation. We may not fix the date at which its statements were true, but we may at least ascertain what passed current for truth among those whom it most concerned.

In the first place Homer's Greece is not yet Hellas, and the Hellenes are a minor Thessalian tribe. The people are commonly styled Achæans. Not Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, but Argolis, is the chief state, and its king, Agamemnon, rules at "golden" Mycenæ, an epithet which the discoveries confirm. Bœotia was divided between the Cadmean Thebes and Minyan Orchomenus. Phthiotis in Thessaly, ruled by Achilles, is the leading Greek state beyond Peloponnesus.

It was an age of marked simplicity. Each state was ruled by a king whose authority descended from Zeus and who was general, judge, and priest in one. As judge he had the advice of the chiefs, the experienced elders of the people, and at his table and counsel-board sat the princes or nobles. The populace are of small moment in Homer. The Greek army numbered one hundred thousand, but three heroes like Achilles, Patroclus, and Idomeneus could put a thousand to flight. Yet they were freemen, and it was customary for the king to summon them to hear his decrees. Slaves were numerous and apparently well treated.

The Homeric Greeks have but one wife, and their women are respected. The comforts of home are highly prized. Hospitality is a virtue, and good cheer prevails. As in later

times, the chief amusements are competitions in feats of arms and bodily skill.

Simple in their lives and loves and deaths, these heroes of Homer were to the Greek what the patriarchs of Holy Writ were to the Hebrew. Their words were household words, their deeds were immortalized in ringing verse, and they were held up as models of manliness to the eye of childhood. The early Greeks were a people of one book, and that book was Homer.

CHAPTER IV..

THE MAKING OF HELLAS.

THE later political divisions of the Greek peninsula and the diffusion of the Greek tribes about the Ægean resulted from a series of migrations which probably began about twelve centuries before Christ, and may have continued through three hundred years. At their close Hellenes occupied the entire peninsula, the neighboring islands, and the opposite coast of Asia, and the three Greek tribes—the rival Dorians and Ionians with the less important Æolians—had displaced the older Achæans, Pelasgi, or whatever peoples had hitherto held the land and built the Cyclopean strongholds.

The impulse which set the tribes in motion came from the north. Some fresh surge of the restless ocean of barbarians that filled the mountainous country about the Danube may have poured down the valleys of Epirus, driving the older races before it. The Thesprotians or Thessalians, one of these older races, settled for many years in the best of the Epirot valleys, left their ancestral seat and sanctuary of Dodona, and, threading the passes of the Pindus, entered the rich plain of the Peneus. The tribes of the plain were many and brave, but they had to submit to the new-comers or migrate. The subject tribes became serfs, or *penestæ*, cultivating the lands of the stranger lords of the soil. Some of the older settlers retired to the mountain fastnesses, others gradually made their way over the brow of Othrys, through the passes about the Maliac Gulf, and founded new homes in Middle Hellas. The valley of the Peneus lost its ancient name of Æolis, and was henceforth called Thessaly. It was composed of a number of states governed by aristocracies

and sometimes uniting for the common defense under a commander-in-chief, or *tagus*.

The Arnæans, or Bæotians, formed the vanguard of the migrating Æolians, whom this influx of Thessalians set in motion. They were numerous and warlike, for they pushed through Thermopylæ, and took for themselves the choicest section of Central Greece, the valley of the Cephissus, a land not less desirable than their earlier home by the Gulf of Pagasæ. The country was already occupied by civilized races—the Minyæ at Orchomenus, on Lake Copais, and the Cadmeans at Thebes. Both these cities, together with their dependencies, were reduced to submission, and all the towns of the region were united in a loose confederacy henceforth called Bæotia, from the name of the conquerors. Once established at Thebes, it is said that the victors attempted to extend their domain to Athens, but the Ionians, who dwelt in Attica, under the princes of the house of Theseus, checked the invaders in the passes of Cithæron. Save at a few crises, down to the end of Greek history Bæotia and Attica, Thebes and Athens remained sworn foes.

The Dorians were the second nation which had to flee from Thessaly. They appear to have followed the Bæotians as far as the head-waters of the Cephissus. There the way closed before them. There were no more accommodations in Central Greece. The Dorians must go farther. Stories of the wealth of Argos, the fair lands of Elis, Messenia, and Laconia, whetted their appetite for conquest.

Two roads led from Central to Southern Greece. Mountain walls and desperate Ionians were insuperable obstacles in the eastern route, by way of the Isthmus of Corinth. The Dorians chose the shorter path. Admitting the Ætolians as partners in their enterprise, they built a fleet at Naupactus, and thence, piloted (the legend said) by the Ætolian Oxylus, they crossed the Gulf of Corinth, here about two miles broad, and set foot in the Peloponnesus.

According to the ancient accounts, which glorified the deeds of the Dorians, the invasion and occupation of the land was accomplished within the span of one human life. But it is probable that the process was gradual, and that the *Ætolians* were the first to profit by it. Representatives of the latter tribe, certainly, settled in the first desirable land which the invasion reached, the valley of Elis. The soil was divided into great estates, owned by noble families, and cultivated by serfs and slaves. They built no cities, but within their district at Olympia grew up the sanctuary of Zeus, which under their direction became a center of the Hellenic race.

Although the Dorians were forestalled in the valleys of the Peneus and Alpheus, their own promised land was not far away; the valleys of Messenia and Laconia were their easy prey. From Stenyclarus they overran the former, and at Sparta they established an army of occupation which held the valley of Eurotas against all comers for six hundred years. More difficult and tedious was the subjection of Argolis, where the descendants of Agamemnon still held sway. But the Dorians ultimately prevailed, taking Argos, Mycenæ, Tiryns, and extending their power northward over Sicyon and Corinth, and over sea to *Ægina*, until the entire south and east coasts of the Peloponnesus were in Doric hands. It is said that a fruitless attempt was made upon Attica, and Megara was established on the Isthmus as a Dorian outpost against the stubborn Ionian state.

The events of the conquest whose probable features have been thus briefly outlined took place before the earliest written records of Grecian history. The materials of this sketch are therefore chiefly traditional, but modern scholarship accepts them as generally true. In the legends this great migration is called the "Return of the *Heraclidæ*." Stripped of its most miraculous incidents, the current version among the Greeks was as follows:

The hero Heracles, the lawful heir to the throne of Argos,

was debarred from his rights by the family of Agamemnon. But his son Hyllus re-asserted the claim and attempted to carry it by force. He was adopted by the King of the Dorians, then dwelling in Central Greece, and his family, the Heraclidæ (descendants of Heracles), succeeded to the Dorian crown. Their attempted land invasion was thrust back from the Isthmus by a coalition of Peloponnesians. But two generations later the Dorians, guided by Oxylyus the Ætolian and led by Temenus, Aristodemus, and Cresphontes, grandsons of Hyllus the Heraclid, crossed from Naupactus and commenced a career of speedy conquest. Oxylyus claimed Elis for himself, leading the invaders past its rich fields by night, lest they should see and seize his portion. The three royal brothers cast lots for the three remaining plains. Cresphontes won Messenia, Aristodemus chose Lacedæmon (Laconia), and from his twin sons descended the two royal families of Sparta. Argolis fell to Temenus, who died before his conquest was complete. His posterity, however, were kings of Argos. Thus the sons of Heracles came to their own again.

The truth of the legend is that Dorian people did oust the Achæans from the most eligible portions of the Peloponnesus. The untruth is that the immense undertaking was accomplished in one life-time or two. The doubtful part is whether the Dorians were led by men of their own race or by Achæans of the old Argive dynasty (Heraclids). The latter case is possible, but it has been considered more probable that they imputed Achæan descent to their leaders in order to facilitate their conquest, and to claim the Achæan kingdoms as if by divine right.

The invaders were not content to share the land with the old inhabitants. Wherever possible, as in Elis, the Achæans were made a subject class, excluded from all political rights, and curtailed in their freedom. Many noble families escaped this disgrace by flight. Attica was the commonest place of

refuge. Thither among others went the royal family of Pylus, the descendants of Neleus and Nestor. Tisamenus, grandson of Agamemnon, led the most spirited remnant of the Argives to the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, where they expelled the Ionian inhabitants and founded the twelve confederated settlements known in history as Achæa. Other Achæans doubtless took refuge in Arcadia, which remained unsubdued. There was little booty to tempt the Dorian hordes among the Arcadian mountains, and the mountaineers were left alone in their independence.

The "Dorization" of Peloponnesus was now complete. The old civilization represented by Mycenæ and Tiryns gave place to a new people, kindred it may be, but of ruder manners and of a sturdier fiber. The Dorians were not the most brilliant of the Hellenes, but they kept through the ages their strength of character, simplicity of life, and tenacity of purpose. Greek art and Greek literature came to their perfection among the more imaginative though less stable Ionians, but the solidity and firmness of the conservative Dorians, if less attractive to the modern reader, were the very bulwark of the Hellenic nationality, and longest resisted the alien forces which at last crushed out the old Hellenic spirit.

These migratory movements in early Greece not only permanently re-arranged the political boundaries of the peninsula, but they affected the sea-islands and the coast of Asia. When the Thessalians of Dodona crowded into the Peneus valley some of the Æolian tribes which they pressed out sought refuge over sea. When the Bœotians elbowed their way into the narrow quarters of Central Greece the superfluous aborigines took ship for Asia. When the Dorians pressed into the Peloponnesus many Achæans and Ionians had to seek new homes. Where could they go? The main-land to the north was cold and wild and barbarous, they dared not venture there. The western waters were broad and deep,

and when the first girdle of islands was passed there rolled an open sea of which the Phenician mariners told frightful yarns of sirens and harpies and enchantment. To the south was Egypt, still a sealed land to foreigners. But on the east was the lovely Ægean flecked with islands which were so many bits of Hellas, under the same mild sky and within sight of the beloved mountains of the dear old home. Beyond the islands was the pleasant shore of Asia, diversified by bays and capes and river-mouth plains like those of Hellas. Behind the fertile lowlands of the shore rose the interior highlands, the seat of civilized states—Lydian, Hittite, Assyrian—and on the shore itself were trading colonies of the Phenicians, and cities of Teucrians, Phrygians, Carians, Lycians—nations not wholly unlike the Hellenes themselves, and with which, if tradition may be credited, the early Greeks had dealt in war and peace.

Since, then, they must emigrate, the first great movement of the surplus population was toward the east; and when it ceased the Ægean islands and coasts from the Bosphorus to the island of Cyprus were studded with Grecian colonies, and the Phenicians had lost forever the sovereignty of the Eastern Levant.

The settlements upon the Asiatic coast fall into three groups, named from the nationality of the colonists—Æolian, Ionian, and Dorian. The Æolians were, as their name (“variegated”) implies, a conglomeration of peoples, the overflow of Thessaly, Bœotia, Locris, and Peloponnesus. They looked back to Aulis in Bœotia as their port of embarkation, and as they voyaged eastward they took possession of the great island of Lesbos, where they founded Mitylene, destined to become the second city of the Asiatic coast. On the mainland their chief towns were Cyme and Smyrna until the Ionians wrested the latter city from them. The new Æolis included some thirty settlements on the coast and islands between the Hellespont and the Bay of Smyrna.

Ionic Attica had withstood the assaults of the Bœotians and Dorians in the first flush of their victory, and so became the natural haven of rest for the shattered tribes of Central and Southern Greece. The Ionians of Peloponnesus sought shelter with their kin, and even Achæans seem to have found asylum there. But meager Attica could furnish only temporary lodgings for the refugees, and for the few families which took up their permanent abode at Athens dozens launched out from the Saronic Gulf to win homes in the East. The southern tips of Ionic Eubœa and Attica are the abutments of the island bridge formed by the Cyclades. On these islands, then held by Carians, Thracians, and other non-Hellenic tribes, the exiled Ionians built their towns. The wine-island of Naxos was the richest of their many settlements in the Cyclades, but the most famous of all was the sterile rock Delos, the mythical birthplace of Apollo and the sanctuary and market-place of all the surrounding island commonwealths.

It was an easy step for the Ionians from the Cyclades to the Sporades, and from Samos, the greatest of the latter group, to the main-land of Asia. The ten Ionian colonies of the shore, together with Samos and its northern neighbor Chios, early formed a "Dodecapolis," or twelve-city league, and all the coast strip from Æolis to the Carian peninsula of Halicarnassus was called Ionia. Here the new settlers clung to their old language and early gods, but did not escape the influences about them. They intermarried with the native women, adopted the flowing robes of the Asiatics, and gradually exchanged their native simplicity for the luxury and effeminacy of the East. But this degeneracy crept over them slowly. The first effect of contact with the East was stimulating. With fresh and plastic minds they came upon the ideas which ages of civilization had developed in the East, and their intellectual power worked up the material thus acquired into new and amazing forms.

In the Ionian towns Greek art, philosophy, poetry, and history first approached perfection, and these emigrant Greeks ultimately took the place of the Phenicians as commercial pioneers.

Miletus, an Athenian colony on the bay which receives the waters of the Mæander, was the emporium of the coast, herself the mother of some eighty colonies in the Ægean and Euxine. Farther north, at the mouth of the Caÿster, was the splendid city of Ephesus, whose many-bosomed nature-goddess the Ionians identified as their own Artemis (Diana). Smyrna, prosperous then as now, was the port of wealthy Lydia, and Phocæa, a few miles farther north, was, like Miletus, the mother of many daughter-cities. The religious center of the Dodecapolis was the Panionium (place of all Ionians), on the promontory of Mycale opposite Samos. Here the people worshiped Posidon (Neptune) and celebrated games in his honor. The bond between them was slight, however, and local jealousies operated as in main-land Greece to prevent firm concert of action in politics or war.

The Dorians were not content with their acquisitions in the Peloponnesus while their kinsmen were founding a new and splendid Æolis and Ionia. Migration was the spirit of the age. Dorian bands left Argolis and Laconia and planted colonies from Crete to Lycia and Cyprus.

Tradition preserved the remembrance of a prehistoric time when Crete was the center of an island empire. Minos, its Zeus-descended hero-king, introduced law and civilization. It seems probable that Crete was a prehistoric commercial center, the meeting-place of Phenicians, Phrygians, and the problematical people who made Mycenæ great. The conquering Dorians swarmed down upon this mixed population and subjected it to their oppressive yoke. A new Crete arose in which the older races tilled the soil as serfs of the Dorian masters, under a discipline not unlike the Spartan.

The trend of the southern islands fixed the course of the

Dorian migration. The young nation moved on from fertile Melos to volcanic Thera, and so on to Cos, Rhodes, and the peninsulas of Caria. The Phenicians and Carians were thrust out of some of their strongholds, but in others the new and old dwelt together. As the twelve Ionian settlements worshiped Posidon at Mycale, so the Dorian cities, Cos, Cnidus, Halicarnassus, with three in Rhodes, formed a "Hexapolis" (six-city league) whose common religious and political center was on the Triopian promontory, in the temple of Apollo.

In addition to the three well-defined colonial groups of Æolis, Ionia, and Doris there was still a long stretch of coast running eastward from the Dorian settlements to the eastern angle of the Mediterranean. But the character of the shore was forbidding, and the inland country lacked the wealth which marked the river valleys of the Ægean border. Greek settlements were consequently rare. The great island of Cyprus now attracted the Grecian as it had long before attracted the people of Tyre and Sidon. As early as the eighth century before Christ the Greek cities in Cyprus were as prosperous and powerful as the older Phenician colonies.

Thus from myth and legend, as well as from the evidence of old laws, customs, and inscriptions, we have traced the progress of those early popular movements which were the making of Hellas. Beginning in the north, the wave of population swept southward over the peninsula, and thence by numerous eastward outlets it overflowed the Ægean islands and coasts. We cannot fix the date of its beginning or of its end, but we know that when after many years Greece emerged into the light of truthful history the commotion was at an end and the Greek lands were in the firm possession of Hellenes. With these great movements migration came to an end. Whole tribes no longer were driven into distant lands by force or inward impulse; but colonization did not cease. It sprang up afresh in historic times and covered the Mediterranean shores with thriving Hellenic towns.

CHAPTER V.

THE HELLENES.

THE student, who has seen the Dorians chasing the Æolians and Ionians from the homes of their forefathers, and who notices that jealousies and even hostility embitter the relations of the settlements of the three Greek tribes in Asia, may well inquire in what sense the Greeks were a "nation," and what it was to be a Hellene. For, however they might be divided among themselves, these kingdoms and tribes and cities did recognize a certain bond of unity which distinguished them from all the world beside.

Strictly speaking, Hellas was Greece proper, the mainland of the peninsula where the first Hellenes were found. But it was not birth or residence upon the old sod that Hellenized a man. The Greeks of the islands, of Ionia, of Cyrene in Africa, and of Massilia in Spain, were as truly Hellenes as those who drank the black broth of Sparta or voted in the Athenian assembly. Nor could any length of absence from Hellas denationalize a Greek. It was immaterial where the Hellene dwelt.

Nor were the Hellenes generally marked off from other people by peculiarities of government. It is true that their city-commonwealth was an innovation, and that the Ionian democracies were a political experiment hitherto untried; but, whatever might be the political characteristics of individual tribes or states, there was no single form of government which distinguished the race. In different parts of the Hellenic world there existed contemporaneously monarchies, oligarchies, tyrannies, and democracies. Moreover, there was at no time of which any record has survived any

catholic Hellenic empire or republic which assembled all the Greek countries in one political body, as the severed members of the British Empire are subject to a single central power.

Tribal distinctions cut deeply into the Hellenic heart. Especially strong and divergent were the traits which marked a man as Dorian or Ionian. The Dorian of Sparta differed from his kinsman of Ionic Attica in countless ways—in accent and garb, in armor and weapons and order of battle, in the coins he used, and the weights with which he traded, in his social and political relations, in the details of his architecture and art and literature. The Dorian conservatism which has been mentioned was in strange contrast with the Ionian lightness and eagerness for change. The former clung to the old forms of government, society, religion, and thought; the latter, ever ready to tell or to hear some new thing, were impressionable, imaginative, fanciful, quick of wit, sharp of eye, and deft of hand. But with all their differences the man of Athens was no truer Hellene than the Spartan.

Community of blood, of language, and of religion formed the triple bond of the Hellenes. To adopt their own fanciful claim, all the tribes were offshoots of an ancestral hero, Hellen; or, in more modern terms, the several sections had lived together as one nation at some remote period before different surroundings and diverse conditions had pressed each into its individual groove. The right of entry in the quadrennial games of the nation, which were celebrated in honor of the chief god, Zeus, at his shrine of Olympia in Elis, was restricted to such as could establish their Hellenic descent, and when the Greek civilization had proved its superiority powerful kings of foreign countries thought it high honor to be accepted as qualified competitors.

One language and one religion further united these men of a common ancestry. The Greek language was the most

perfect vehicle of human thought which has ever been invented. The precision of its terms, the richness of its vocabulary, and the variety and delicacy of expression which its exquisite organism rendered possible have not been equaled. It was peculiarly adapted to record and convey the speculations and conclusions reached by the Greek philosophers. The spoken language was, like all spoken tongues, subject to variations. The people of Eubœa, the Cyclades, and the Ionian Dodecapolis pronounced their vowels, especially their long *a*, more crisply than the Dorians. The latter used the broad *a*, and spoke with an accent which jarred upon the sensitive ears of the Ionians. The Athenians or Attic Greeks used a dialect which was midway between these leading types and was so fitted to become the literary language. Athens, as the literary center of Hellas, fixed the standard of written language, and nearly all the masterpieces of prose and poetry are in the Attic dialect.

The superficial variations of spelling and pronunciation did not affect the unity of the Greek language. Athenian, Spartan, Æolian, and Rhodian could converse with ease. They employed the same alphabet and almost the same lexicon and grammar, and it was only in the use of certain sounds that the peculiarities cropped out. Homer was composed in Ionic Greek, probably in the coast cities of Asia, but Shakespeare is not more intelligible to every man of English blood than were the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to every son of Hellen. Those grand poems were history, poetry, and theology to the Greeks, and their possession from early times was a strong strand in the cord of feeling which made one people of these scattered members. Hesiod was a somewhat later and less ambitious poet of Bœotia whose *Theogony* and *Works and Days* were held in high esteem throughout the Greek lands. Moreover, in the classical times the dramas which the tragic and comic poets produced

in the Athenian theater were repeated the Greek world over, and the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, Xenophon's novels and essays, and Plato's dialogues were the common property of the race.

The oracles, games, and stage-plays, which contributed so largely to the unity of Hellas, were themselves the outgrowth of the religious system which embraced the Greek world, and penetrated to every department of its life and literature. We can have no certain knowledge of the primitive religion of the Greeks, but we may infer that as Aryans they worshiped the heaven-god of their race. His altars were on high-places, and lightnings were his symbol. Other powers and objects of nature were probably deified, as light and fire and water. It is not unlikely that curiously shaped stones and meteorites were holy in their simple eyes. As the rude people learned milder ways they began to conceive of their gods in the likeness of men. Eastern models may have suggested this conception, for very ancient gold-leaf images of the Phenician Astarte or Aphrodite were found in the third grave at Mycenæ, and ludicrous female figures in terracotta in the first grave, and at the neighboring Tiryns. Having once grasped the idea that the gods were beings of like nature with themselves, the Greeks made it their own and carried it to its fullest extent. They viewed their gods as men and women capable of birth, love, hate, envy, though not of decay or death. The earlier poets, especially the author of the Homeric poems and Hesiod, brought a degree of order into the traditions of the gods, and thus became the fathers of mythology.

The imaginative Greeks saw a divinity in every thing. Not only the operations and objects of nature, but abstract ideas like love and death, were personified and worshiped, and as the Greeks brought the human form to its perfection of physical culture they imputed the same qualities to the gods, and represented them in painting and sculpture as

ideal men and women. The Minotaur, or bull-headed man, is killed by the Hellenic hero Theseus. The centaurs, or horse-bodied men, are slain by the Hellenic hero Heracles. Io, the cow-headed woman of Argos, is driven out of Hellas by the fair goddess Hera. There was no place among the great gods of Greece for the monstrous idols of Egypt, Phenicia, and the East; whatever the Hellenes borrowed from these nations they raised to their own standard of human beauty.

Among their scores of divinities the Greeks recognized twelve great gods, sometimes styled the Olympian divinities, because they dwelt, so said the poets and theologians, on the cloudy summits of Mount Olympus, in Thessaly. Above them, as god the father and king, was Zeus, the Jupiter (Zeus-pater) of the Romans. In him we discern the old heaven-god of the Aryans. He was god of the bright sky, of clouds, of thunder, and of rain. The eagle was his bolt-bearer. The statues and coins represent him as a bearded man whose forehead is furrowed by experience. The poets said that he was the son of Cronus (Time), and had overthrown his father and his allies, the Titans. The universe was then parted between Zeus, king of heaven, Posidon (Neptune), king of the seas, and Hades, lord of the lower world. Earth and Olympus were common property, but the authority of Zeus was pre-eminent over all gods and men. Many places were sacred to him. In the oak woods of Dodona, the early home of the Hellenes, was a temple and an oracle of great antiquity. On Mount Lycæus, in Arcadia, in early times, human sacrifices were offered to him. Mount Ida, in the Troad, was one of his favorite haunts. His temples were every-where, but his chief sanctuary was at Olympia, in Elis. Here all Hellas celebrated its own unity and his sovereignty by a quadrennial competition in feats of bodily strength and skill.

Of the other gods of Olympus, Hera (Juno), Posidon,

Hades, Hestia, and Demeter were brothers or sisters of the lord Zeus. It is characteristic of the lack of morals in the Greek myths that Hera (Juno) was at once his sister and wife. Thus she was his feminine counterpart, and like him controlled the rain-clouds. Iris, the rainbow, and the Horæ, or Seasons, were her messengers. Women owed their strength and bloom to her favor, and she helped them through their hardest trials. As her husband was the ward of oaths, so she guarded marriage vows, and many were the angry scenes in Olympus to which her husband's wayward loves gave rise. Her statues which have come down to us show a woman of exalted beauty, but devoid of passion or emotion. The splendid peacock was her sacred bird. The Argives were her favorite people; she championed them in the Trojan war, and the Heræum, between Argos and Mycenæ, was her noblest temple. At the festival of the Heræa her priestess was brought from Argos to the sanctuary in a car drawn by two white oxen. Maidens raced in her honor at Olympia.

Posidon (Neptune), lord of the sea and brother of the Olympian pair, is represented as a sinewy man of mature years bearing a three-toothed spear, or trident, and riding the waves in a car drawn by horses and surrounded by marine monsters. To the Greeks the sea seemed to penetrate the land and bear it on its bosom, hence the god was called "earth-holder" and "earth-shaker." It was his trident which cleft the quaking mountains, and his temples abounded in the region of earthquakes. He was the especial divinity of the Ionians, the coast-dwellers, who held their all-Ionian (Panionia) festival at his temple on Mount Mycale. Other feasts and shrines of the water-god were at Corinth, where the Isthmian games were celebrated, at Calauria, whose temple was the asylum where Demosthenes sought refuge. His statues graced many a harbor mouth, and his white temples gladdened the sailor's eye from many a headland. The horse, the dolphin,

and the naval pine were sacred to him, and bulls were slaughtered on his altars.

By the goddess Leto, his earlier wife or later mistress, Zeus had twin children, a son and a daughter, both of whom were Olympians. The god was Apollo; the goddess, Artemis (Diana). The former, with Athena (Minerva), stood for all the best traits in the Hellenic character, and with his worship were linked the progress and civilization of Hellas. Originally the god of light, Apollo personified all purifying and expiating qualities. He was the spokesman of Zeus, and through his oracles the will of the gods was made known to man. He was the patron of inspiring music, and the lyre was sacred to him. In sculpture he was a lithe but vigorous youth of radiant, manly beauty. Delos was his reputed birthplace and a favorite sanctuary where the quinquennial Delian games were given in his name. He had a famous shrine in Asia, at Patara, but by far the most famous of his scores of holy places was Delphi, on Mount Parnassus. It was a gloomy terrace high among the crags, but springs and waterfalls marked it as a favored spot. From a crevice in the rocks issued a current of intoxicating gases. Whoever breathed these was inspired by the god. The temple prophetess, called the Pythia, sat on a tripod above the sacred cleft until she lost consciousness in holy ecstasy. The priest who stood by noted the words which she let fall and gave them out as the god's response to the suppliant. The sagacious priests gave prudent answers, and when they could not prophesy the exact truth they clothed the message in such ambiguous words that the credit of the oracle was safe, whatever the outcome. The reputation thus gained was of immense advantage to Delphi. A succession of temples, each more splendid than its predecessor, rose upon the hallowed ground. At first the adviser of the Dorians, the Delphic Apollo became the favorite counselor of all the Greeks. Even barbarian kings in Asia heard of his fame and hazarded

their thrones upon his answers to their questions. Grateful suitors adorned the temple with statues, and states which had resisted barbarian attacks dedicated groups of bronze and marble to the saviour of the Hellenes at Delphi. From gifts and tithes the priests acquired an enormous treasure, which in time became a fatal snare. The government of the temple, the protection of its rights, the preservation of its ritual, and the celebration of the Pythian games were in charge of twelve allied tribes, seven from Thessaly and the Malians, Phocians, Locrians, Dorians (especially of Sparta), and Ionians (of Attica). This league was called an *Amphictyony*, and had two holy places, Delphi and the temple of Demeter, near Thermopylæ.

Delphi was the religious capital of Hellas. Its priests prescribed the forms of worship and punished blasphemy and impiety; they fixed the holy days and the calendar, and their influence was felt in the relations of the Greek states and their foreign policy. Until after the Persian war the Delphians had been so continuously on the side of wisdom, of prudence, and of right that they held the popular confidence. But when it was known that a bribe would influence the tenor of the oracle its fame fast fell away.

By the side of Apollo, the personification of the enlightened moral enthusiasms of the Hellenic nature, stood Athena, the goddess of the Hellenic mind. The myth declared that she was not born of woman, but sprang full-armed from the head of Zeus. She was her father's favorite child, and was ranked with him and Apollo as one of the three chief Olympians. In her statues she stands armed for battle, for Hellenism waged perpetual war with barbarism. But she was in the main protectress of the arts of peace. She gave to Athens, the city of her name, the olive-tree, the best production of the soil of Attica. She helped men to tame the horse and to build the first sea-going vessels. The plow and yoke, as well as the distaff, were her inventions. The Athenians, quick-

witted and clever beyond any of their time, were her proper care. She was worshiped from very early times on their Acropolis, and after the city had pushed to the front of Hellas it honored its guardian goddess by erecting there the Parthenon, the temple of Athena Parthenos, "the virgin Athena." In the festival of the Panathenæa the people of Attica periodically thanked the goddess for her favor. The olive and the owl are her most frequent symbols in art.

The remaining Olympian deities were of less significance and less characteristic of the Greeks. Apollo's twin sister, Artemis (Diana), shared many of his splendid qualities, and was frequently joined with him in worship. She carried bow and arrows, and was the patron of the chase. He was the blazing sun, she the pure and gentle moon. When the Ionian emigrants reached Ephesus they found already established there the worship of a nature goddess, who was also the goddess of the moon. They adopted her and called her by the name of their own maiden moon-god, though the Asiatics viewed their divinity as mother of all things. To her was built the gorgeous temple of Diana of the Ephesians, one of the wonders of the ancient world.

The smiling goddess of love and feminine beauty, Aphrodite (Venus), had, as we have seen, come from Phenicia to Greece. But with the Hellenes she sometimes, not always, stood for something higher than the Syrian goddess of sensual lust. Her statues are the perfection of soft and delicate beauty, and the gentle dove, the blushing rose, and the graceful myrtle are well chosen for her symbols. Most of her temples were where Phenician influence would be strongest felt—in Cyprus, at Cnidus in Doris, on Cythera, and at Corinth, where she was worshiped with disgusting rites.

It was disputed whether the goddess of love sprang from the sea-foam or was a child of Zeus ; but the war-god, Ares (Mars), was the undoubted son of the king and queen of heaven. His father's energy and his mother's violent tem-

per were his inheritance. Athena was a war goddess also, but hers was the prowess that wins by generalship. Ares was the bloodthirsty, hand-to-hand fighter. In art he is pictured as a young man of fine physique, bearing a spear and the torch of war. Strangely enough, he was loved by Aphrodite, and Eros (Cupid) was the son of this ill-assorted pair. Such a divinity could not be popular, and Ares found few to do him reverence.

Hephæstus (Vulcan), the god of fire, was a full brother to the fiery Ares. Smiths made offerings to him as the god of workers in metals, and he was especially honored at Athens for his co-operation with Athena in the mechanical arts. In general, volcanic fires were considered his forges, and Lemnos, Ætna, and one of the volcanic islands of Lipari were mentioned in the list of his work-shops. Lamé and ugly, and clad in the cap and tunic of an artisan, Hephæstus cuts a somewhat comic figure in art, but he was ever a popular deity with the hard-working handicraftsmen.

What Hephæstus was to the artisan, the shrewd Hermes (Mercury) was to the shop-keeper. This light-footed god, the swift messenger of Zeus, was also light of finger; thieves worshiped him. His agility commended him to youths, and the gymnasia and exercising-grounds were under his care. He carried a wand, and led the souls of the dead to their abode in the under-world. As a patron of ways and wayfarers all roads were his province, and in the public places of the city and at country cross-roads stood squared posts called Hermæ, bearing his sculptured head.

Demeter (Ceres), sister of Zeus, was the goddess of fertility in man and beast, and above all of the fruitful earth. She was worshiped far and wide by husbandmen. With her daughter Persephone, queen of the nether world, and with Dionysus, she was worshiped with solemn rites at Eleusis in Attica. Her shrine near Thermopylæ divided with Delphi the care of the Amphictyonic League.

The twelfth and last of the Olympians was Hestia (Vesta), patroness of hearth and home. She represented a fixed abode, and never left the divine hearthstone at Olympus. Her name was spoken in every prayer, and her fire burned continually in the central altar of the city whence colonists took live coals with which to kindle new civic altars in foreign lands.

Beside these greater gods were scores of others, some of whom were even more popular than many of the twelve. Thus Dionysus, or Bacchus, the patron of the vine, was worshiped with especial honors in all the wine-lands. He, too, was son of Zeus, and the poets loved to weave stories of his human wanderings and victories, for he had once lived as a mortal man before his godhead was established. From the choruses sung in his honor at the vintage festivals sprang the Greek drama, both tragedy and comedy, and these were in their best estate ornaments of the Dionysiac festivals at Athens.

Then there were the Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux), the Twin Brethren, who watched over warlike youth and guided sailors into port. There was Eros, god of love, and Eris, goddess of discord, and ancient Rhea, or Cybele, the wife of Cronus, mother of Zeus himself, and others of local fame.

Besides these and more of their sort were numerous minor divinities. Every grove, mead, cave, river, hill, and spring had its own nymph. The Naiads of the land-waters were akin to the Oceanids and Nereids of the sea. Among the hills dwelt gentle Oreads, and even trees had their familiar Dryads. Refreshing fountains like those of Parnassus and Helicon were sacred to the nine Muses, the goddesses of as many branches of science, poetry, and art. The three Charites, or Graces; the three Mœræ, or Fates; the Erinnyes, or Furies; the Satyrs, or goat-men of the wine-god's train—such forms as these went to make up the supernatural population of the Greek lands. For the Greek was intensely

religious. By prayer and frequent sacrifice he sought to win the favor of the gods, and by signs and omens as well as by oracles he sought to know their will. He inherited from his fathers an ancient ritual, more complex than the law of Moses, which prescribed offerings, purifications, libations in great variety and number. The father was priest of his own household, and made the sacrifices for his own family. But each temple had its especial and hereditary priesthood who conducted the religion of the state. Greek piety consisted less in morals than in strict observance of the ceremonial law.

Certain institutions connected with this common religion brought out more clearly the unity of the Greeks. The Oracles, particularly that of Apollo at Delphi, were centers of the Hellenic spirit, and in the periodical games, especially those of Zeus at Olympia, Greeks—and Greeks only—met in friendly rivalry.

It is not asserted that the celebration of athletic games in honor of a god was peculiar to the Greeks. Indeed, there are traces of such festivals in more than one Eastern nation, but in this case, as in so many others, it was Greek genius which brought them to perfection. Nor were the Olympian games alone worthy of note. Wherever a Greek state or alliance would pay extraordinary honors to the memory of a god such sports were instituted. Four of these Greek festivals attained national importance: first the Olympian, and after it the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean.

In Elis, near the city of Pisa, the river Alpheus runs through a sandy plain, where stood in very ancient times a temple of Olympian Zeus. After the Dorian migration the local festival of Zeus was opened to the Spartans and a truce (*ekecheiria*, or “stay-of-hands”) was proclaimed, during which visitors to the tourney had safe conduct through the warring states of Hellas. In time the contests were made free to all true Greeks. They were held in midsummer at

intervals of forty-eight months. The chronologers reckoned time by them, and the first accepted date of Grecian history is Olympiad I. 1 (776 B. C.) when Coræbus won the foot-race, which was the *stadium*, a dash of 210 yards. Gradually other events were added: the double dash of 420 yards; the long run of uncertain length; the *pentathlon* (fivefold event), an all-around competition in running, jumping, hurling the spear, putting the *discus*, or quoit, and wrestling; boxing was the sensation of 688 B. C. Eight years later came the four-in-hand chariot race, or *hippodrome*. After this came equestrian feats, and other novelties. The contestants were free-born male Greeks; the judges and marshals were from Elis. A palm branch was given to each winner, and on the last day of the feast a crown of wild olive from the sacred tree of Heracles was placed upon his head. That was the simple prize of victory, but it was highest honor to be proclaimed the four-years' champion of Hellas. In his native city the returning victor was greeted like a conquering king. The greatest lyric poets, like Pindar and Simonides, sang odes in his honor, and not infrequently his tribe or city placed his statue on the scene of his triumph. The proud Athenians pensioned their successful champions for life. Thus veneration for the sovereign god, and the deeply implanted spirit of emulation, combined to make Olympia popular, and when antiquity and fame brought wealth and crowds the old sanctuary became a cluster of noble temples, surrounded by a forest of statues, and the festivals attracted all the world to see. And thither, where the best of Greece was gathered, the poet came with his inspired verses, the musician brought his lyre, the philosopher taught his novel doctrines, and the historian found a ready audience for his story of the past. For more than a thousand years (776 B. C. to 394 A. D.) the Olympian games remained the visible symbol of that Hellas which might be conquered and enslaved, but could not perish.

In the third year of each Olympiad (the interval between two successive Olympian festivals) the Pythian games took place on the plain of Crissa at the foot of the spur of Parnassus, on which Apollo's temple of Delphi was perched. Music was the province of this god, and singers and players on lyre and flute here strove for the prize, a wreath of sacred laurel. There were athletic contests here also, but of less note. The Amphictyonic Council, which controlled the sanctuary, supervised the games. In a pine grove not far from Corinth the Isthmian games were held each alternate spring. Some said they commemorated the death of the hero Melicertes; others maintained that they belonged to the sea-god Posidon. Athletic games, horse-races, and musical competitions with compositions by poets of both sexes made up the programme. The Corinthians and Athenians were the chief supporters of this festival, though the people of Elis alone were barred. A garland of wild celery was awarded to the victor. Biennial games which were celebrated at Nemea in Argos in honor of Zeus resembled the Isthmian in programme and in prize.

Back of their community of blood, of language, and of religion there was a still more abiding, if less easily defined, sense of Greek unity. To be a son of Hellen was something more than to venerate the lord of Delphi and to battle for the corruptible crown of Olympia before a cloud of witnesses. These were but incidents; the real Hellenism is to be found in the mental make-up of the Greek, the sum of the things which he loved and the things which he hated. It is possible to reduce this multiplex character to its lowest terms in three ruling traits: a love of independence, a fondness for truth (or reality), and a passion for beauty.

This independence of the Greeks seems to have been born of their own mountain land, which fostered the growth of valley communities, city-states, and local self-government. Their history shows how this divisive trait cursed their poli-

tics with separatism and frustrated every great-souled aspiration toward a visible union of the race which was already one in spirit. But the trait went deeper than mere politics, and tinged their every act with originality. The old claim that the Greeks invented all things good and great is no longer tenable. The contents of the older mounds of Assyria and Egypt have proved to us that the Greeks were the greatest of borrowers. But what they took they made their own. If the Egyptians taught them painting and sculpture and architecture, as is reasonably asserted, they soon surpassed their teachers and produced paintings and statues and buildings which show scarcely a vestige of foreign influence. The freedom of the Greek genius was never fettered by the foreign ideas which it acquired. From the bare results of thousands of years of thought and observation in the far East the Greek scholars founded philosophy and science as known to moderns. At the touch of Herodotus and Thucydides dead chronological tables and lists of kings became history. So it was with poetry, with the drama, with the festivals. The Greek genius gave an original and independent turn to every idea which came in its way.

This Greek independence was in essence a devotion to truth and beauty. "Know thyself" and "Observe measure in all things" are two of the golden texts which admonished the worshiper at Delphi; and the Greeks were doers of the word and not hearers only. In their self-governing cities and cantons human nature was made a study. The political body was so small that no man could shirk his duty. Each was a part of the state, legislating for it directly (for the Greeks never reached the modern idea of representative government with delegated assemblies), girding a sword for its wars, and struggling for its honor at Olympia. Every man was thrown upon his mettle to search out and live up to the best that was in him. Hence arose the famous culture of Greece, the training which made the most of every human

faculty of body as of mind. This search for truth was the basis of Greek philosophy and science. It opened the eye and ear to the truths of nature and mind and soul, and sharpened the finer perceptions of a Socrates, a Plato, and an Aristotle in the quest of the deeper verities of man and God.

Beauty of form marked every Greek creation. Whether it was the form of his native mountains seen through the lucid air, or the hue of flower and sky and sea and island, ever present to his eye, something empowered the Greek artist to color and carve forms of ideal grace. Compared in size or in profusion of ornament with mediæval and modern cathedrals the most famous temples of Greece are insignificant. Yet

Earth proudly wears the Parthenon
As the best gem upon her zone,

so perfect are its proportions. This sense of proportion, measure, fitness, is a constant quality of Greek art, and dominates not only architecture and sculpture but the literary form of poetry and prose. Nor was this appreciation of form confined to an enlightened few. The male populace of Greece, even to the slaves, were admitted to witness the national games, and citizens of every degree worshiped in the same temple and witnessed the same drama.

It will be interesting to the student as he pursues the history of the Greeks through its periods of development to its culmination in the age of Pericles, and thence to its term of decay, to see for himself how these three qualities in one form or another continually manifest themselves. He will not discover in every Greek skin a lover of freedom, truth, and beauty, but he will find these the impelling forces of the nation as it surges on in one track or another, now in statesmanship, next in letters, and again in art. Nor did the Greek states keep perfect alignment. Together they led the march of civilization, but first one country and then another carried the flag as opportunity or circumstances or

the presence of a master-mind determined. This inequality of pace increases the difficulty of comprehending the history of Greece, for we cannot, as in England and France, follow the progress of a centralized state, but must fix our attention now on Argos, now on Sparta, now on Athens, and now on Thebes, as one or another happens for the moment to be in the van.

CHAPTER VI.

SPARTA OF THE DORIANS.

THE military state which grew out of the Dorian settlements in the valley of Lacedæmon ultimately acquired the supremacy of two thirds of the Peloponnesus, but it was not the earliest of the Dorian states to achieve greatness. Whether as the inheritor of the Achæan supremacy, or because of greater numbers and a more favorable position for trade, it is certain that Argos, the so-called "lot of Temenus," was for many generations the ruling city. Lists of early Argive kings have come down to us, but they merely throw a flimsy bridge of unmeaning names across the chasm which separates the Dorian migration from the first trustworthy annals. The gap is perhaps three hundred years wide, from the eleventh to the eighth centuries before Christ. During this time Argos was ruled by monarchs whose authority was probably limited by an ambitious council of nobles or chiefs, whose aim was to make themselves masters of the state. They had nearly succeeded when the tenth, King Phidon, re-asserted the dignity of the crown. His is the one great name among the Dorian kings of Argos, and many innovations are imputed to him. He is said to have introduced coined money and a new standard of weights and measures; he invaded Elis, and for one Olympiad supplanted the Eleans in the conduct of the games. After his death discord returned. The rise of Corinth, Sicyon, and Athens by degrees robbed Argos of its trading supremacy, and Sparta, its dangerous southern neighbor, continually encroached upon its soil.

Little is known of the internal condition of the people of

Argos, or indeed of any Peloponnesian state save one. The Dorians predominated, but a remnant of the former race (whom for convenience we are calling Achæans) dwelt alongside. There seems to have been a class of inhabitants free, but not full citizens, and there were slaves, as nearly everywhere in Greece. The one Peloponnesian country which had no slaves was Arcadia, but the materials for writing its history are very slight. It was never a closely organized state. In its western valleys tribes of peasant freemen lived under their kings. In the east cities took the place of rural tribes. The Arcadians were warlike and well seasoned, and having no government to fight for frequently served abroad as mercenaries.

Achæa, on the Gulf of Corinth, was at one side of the course of Hellenic war and politics, and acted but a minor part. Its city-states were said to have been founded by exiles driven from the lower part of the peninsula by the Dorians. It followed its own course, and its people were prosperous husbandmen and shepherds untroubled by the strife which went on almost within sight of their doors.

The Eleans, who were the Ætolian fellow-immigrants with the Dorians, soon changed their original monarchy for an aristocracy, the government being in the hands of a few noble families of landed proprietors. The early history of Elis is filled with the struggle of the Pisatans to regain control of their Zeus festival at Olympia, but the Eleans made strong alliances with the Spartans and overbore their enemies. To the same influential ally the games owed their support in their period of weakness, and to the games themselves, with their crowds of visitors, Elis owed the chief part of its prosperity and peace.

Of the three sons of the legendary leader of the Dorian migration, the fair corn-land of Messenia fell to Cresphontes. It appears that he did not perfect the Dorian conquest, but shared the territory equally between his own people and the

former folk. Save for the empty names of kings, Messenian history is almost a blank until conflict with the strong neighbor on the east converted it to a record of national disaster. But before taking up the Messenian wars we must see what manner of state this Sparta had become, which was dismembering Argos, upholding Elis, raiding Arcadia, and annexing the Messenian kingdom.

The Dorian migration established an armed force at Sparta in the valley of the Eurotas on the site of the Achæan kingdom of Menelaus—Helen's misused Menelaus. The Eurotas valley was fertile enough, but it was narrow and girt with enemies. The Dorians were cut off from the sea by the Achæan stronghold of Amyclæ; Argolis hemmed them in on the east, Messenia on the west, and on the north was hostile Arcadia. For three centuries there was little chance for growth, and no historian to record it. We have again the meaningless lists of sovereigns, and we may believe that the government comprised two co-equal kings (an institution not yet satisfactorily accounted for), a council of elders, and the assembly of citizens. The people were warlike enough, but rude and unfit to make headway against the surrounding tribes. Indeed, their own political body was torn by jealousies. The king was striving to maintain his divine right to rule, the nobles were asserting their privileges, and the people distrusted both king and council.

The first and foremost name in Spartan history is that of the statesman who came forward at this crisis and laid the foundations of a political, social, and military order which rapidly made his native state the first power in Hellas. The reformer was Lycurgus.

Legend and tradition have done much for the fame of this lawgiver, and have accredited to him many features of the Spartan constitution which cannot possibly be his. But that Sparta owed its new birth and subsequent career to one organizing spirit is scarcely to be denied. According

to the current belief of Greece, Lycurgus was a Spartan of the royal blood. During the minority of his nephew, the king, he traveled in many lands, studying governmental forms, and planning for the renovation of his native state. The Cretan institutions most impressed him. Having received the indorsement of the Delphic oracle for his undertaking, he appeared in the market-place of Sparta with thirty of the best citizens, all fully armed, and seized the government. The people, satisfied of his fair intentions, empowered him to establish a new constitution. Lycurgus commanded the people to build temples to Zeus and Athena, arrange the people in tribes and thirty clans, establish a senate of thirty, of which the two kings should be members, and from time to time to summon the citizens to an open air assembly; the people were to hear and decide all laws. This is all that we know of the famous "Rhethra" of Lycurgus, and its significance is somewhat obscure. It seems to imply a change in the objects of worship, and a re-adjustment of the several parts of the government. The old dual monarchy was left greatly diminished in authority. The council of chiefs gave way to a senate of limited numbers, and the popular voice was recognized as decisive. In later times the Greeks attributed all the salient features of the Spartan constitution to Lycurgus, but in the absence of any positive proof of their origin with him, and much which is against it, it will be better for us to leave these mooted questions and take up the constitution of Sparta as we find it existing in historical times. The government was made up of kings, senate, or Gerusia, assembly, or Apella, and the board of Ephors. The first three date at least from Lycurgus, the last was a later development.

The existence of two Spartan royal families has puzzled every student of Grecian history, and the problem has yet to be solved. The Spartans believed that Aristodemus, to whom Laconia fell by lot, had twin sons, hence the two collateral

sovereigns. Modern scholars have suggested that the Dorian invaders united with the Achæan inhabitants, the two monarchs thus representing the dynasties of the two nationalities. There is also a theory that an ancient strife between rival claimants to the crown was compromised by crowning both. Whatever the cause of the anomaly, it is certain that throughout its entire history Sparta had two royal families, a fruitful source of jealousy and faction. The kings were priests, who offered certain sacrifices in the name of the state. They had a limited jurisdiction as judges. They were commanders-in-chief of the army. Equal in power and mutually jealous, they tended to bring disasters upon the army, until a law was passed allowing only one to take the field at a time. Later laws so aggrandized the Ephorate that the authority of the king, unless he were a man of extraordinary ability, was reduced to a shadow.

The Gerusia, or Senate of Elders, consisted of thirty men, as many as there were *obæ*, or clans. Spartan citizens were eligible at sixty years of age and served for life. They were chosen by vote of the people, and their chief business was to give counsel to the kings and prepare legislation for the decision of the assembly. Each king had a vote in the Senate.

The Apella, or assembly of Dorian citizens, met once a month or oftener in the open air near the city of Sparta. It filled vacancies in the Gerusia, and voted yea or nay without debate upon all questions handed down to it by the Senate. In later times it chose the annual ephors.

Long after Lycurgus had passed away a new magistracy, the Ephorate, was established, apparently in order to watch over the home interests of the state while both kings were absent with the troops. The ephors, five in number, chosen annually by the people, drew to their office the loose ends of authority which jealous kings and a senile Senate left hanging. They were charged with the execution of the whole body of Spartan rules, those which governed the kings as

well as the people, and their incessant activity and unchecked authority gave ground for the saying that Sparta had two kings and five despots.

The inhabitants of Laconia were divided into three classes—Spartans, Periœci, and Helots. The Spartans, or Spartiatæ (a name derived, perhaps, from a word meaning “sowed”), were the whole body of Dorian citizens. They were the state. The choicest of its soil was cut up into several thousand lots and assigned to as many families. The men of these families constituted the Assembly, and from and by them the ephors and elders were chosen. They were forbidden to till the soil or engage in trade and manufactures. The produce of their serf-tilled farms yielded enough to maintain them in frugal style, and the laws discouraged the possession of personal property and the use of money. Indeed, it is said that iron in bars took the place of the precious metals as a standard of value and coinage. The Spartiatæ were the descendants of the Dorian masters of the country.

The Periœci were land-holders no less than the Spartans. They farmed the lands of the state, paying a fixed rental therefor. Towns were assigned to them for residence, and the handicrafts and trade which the Spartans disdained fell easily into their hands, and not a few of the Periœci accumulated wealth from their iron and wooden wares and other articles of domestic use which they produced. The name Periœci signifies “dwellers around,” and it has been supposed that the people were so called because their lands and settlements were located around those of Sparta. They dwelt in towns under Spartan governors, or *Harmostæ*, and paid tribute for the lands which they occupied. They had no share in the conduct of the state, no vote, no representation, and were ineligible to office; yet they probably outnumbered the citizens three to one, and they furnished more than their proportionate share of heavy-armed soldiers for the armies of the state. Yet apart from their exclusion from

political and social rights they seem to have been prosperous and contented. There were times when they might have combined with internal faction or foreign foes of the Spartan state for its overthrow, but they remained faithful. What was the nationality of these Pericæci and how they came to be subject to Sparta is a matter of much debate and little information. It has been confidently asserted that they were the half-subjugated and leniently treated remnant of the old or Achæan population of Laconia, but there is no recorded diversity of language, form, or feature to establish the truth of this assumption.

The Spartans were saved from manual labor by the presence of a third class—the Helots, or state slaves, who tilled the soil allotted to the citizens. Their name is said to be derived from Helos, an Achæan town which the Spartans enslaved; and it is maintained that the term was generally applied to such prisoners of war as were subjected to this humiliating condition. For the Helots were not only devoid of political and social rights, but they had scarcely the right to live. They far outnumbered the other Laconians, amounting to several hundred thousand. The state assigned a gang of them to work the farm of each Dorian household. They paid over a certain amount in produce to the family and were at liberty to retain the rest. They were not slaves of individuals, but of the state, and the central government alone might kill, sell, or set them free. In times of war they accompanied the Spartans as armor-bearers, to perform the light duties of the camp, or as bowmen and slingers. When Sparta ventured upon naval expeditions the Helots pulled the oars and piloted the ship. The Spartans continually suspected them of insurrection, and there were times when the danger of such an outbreak was very great. The Spartans never met with a reverse abroad which did not stir to life this enemy within the gates. It is not to be wondered at that the ephors put to death every Helot who showed promise of popularity and

strength among his fellows, and organized the army recruits into a secret police, or *Cryptea*, to watch for Helotic insubordination and kill its ringleaders.

There is nothing in the political constitution of Sparta or in its class divisions to promise that strength and permanence of government which was the marvel of the ancients. The secret of this must be sought in the socialism, or rather, in this case, the militarism, which converted the political body into a picked corps of drilled and disciplined soldiers.

The Spartan training, or *agogè*, was adopted in order to enable the comparatively small body of Dorian conquerors to hold their ground and extend their boundaries. To it the Spartan sacrificed much that most men love and nearly every thing that was dear to the Greek heart. But its success vindicated its claim to utility. It kept the Spartans rude, unpolished, rural, provincial; but it made a handful of them masters of their own country, lords of the Peloponnesus, and for a protracted period the leaders of Greece.

The Spartan families did not live on their farms, but dwelt together at Sparta, a cluster of villages on the banks of the Eurotas. The city was without walls, and it was the boast of its inhabitants that it needed none, for their women had never seen the smoke of hostile camp-fires. The hand of the state was laid upon the Spartan child at its birth. The old men of its tribe examined the little stranger, and unless it gave promise of becoming a strong soldier or a mother of strong soldiers it was taken from its mother and exposed in a gulch of Taygetus, and left to the tender mercies of wolves and weather. Healthy children were under the care of the women for the first few years of their lives, but at seven the state took full charge of the boys, and commenced the twenty-three years' course of training. Their literary education ceased when they had learned to read and write, but their bodies were trained to endure hardness, their minds to obey orders, and all their faculties were sharpened to meet

the exigences of war. The little fellows went barefoot the year round, with short-cropped hair and but one scanty garment. They lived in barracks which were scarcely more than pens; their rations were severely plain, and their only bedding was the rushes and grasses which they pulled for themselves by the river-side. The better to manage them, and at the same time to give employment to the cadets, the smaller boys were divided into squads, under the command of the cadets, who were between twenty and thirty years of age. Furthermore, each young man had his particular friend among the little fellows, whom he instructed in the art of war. The whole course of training, although it neglected the intellectual and spiritual side of the youth, was admirably adapted to attain the end which it sought. The Spartan boys were inured to heat and cold, to poor food and hard beds, to serve, and to obey. They cared little for art and literature, but music was highly cultivated among them, and choral dances, with gymnastic movements, were popular. Once a year, in the festival of the *Gymnopaedia*, a sort of annual "graduating exercise," the youngsters ran races and performed feats which displayed to their parents the perfection of their physical condition and their skill in bodily arts. So famous was the system of training that rich men from other states sometimes sent their sons to Sparta to undergo the discipline. The Spartan maidens were subjected to a course not unlike that of their brothers. Consequently they were finely formed and healthy, and they occupied a position of more liberty and respect than Greek women generally. From their skill in training children Spartan nurses were in great demand.

From the age of thirty the young Spartan was a citizen. He became a member of the citizen assembly, which elected the magistrates of the kingdom, and was enrolled as a heavy-armed infantry soldier (*hoplite*). In the last years of his training period he had served in the afore-mentioned Cryptea.

Even now the state did not leave him to himself. His life belonged to his country. He might marry—by a half-barbarous ceremony of simulated abduction—but he might not live at home, and must take his meals at the public tables. These eating clubs (*Syssitia* or *Phiditia*) have no parallel, except among the Dorians of Crete. Each club, or mess, was composed of about fifteen male citizens of the military age (from thirty to sixty). Each club filled its own vacancies, and elections must be unanimous. In time of peace the meals were held in mess-booths or tents in one section of the city of Sparta, and the same table companions probably fought side by side in battle and bivouacked together. Each member of the mess paid a fixed contribution to the quartermaster, so many quarts of barley-meal, half as much wine, a few pounds of cheese and figs, and a little money. The monotonous bill-of-fare was made up from these simple provisions, with an occasional gift of venison from a lucky hunting expedition, or a roast from the sacrificial victim. The pampered Greeks from the colonies looked with disgust upon the Spartan mode of life. “No wonder they welcome death,” said one; “any change would be better than such life as theirs.” A modern writer has said that the Spartans welcomed war as a respite from “the horrors of peace.”

The citizen body of Sparta seems never to have numbered more than 10,000 men. The spirit of conservatism and exclusiveness which ruled the state prevented the infusion of new blood or the admission of enfranchised Pericæci or foreign immigrants to the rights of the Spartiatæ. Consequently the number steadily shrank. Losses in war were at first rare, and the state carefully bred new citizens to replace degenerate sons, but when, in the long war with Athens, Spartans were slain or captured by scores and hundreds, the loss could not be made good. In the fifth century the army of able-bodied men had shrunk to six thousand, and by the end of the fourth century scarcely one thousand

of the stern old race were left alive. But these still practiced the old customs, and resisted all attempts to broaden the constitution. When in the field the citizen troops, commonly the smallest division, were the mainstay of the Lacedæmonian army. They fought in regular order, under trained officers, and their movements were directed in accordance with a well-understood system of tactics. In all these points they were superior to other Grecian troops, which were an unmanageable mob, brave enough, but unwieldy, and likely to be broken by a steadfast resistance or a show of strategy. The contingent of the Pericæci, which was at least equal to the Spartans in numbers, formed an excellent reserve line, and rendered efficient service to the Spartans, and not infrequently bands of Helots served with a bravery and devotion which won their freedom.

By the operation of such institutions as these the small Dorian community at Sparta became a standing army, mobilized for instant service. Its citizens had few private interests. They were taught to care little for wives and children and home, and much for military glory and the honor of the state. They had no trade, profession, or calling but the trade of arms, and that they mastered.

The first achievement of the state of Lycurgus was the completion of the conquest of Laconia. The Spartans attacked and took the Arcadian positions at the head-waters of Eurotas, and then, following the valley southward, overwhelmed ancient Amyclæ and the remaining Achæan posts. Helos, on the Laconic Gulf, was the last to yield, and it was said that from this town the term Helot was applied to all enslaved captives. By the year 765 B. C. the Eurotas flowed unvexed to the sea, and all Laconia between the mountains was in subjection. But beyond Parnon was the tempting Argive coast-land of Cynuria, and west of Taygetus was fruitful, smiling Messenia. As long as Phidon ruled Argos the Spartans did not venture beyond their natural boundaries, but

after his death they dismembered his realm and added Messenia to their own.

The two Messenian wars seem to lie between 743 B. C. and 645 B. C. A few bits only of contemporary history have come down to us from the second, and a great mass of confusing and untrustworthy legends conceal the details of truth about them both. The real cause of the first was doubtless twofold: first, the Spartans coveted the rich Messenian plain, and, secondly, the border settlements of both countries preyed upon each other's cattle. The legends seem to indicate that Messenian borderers had insulted Laconian maidens at a festival of the goddess Artemis Limnatis, held at a sanctuary on Taygetus frequented by both peoples. King Teleclus, defending the daughters of his subjects, was foully murdered. The Spartans crossed the mountains and ravaged the corn-lands and vineyards, driving the people to take refuge in Mount Ithome, the natural citadel in the heart of the kingdom. Here they made a gallant stand for nineteen years under their leader, Aristodemus, but in the twentieth (724 B. C.) the Spartans drove them thence. Some of the Messenians fled over the western sea to the Greek colonies in Italy; others remained on their estates, paying rents as *Periœci*, or cultivating them as *Helots* of the conquerors. Three thousand homestead farms were carved out of the soil and assigned to Spartan citizens. Sparta became the ruling city of the consolidated kingdom, but the Messenians of the north, with the example of a free Arcadia before their eyes, nursed their resentment and awaited their opportunity.

In the interval between the two Messenian wars Sparta had to face a serious internal danger. Since the outbreak of the first war there had arisen a discontented class known as *Partheniæ*. By all accounts these were men born of Spartan mothers during the war, and for some unexplained reason excluded from full citizenship. Conspiring with the *Helots*, they plotted the overthrow of the state. But the plans were

discovered and thwarted, and the conspirators thrust out of the country. Tradition has it that the exiles founded Tarentum in Italy.

Messenia apparently subdued and the insurrection quelled, the Spartans attacked the Argive territory, and made some progress toward its conquest.

It was at this early period in its history that Sparta became the center of the first development of musical art on the main-land of Greece. Music became a useful art, and therefore tolerable to the practical Dorians, when it was applied to gymnastic and military exercise, as in martial chants, war-dances, choral-maneuvers, and barrack-room ballads. Three several poets are mentioned as leaders in these forms of music: Terpander, a Lesbian lyric poet; Thaletas, a Cretan composer of choral songs; and Aleman, from Sardis in Asia Minor, who wrote lyrics for choirs of girls.

The waxing might of Sparta threatened the states of Peloponnesus, and new efforts were made to hold it in check. About 669 B. C. the Argives inflicted a bloody defeat upon an invading Spartan army, and other states of the lower peninsula were quick to see the signal. The Pisatans, whom Sparta and Elis had held in check, again resumed the direction of the Olympian games, and their neighbors, the northern Messenians, were stirred into open war. The Argives, Arcadians, and Pisatans leagued with them against the common foe.

The Messenian hero of the second war was Aristomenes, a prince of the blood, and when a new Messenia was founded, centuries after his death, a garland of fanciful stories was woven about his memory. Indeed, so laudatory are the legends and poetical accounts that it seems as if his countrymen won all the battles, and yet were worsted. In fact, the long continuance of the war points to the strength of the alliance, the bravery of its leadership, and the strange weakness of the enemy. The Lacedæmonians invaded Messenia as before,

and laid waste the farms and gardens. But the citadel of Eira on the Arcadian frontier, to which Aristomenes removed his people, was invincible, the allies greatly outnumbering the invaders, whose resources were exhausted by the many long-drawn campaigns. Aristomenes is said to have performed prodigies of valor, penetrating by night to the temple of Athena in Sparta, and escaping almost by miracle from his enemies. Had his spirit animated the coalition, Sparta would have been destroyed. She succeeded, however, in bribing the Arcadian king to withdraw from the league, while the martial music of the bard Tyrtæus, who is said to have been a lame Athenian school-master, breathed new courage into her own ranks. Fragments of his poems which survive show how Tyrtæus played upon the patriotism of the Spartans, and by a skillful appeal to their pride and courage renewed their flagging zeal. They defeated Aristomenes in the "battle of the Great Trench," and drew the lines closer about his mountain fastness. Hope failed and the Messenian remnant had to fly. Many found a safe asylum in Arcadia, whose traitorous king had been stoned to death; others fled westward by sea and built new homes at Messene (Messina) in Sicily. Aristomenes, himself, died in Rhodes. The old centers of population and power were ruined. Pylus, a famous port from the times of Homer, became an uninhabited lagoon. Methone was given over to Argive exiles from Nauplia. Messenia ceased to exist as a country distinct from Sparta.

The Spartans never ceased to be grateful to Tyrtæus for his timely aid. Generations of soldiers kept time to his brief marching hymns, and went into battle singing them as Cromwell's troopers sang the Psalms. Afterward around the camp-fires, or in the mess-tents, the men vied with each other in singing the elegies. Even the boys in training committed the words to memory and sang them in their barracks. In later times, even at Athens, the poetry of Tyrtæus


was admired, and its extant fragments retain much of their original beauty.

The collapse of the Messenian revolt left Sparta with a long list of unsettled scores. The Argives had thrown their influence against her; the Pisatans had led the way to the rebellion; Arcadia, notwithstanding the fatal treachery of its king, had given aid and comfort, and at last an asylum, to the heroic rebels. Natural feelings of revenge, as well as considerations for their own safety, forbade the Spartans to overlook these injuries. It was nearly a century after the fall of Eira that the last of these debts were paid in blood. Relying upon Spartan support, the Eleans fell upon the Pisatans, recaptured Olympia, and re-assumed the conduct of the games, and ultimately (581 B. C.) destroyed the city of Pisatis and made them dependents or serfs of Elis. Henceforth a train of troubles beset Argos. After the fall of Aristomenes, Corinth and Sicyon upon the north, which owed allegiance to the Argives, underwent a revolution, and received new despotic rulers or tyrants. Cynuria, her last outlying strip of coast-land, was conquered and annexed to Laconia (547 B. C.). The world was changing. A new world in the West had been opened by Greek enterprise, and the old trading cities of the Argolic Gulf fell into decay as Corinth, Ægina, Megara, and Athens rose to eminence. But for all her isolation and distress, Argos did not lose her independence. She maintained a shadow of authority, and resisted to the bitter end each new advance of Sparta.

As for Sparta, her conquest of Peloponnesus had reached its limits. All Laconia, all Messenia, and the southern third of Argolis were hers. She was the accepted leader, moreover, of Elis, and of Tegea, and other Arcadian cities. By her alliance with Elis she practically became the protectress of the Olympian games and gathered about them a semi-religious combination of Peloponnesian states. Sparta was chief of this new league, commander of its troops, and enforcer of its inter-

national law. By its means she perpetuated her power in the lower peninsula, and with the extension of the influence and importance of the Olympian festival throughout all Hellas the name and fame of Sparta ran with equal pace. In two and one half centuries after its establishment the constitution of Lycurgus had produced a military power which had conquered a third of Peloponnesus and rendered another third subservient to its will.





CHAPTER VII.

THE EXTENSION OF HELLAS.

THE restless movement of the Hellenic tribes came to an end in prehistoric times. It had resulted in the permanent occupation of Greece, and of the islands and eastern shore of the Ægean, by people of Greek blood, language, and religion. It is true that the Greeks afterward spread far beyond these countries, but their later extension was accomplished not by the migration of tribes and nations, but by small bands of colonists seeking more favored circumstances of fortune or freedom. These expeditions so abounded in the eighth and seventh centuries before Christ that this whole period of Grecian history is sometimes called the age of colonization.

The events of the migration, and of the centuries which closely followed it, had acquainted the Greeks with navigation and quickened their commercial sense. Brisk traffic naturally sprang up in the waters which separated these kindred people, yielding wealth and prosperity to the Greek cities, and encroaching upon the trade preserves of the Phenicians. But it so happened that at this juncture the latter people were unable to defend the commercial empire which they were the first to develop and control. For at the time when the Ionian cities became conscious of their strength Tyre and Sidon suffered a tremendous check. In the ninth century before Christ the conquering monarchs of Assyria extended their empire to the sea-shore and levied tribute upon the accumulations of Phenicia. For two centuries the hand of Assyria lay more or less heavily upon the mistress of the world's commerce, and although her cities were not utterly ruined the interruption of their prosperity allowed the naval

supremacy to slip into the grasp of the Greeks. But on the coast of Africa, in the distant west, the Tyrian colony of Carthage attained a power and splendor comparable to that of the mother-country, and in that quarter the Carthaginians continued to carry out with energy and success the policy of their Phenician forefathers.

The region of trade to which the Greeks now succeeded was of immense extent and value, comprising the eastern Mediterranean, with its connecting seas. Its acquisition transformed the Greek lands. New routes of trade demanded new markets, the influx of wealth and consequent social changes revolutionized the political constitutions, and these in turn led to fresh colonizing schemes.

Under the older conditions Crete had been the meeting-ground of Greece and the Orient, and Orchomenus and the "Achæan" cities of the Argolic Gulf had flourished by their connection with it. When Miletus became the emporium the channels of trade were altered, and the cities of Eubœa and the Saronic Gulf usurped the primacy among the merchants of continental Hellas. The island towns, Chalcis and Eretria, with Corinth and Megara on the Isthmus, were the first to feel the young flood of the tide of commercial prosperity, and these cities were pioneers in the colonizing enterprises which marked the spirit of the age.

If we had space to follow in detail (so far as the facts are known) the internal history of the Greek states, we should notice that this era of external growth was closely joined with wide-spread constitutional changes, some of which assisted in the new movement while others were its immediate outgrowth. In the eighth century many Greek monarchies became oligarchies, in the seventh the rise of the "Tyrants" paved the way to democratic reforms.

From the earliest times the Greek communities, great and small, were ruled by kings who generally claimed descent from a god or mythical hero, and who were assisted in the

government by the *Boule*, or council of the elders. In the unsettled state of society which followed the great migrations the kings, as generals of the army, easily maintained their authority. The establishment of peace made their position more difficult. We have seen how the reforms attributed to Lycurgus successfully adjusted the difficulties which had set kings, nobles, and citizens at strife in Sparta. The same elements were in conflict elsewhere, but nowhere else was such a masterly compromise discovered. Generally the nobles abolished the monarchy and seized the chief power for themselves. They were a haughty and exclusive landed aristocracy, a small circle of families who chose the magistrates from their own number. Such a government bred dissension naturally. Jealousies within the privileged class, and attacks from ambitious men outside the sacred pale, kept the oligarchies in turmoil. Secession and emigration were the commonest means of relief, and some of the most famous colonies of Corinth grew out of such inauspicious events in the home city.

Where civil discord founded its tens of colonies hundreds began as mere commercial stations. Such cities grew up upon the site where some Greek merchant, following Phœnician pioneers, built a warehouse and established an agency for the collection and shipment of goods. As the volume of its trade increased, new settlers came out to live at the station, which ultimately became an independent city. But wherever, as in the political secessions and in colonies dispatched to relieve a state of its surplus of population and give occupation to unused talent, the choice of a location was carefully determined beforehand, such colonists never sailed without consulting the oracle of Delphi, whose priests gave out as divine the information which their agents collected from every source. The shrewdness of their counsel gave high repute to the temple and brought it gifts from every side. The colonists, having secured the sanction of Apollo,

took coals from the perpetual fire of Hestia on the altar of their city and kindled it anew on the hearth of the new settlement. Wherever their cities rose they built temples to the gods of the mother-city, and they continued to look back in reverence, if sometimes in disobedience, to the old home. But the colony was usually an independent commonwealth, governing itself and going its own way. In frequent instances the daughter-state quite outstripped the parent in population and wealth.

The native races to whose coasts the Hellenes came as strangers received them variously. The new-comers took the land as if by divine right, and used force when necessary to obtain a coveted position. On such occasions they treated the original owners with the same degree of fairness and mercy which characterized the dealings of the European colonists with the American Indians. In general, however, the natives in losing their independence gained by their contact with Hellenic civilization.

The north-eastern colonies were chiefly the plantations of Chalcis, Megaris, and Miletus. The three-pronged peninsula which protrudes from the coast of Macedonia was so thoroughly occupied by citizens of Chalcis that it was known as Chalcidice. Olynthus was its most famous city. Potidæa, on the western prong, was a Corinthian offshoot. The little Grecian state of Megaris, with its single city, having harbors upon both seas, has the credit of establishing the most famous of all the colonies. In 675 B. C. Megarians passing through the Hellespont built a town at Chalcedon by the entrance of the Bosphorus. Seventeen years later (658 B. C.) another of their expeditions, asking the Delphic oracle where they should settle with the favor of the god, was directed to "build opposite the city of the blind." They seized the native Thracian fortress of Byzas and founded Byzantium, opposite Chalcedon, whose founders had been "blind" to the advantages of the former site. The safety of its har-

bor and the perfection of its situation at the junction of two seas and two continents insured its importance through all time. The emperor Constantine made this Greek town the capital of the Roman Empire, and to him it owes its later name, Constantinople. No other Greek city mothered so many colonies as Miletus. Sinope (770 B. C.), Trapezus (756 B. C.), and Cyzicus (675 B. C.) were the first and most important of the cities by which the Milesians gained control of the south coast trade of the Euxine, and half a century later they ventured upon the north coast, and thenceforth handled the grain trade of that region of well-watered plains. The ring of Hellenic colonies on the Black Sea was now complete, and the old name of the sea, Axinus (inhospitable), gave way to one of better omen, Euxinus (kind-to-strangers). Not far from 700 B. C., Thasos, whose mineral wealth had previously lured the Phenicians into the northern Ægean, was taken by a colony of Parians, among whom was Archilochus, one of the master-poets of his race. The Thasians prospered and soon acquired the opposite coast of Thrace, the "gold coast" of that day. We have had space to mention only a few of the scores of Greek cities which sprang up before the middle of the seventh century in the north and east. Many besides these became populous and wealthy, themselves the seat of independent colonial undertakings; and though their inhabitants commonly turned their faces toward the sea and abstained from conquering the territory at their backs, they exercised a constant ameliorating and civilizing influence upon the barbarians of the vicinity.

The Eubœan cities seem to have led in the colonization of the west. A tradition of doubtful value declared that Eubœans of Chalcis and Cyme founded a new Cyme (Latin, Cumæ) in Italy, on the Bay of Naples, before the year 1000 B. C. Cumæ was an ancient colony of Chalcis, but it seems probable that it was not planted until after the settlement of Sicily in the seventh century. The Chalcidian sailors

rounded the Peloponnesian capes, ran up the back side of Greece to Corcyra, darted across the channel to the heel of Italy, and still following the shore to its toe-tip came to Sicily, whose sunny meadows and rich pastures must have seemed like a garden of the gods to the emigrant from stony Eubœa. The Phenician tales of harpies, enchantresses, and one-eyed giants proved to be but sailors' yarns, and the fire-mountain (*Ætna*) fascinated while it threatened. In 735 B. C. Chalcidians, with associates from the isle of Naxos, founded a new Naxos at the very foot of the volcano, the first Greek town in Sicily. The encouraging news traveled home quickly, and the next year a band of Corinthian exiles came out and, seizing the islet of Ortygia, which covered the best harbor on the east coast, laid the foundations of Syracuse, destined to be the queen city of the west Greeks. Cumæans and Chalcidians occupied Zancle (728 B. C.), on the Straits of Messina, and again Chalcidians, with Messenian refugees, took position at Rhegium, on the opposite side of the strait. Megara was represented in the west by two Sicilian colonies: one, her namesake, near Syracuse, the other, Selinus, surrounded by the Phenicians, whom the influx of the Greeks compressed into the western angle of the three-cornered isle. Himera and Acragas (*Agrigentum*) were other frontier stations of the Greeks in Sicily.

Cumæ was probably the first Greek foothold in Italy, and it is suggested that its people first taught the rude Italians the art of writing. They certainly traded together, for fragments of early Greek pottery and early coins of the Grecian states have been dug up in all parts of western Italy. At the head of the gulf which makes in to the base of Vesuvius the Rhodians founded a rival city, which the Cumæans destroyed, only to rebuild it again at the bidding of the oracle. The modern Naples occupies the site and bears the name of this "new city," Neapolis. Eretria, the second city of Eubœa, vied with its neighbor, Chalcis, in foreign trade and colonial

undertakings until the latter vanquished and ruined her in a struggle for the possession of the Lelantian plain in the eighth century. The Eretrians were represented in Chalcidice and in the earlier operations in the west. They are said to have brought Greek influences to the island of Coreyra, but it was the energy and capital of Corinth which completed the conquest of the island (704 B. C.), which was well situated in the route of trade. After a generation the island declared its independence of the mother-city and commenced a series of wars which lasted for two centuries and embroiled other states. To offset this revolt, Corinth colonized the main-land of Acarnania, and Coreyra retaliated by colonizing the Epirot coast.

The authority of Syracuse gave to the Dorian influences the upper hand in Sicily, but this tribe had but a single great city in Italy. The exception was Taras, or Tarentum, founded (708 B. C.) by the Partheniæ, who were banished from Laconia. Their city thrived enormously, and even after she had passed her best estate gave young Rome a chance to try her strength. In the same deep indentation of southern Italy, and near the headland at its western entrance, two parties from Achæa founded Sybaris (720 B. C.) and Croton (710 B. C.). These two cities covered lower Italy with their daughter-colonies. In comparison with the old homes in the main-land of Hellas the new cities were vastly superior in number, size, and prosperity. Indeed, the region was so thoroughly Hellenized that it bore the name of Great Greece (*Magna Græcia*). Merchants from as far as Miletus brought their goods to this splendid market, and the gods of Greece ruled here as there. The temples of the west were in the same style and of equal beauty with those of the east, and local games and festivals sprang up about them. But no oracle gained an authority like that of Delphi, and the proudest distinction of a Syracusan or Sybarite was to be crowned with the laurel of Olympia. This new west ex-

ported breadstuffs, meats, and wool in exchange for the finer wares of the Orient, and attracted to its courts the scholars and dramatic poets of the Ionian and old Greek cities.

About 630 B. C. a Samian merchantman bound for the Nile was blown out of its course and driven the whole length of the Mediterranean. The master sold his cargo in Tarshish at a rich profit, and on his safe return dedicated a monument to the goddess Hera. Other Ionians made the voyage, tempted by the silver-mines of Spain. The Phocæans founded the first colony (600 B. C.) in those parts, Massilia (Marseilles), east of the mouth of the Rhone, and built temples to the Delphian Apollo and Diana of the Ephesians on what is now the soil of France. From this base a line of Greek trading stations extended nearly to the Pillars of Heracles.

In the seventh century the Ionian cities found a fresh market in the south for the goods which they collected from east and west. Egypt had hitherto been sealed to Hellenic influences. A few objects found in the Mycenæan graves, and a few disputed inscriptions upon Egyptian temple walls, are slight but significant witnesses to a prehistoric connection between the Nile and the Greek lands. But the relation had now been severed from time immemorial, and neither traveler nor trader knew, except by vague rumor, the treasures and wonders of the valley of the Nile. The Assyrians, who had overrun Phenicia and Israel and Egypt, were driven out of the latter empire by Psammetichus I., whom they had established as a governor of one of its provinces, and who now (665 B.C.) became Pharaoh, the first king of the twenty-sixth dynasty. The soldiers with which Psammetichus had conquered were Greek mercenaries from the Carian and Milesian towns of Asia Minor. To keep what he had won the usurper needed their continued help, and the monarch cantoned them on the bank of the Pelusiæ branch of the Nile, and the Greek town of Daphnæ (the Tahpanhes of Holy Writ) grew up beside it. Recent excavations (1886)

have laid bare portions of both camp and city, with many relics, arrow-heads, horses' bits, jewelry, etc. Psammetichus and his descendants showed especial favor to the Greeks, allowing them to build the commercial city of Naucratis, where they dwelt by themselves, carrying on a lively traffic with the Egyptians, but preserving their own language, customs, and religion. That the soldiers still served in the royal armies we know, because we can still read upon the leg of a colossal statue at Abu Simbel the writing scratched there by Ionian mercenaries of Psammetichus II., the grandson of the founder of the dynasty. Daphnæ and Naucratis were founded under circumstances unlike those of all other Greek colonies. Instead of bringing art and civilization among rude and warlike people, these Greeks came in contact with a race which had already passed its prime. The pyramids and the sphinx seemed as old and wonderful to the Greeks as they do to the modern traveler. The colonists were doubtless deeply impressed by what they saw of this antique civilization. With the cleverness of their race, they adopted and improved upon the arts practiced by these strange people. Indeed, the excavations at Daphnæ and Naucratis give some color to the theory that sculpture and painting and, it may be, the "Greek style" of architecture, came to Hellas by way of these two colonies, which were as windows through which the impressionable Greeks looked in upon a suggestive civilization.

Great as was the service which these colonies in Egypt rendered to their countrymen, they were merely tolerated in a foreign land, and could not extend their power. The greatest colony of the south was farther west, where the coast of Africa swells out toward Greece. Here, on a terraced height two thousand feet above the Mediterranean, colonists from the island of Thera built the city of Cyrene (623 B. C.). The fertile plateau behind it yielded richly grain, oil, wine, and silphium, a wild plant now unknown, which

the Greeks prized above all medicines. The foreign traffic in these staples, together with wool and the Libyan products which the caravans here brought to the coast, was very great, and Cyrene rivaled Carthage in magnificence. Its champions were often seen at Olympia, and the horses of this coast were favorites in the hippodrome. The great city threw out several colonies along the adjacent coast, and for a century was ruled by kings. In 522 B. C. it was conquered by the Persian masters of Egypt.

With 600 B. C. the era of colonization came to a close. The Greek settlements at that time dotted the coasts of the Black and Ægean Seas, were sprinkled thickly over the southern extremity of Italy, and all but the western knob of Sicily. Here they were met and checked by Etruscans and Carthaginians. Greece and Carthage also shared the coast of Gaul (France and Spain). In the south the Greeks were tolerated as in Egypt, and firmly established as in Cyrene. The greater part of this extension of Hellas was accomplished in the single century from 750 B. C. to 650 B. C.

Closely connected with this expansion of commerce was the introduction of coined money. The Greeks of the Iliad measured value in beeves, and when they used metals for exchange they weighed them out. No coins have been found at Mycenæ, or in any of the prehistoric tombs. In Lydia, or in the neighboring Ionian cities, the government struck the first coined money very near the close of the seventh century. The device recommended itself to all mercantile classes, and the invention was quickly adopted throughout the Hellenic world. Gold, silver, and *electron* (an alloy of the two metals) were used in the mints. Each city had its own coinage, stamping the earlier coins with rude designs, but soon producing pieces of beautiful design and workmanship. They commonly bore the head of a patron deity, together with the initial of the city's name and some device symbolic of its origin, its chief production, or an

event in its history. The owl of Athena stares from the coins of Athens, Pegasus flies across the broad pieces of Corinth. Practical Cyrene embossed the silphium plant upon her money, and many maritime cities chose the dolphin for their token. Two monetary standards were in use among the Greeks. Both seem to have originated in Babylonia, but one reached continental Hellas by way of Asia Minor, the other was brought by the Phenicians. The basis of the former, or Eubœan, was a gold stater weighing one hundred and thirty grains, the latter, the Æginæan, weighing one hundred and ninety-four grains.

The extension of commerce also led to improvements in naval architecture. Better merchantmen were required for transportation, and better ships of war to protect the grain fleets from Phenicians and pirates. In the Homeric poems war-ships are nothing more than swift transports, the oarsmen going on shore to fight. The *penteconter*, with twenty-five oars on a side, is an example of these early vessels. The Corinthian architects devised a plan for increasing the usefulness of battle-ships by seating the oarsmen in tiers, thus multiplying their numbers. They are said to have presented four of these *triremes* (three-tier ships) to the Samians as early as 704 B. C. The advantage of these ships lay in their superior speed, power, and ease of handling. They were especially adapted to the ramming and oar-breaking maneuvers which distinguished naval wars before the introduction of artillery.

The expansion of Hellas wrought great changes in the affairs of the cities which took part in it, especially in the Greek towns of Asia Minor and the states of the Isthmus. The ruling oligarchies were never popular with the masses of the people, but so long as occupations were mainly agricultural the few aristocrats who owned the land were able to keep the landless masses in subjection. But the new commerce opened a field for talent. Although the old families

monopolized the ownership of land, they had no monopoly of business sagacity and enterprise, and they were compelled to see plain citizen-merchants surpassing them in wealth. It went against the grain of the oligarchs to admit these new men to their privileged ranks. Factional strife was the result. The oligarchs were opposed at the same time by a second element, for the manufacturing and trading operations produced in the large cities a numerous class of artisans and small tradesmen who had suffered from the oppression of the nobles and eagerly joined their enemies. In many instances the wars of the factions led ultimately to the abolition of privilege and the establishment of government by the people. From oligarchy to democracy was a long leap, and in many cities the gap was bridged by what the Greeks called a "Tyranny."

Our word tyrant has been wrested from its original meaning. The Greek applied it to any ruler who absolved himself from the restrictions of law, and followed his own will. The Greek tyrant might be kind and lenient, devoted to the public welfare, or harsh and cruel, bent on his own aggrandizement. The tyranny lay in the fact that his power was unlimited by council or assembly or law. The age of tyrannies lasted less than a century, and as their history, which has come down to us, was written under the democratic or oligarchic influences which superseded them it is easy to account for the dark colors in which the tyrant's character is usually painted. Some of them were hard and cruel, but the tyrannies have their indispensable part in the history of Greece, inasmuch as they usually broke down the aristocracy of birth, and sometimes opened the gate to popular government.

The first tyrannies rose in Ionia, the region which first profited by foreign trade, and afterward spread, not only to the maritime cities of continental Hellas, but even to the Sicilian colonies. In some cases, probably at Miletus, the yearly *prytanis*, or president, chosen from the oligarchs, used

his position to win the favor of the populace, and so maintain himself at the head of the state after his term had expired. At Corinth the course of events was somewhat different.

Corinth, situated upon the isthmus, was at the cross-roads of the Greek world. The land route from the north to Peloponnesus traversed her territory, and the goods of the east and west met in her markets. After a stubborn resistance to the Dorians, she had finally been conquered by the kings of Argos, and had fluctuated between independence and subjection, as the power of that state waned or waxed. About the middle of the eighth century (747 B. C.) the kings were set aside in favor of an oligarchy. ~~The descendants of a former king, Bacchias—the Bacchiadæ—two hundred families, continued to exercise the sovereignty, selecting from their own number an annual magistrate or prytanis. The Bacchiad kings, and oligarchs were fully awake to the advantages of their city, and showed ability and zeal in making the most of them. Their energy sent Corinthian colonies to Syracuse and Corecra, building up immense trade connections abroad, and at the same time inviting talent to settle in the mother-city. Manufactures thrived side by side with commerce, and Corinthian pottery and bronze were highly valued. The oligarchs claimed the first-fruits of the city's prosperity, and with their wealth became haughty and overbearing.~~

The oligarchy had ruled for more than ninety years, and Corinth had become the most populous city in Greece, when (about 657 B. C.) Cypselus, the son of a Bacchiad mother who had married below her rank, raised a revolt and drove the oligarchs from the city. They fled to Corecra, to Sparta, the constant friend of oligarchists, to Italy, and Sicily. Cypselus confiscated their rich estates, and ruled the city as its first tyrant for thirty years. With a part of his wealth he won the favor of the pious and the priesthood by dedicating splendid gifts to Apollo at Delphi and Zeus at

Olympia. Tradition said that he burdened the people with heavy taxes, but, be that as it may, he strengthened the state by planting new colonies on the west coast of Greece, and bequeathed the tyranny to his son Periander 627 B. C. He (it is said) ruled mildly until Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, striking off the heads of the tallest grain with a sweep of his staff, hinted to him that he must secure his dynasty by killing the nobles. Forthwith he became a monster of cruelty. He killed his own wife, and involved himself in war with Coreyra and Epidaurus. In both he was victorious. He founded Potidæa, minted the first Corinthian coins, and is said to have planned a ship canal through the Isthmus. Like his father, he gave gifts to the great gods, and like the Venetian and Florentine princes, he made his court the resort of artists. Among his guests was Arion, a Lesbian musician, who gave artistic form to the *dithyramb* or hymn which was sung in honor of Bacchus, and in which the Greek drama originated. Having killed the dangerous nobles, the tyrant introduced festivals and shows to entertain the populace, and either founded or renovated the biennial Isthmian games. But Periander left no son, and his nephew and successor, named Psammetichus, from the Greek-loving Pharaoh of Egypt, was murdered by an uprising of the exasperated people, in which the Corinthian tyranny ended after seventy-three years of power. The new oligarchy which took its place was more liberal than that of the Bacchiadæ. The people after their experience with tyrants never again tolerated the rule of one man.

What the Cypselidæ did for Corinth the Orthagoridæ did for its sister-city, Sicyon. Here the reigning aristocracy was crushed (665 B. C.) by Orthagoras, a commoner who had the populace at his back. His family ruled as tyrants for a century. The sixth and greatest of the line was Clisthenes. He degraded the Dorian nobility, prohibited the worship of their hero Adrastus, and forbade the public recitation of

Homer and other poems celebrating the greatness of his enemy, Argos. Clisthenes testified his reverence for Apollo by leading a contingent in the Sacred War which the Delphian protectorate (amphictyony) waged against the city of Crissa for the independence of the temple town. His four-in-hand won the first prize in the chariot-race of the Pythian games, which were established at the close of this war, and his stables took the Olympian laurel in 572 and 568. This was glory indeed, and we need not marvel at the tradition that the victor's daughter, Agariste, was sought in marriage by sixty noble suitors, who dwelt for a year at her father's court between hope and despair until Megacles, the Athenian noble, ancestor of Pericles, was selected as the tyrant's son-in-law. About 565 B. C. Clisthenes died without male issue, the oligarchy was restored, and Sicyon after a brief period of distinction fell back into the obscurity whence the genius of the Orthagoridæ had lifted it.

Megarís also had its tyrant, one Theagenes, said to have been an outlawed noble who led the assault of the common people upon the oligarchy. He came into his power about the time of Cypselus. How long he held it is not known. But he was finally expelled after he had lavished the money of the wealthy classes upon public works. In the times of his prosperity his daughter was married to the Athenian Cylon. After the expulsion of Theagenes, Megaris, whose control of the Bosphorus and the Black Sea grain trade had produced a merchant class of enormous wealth, wasted its resources in party strife, while Athens and Ægina usurped its commerce.

Pittacus, of Lesbos, and Polycrates, of Samos, among the eastern islands, and Phalaris, of Acragas, and Gelo and Hiero, of Syracuse in Sicily, were famous tyrants in their several cities whom we can merely mention by name. Of Pisistratus and his sons, and what they did for Athens, we shall speak in another chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.

ATHENS was the foremost city of Greece, but up to the sixth century before Christ neither the city itself nor Attica, the state of which it was the head, gave much promise of future greatness. In prehistoric Greece Athens was scarcely mentioned, and it was not until Argos had passed her second period of bloom, and Sparta had perfected her constitution, and the Eubœan and Isthmian towns had built up their foreign connections, that Athens took her rightful place. But when the Athenians at last appeared they proved themselves worthy of the name of Hellenes, for they had developed a government as remarkable for its liberality and freedom as that of Sparta was for its narrow conservatism. The two states represented the diverse genius of the Dorian and Ionian tribes, and were bitter rivals throughout their career.

The Athenians of the later times claimed that Attica was never conquered by an immigrant race like the Dorians, but that their forefathers were autochthonous—sprung from the soil. Cecrops, the earliest of the Attic kings, they said, had divided the people of Attica into twelve *demes* or districts, and had built a castle called Cecropia for himself on the Acropolis, a rocky table-land which rises from the fertile plain of the Attic Cephissus, a few miles from the Saronic Gulf. This misty monarch introduced the elements of civilization. It was he who decided for Athena's gift the olive, when Posidon vied with her for the possession of the kingdom, and from the patron goddess Cecropia received the name Athens. The Cecropidæ, his descendants, followed him in a long line of kings, one of whom, Erechtheus, was after-

ward worshiped as a god in the Erechtheum, the splendid temple near the Parthenon. The greatest of the Cecropidæ was Theseus, who was born at Træzen, an old Ionian town of Argolis, and became the hero of the Ionians, as Heracles was of the Dorians, slaying the bull of Marathon and the Cretan Minotaur, and sailing with Jason for the golden fleece. As king, he "founded" Athens by coercing or persuading the several communities of Attica to recognize the city of Cecrops as the capital. He also divided the people into Eupatridæ (patricians), Geomori (husbandmen), and Demiurgi (artisans). In the fifth century, when Athens was mistress of an empire, a splendid temple was erected there in his honor.

The kings of the house of Theseus had ruled Attica for several generations when a crisis came upon the state. The Bæotians, whom the pressure of the great migrations had brought to the northern boundary of Attica, began to invade the kingdom. The campaign was decided by a duel in which Melanthus, a refugee from Pylus, in Peloponnesus, as the Attic champion, slew the Bæotian. The thankful people of Attica made him king, and when his son and successor, Codrus, further won their love by giving his life to save them from the Dorians, who had passed the Isthmus, they decreed that no other ruler should wear the title which Codrus had glorified. Thenceforth, beginning with his son Medon, the kings of Attica were called archons (rulers). Years afterward the archon was elected from the family of Codrus for a term of ten years. Forty years later the choice was thrown open to all the noble families, and in 683 B. C. a board of nine patrician archons, selected annually, took the place of the old decennial magistrates.

Such is the Attic legend, stripped of its wonder-stories. The truth which it conceals may be this: The early inhabitants of Attica, like those of most other Greek states, were divided into a number of independent communities, sometimes jeal-

ous and hostile to their neighbors, sometimes uniting in small city leagues or "amphictyonies" for the protection of a common sanctuary and the celebration of its festivals. They were not conquered from without, but beat back the Bœotians on the north and the Dorians on the south. The Ionian Theseus, uniting the communities around the citadel of Athens, and so founding its prosperity, may be the legendary expression of a union which undoubtedly took place. By compulsion or attraction the independent demes were made to look up to Athens as their chief city. Probably the local nobility and priesthood had to leave their ancestral communities and settle in the new city. Such a movement was not unknown in other Greek states. The people called it a housing together, synœcismus, and the eve of their festival, the Panathenæa, which was said to commemorate this centralizing movement, was called the *Synœcia*. After this union one king ruled the state, having his seat at Athens.

The threefold division of the people by classes, and the fourfold division by tribes, date from the times of the kings, if not from the more remote antiquity. The Eupatridæ, Geomori, and Demiurgi were very ancient Attic ranks, and the four tribes—Geleontes, Hopletes, Argadeis, and Ægicoreis—were the largest political units.

The Dorian invasion of Peloponnesus not only imperiled the independence of Attica, but filled the little kingdom with fugitive families from conquered states. Many of these were but sojourners, soon moving eastward in that early tide of migration which Hellenized the archipelago and the coast of Asia Minor, but not a few families remained behind and were admitted to the class of the Eupatridæ. Thus the family of Codrus, the martyr-king, claimed descent from the Pylian house of Neleus and Nestor.

In Athens, as in the rest of Hellas, the nobles were jealous of the kings. Unless the improbable legend is true, we cannot tell how or why the monarchs became archons. But

in fact the new life-archons were but the old kings "writ small." It is not until the archonate is limited to ten years, and then thrown open to the nobility, that we discover what inroads the aristocrats have made upon the royal power. The constitutional change of 683 B. C., with its annually elected board of nine Eupatrid magistrates, completed the transformation. The monarchy had vanished, and an oligarchy of the most approved Greek pattern reigned in its stead.

In the early part of the seventh century the Attic government was completely in the hands of the Eupatrids, or nobles. Their nine archons, together with the four tribal chiefs, and the doubtful "presidents of the Naucraries," represented Church and State, as well as the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments. The duties of the ancient kings were distributed among the archons. The first, or *Archon Eponymus* gave his name to the year, and was a paternal head of the community, having charge of the family rights, adoptions, marriages of heiresses, etc. The king-archon, or *Archon Basileus*, was judge in cases of murder and sacrilege. The third, or *Archon Polemarch*, was general of the forces and warden of the foreign residents of the city. The remaining six were called *Thesmothetæ* (adjusters), and presided as judges in all but the most grave law cases.

There was probably an early senate, or council of elders, but we have no information on this point, and we can only conjecture that the Ecclesia, or general assembly of the citizens, must be consulted by the magistrates upon questions which were vital to the whole body, like the declaration of war or the conclusion of peace.

Nothing but distress could spring from such a government. An aristocracy of birth, confined to members of a few families, ruled irresponsibly, executing the laws which they made and interpreted. The higher offices were closed to all citizens outside the patrician circle. The people were not only excluded from the government, but burdens were heaped

upon them. The nobles enriched themselves at the expense of the state, and then in their own interests as capitalists burdened the borrowers with cruel debtor laws. Mortgages were permitted upon persons as well as upon land, the rate of interest was enormous, and creditors hard. The poor debtor often lost not only his farm, but was obliged to sell his family or even himself into slavery to satisfy the law.

Out of the all-pervading discontent sprang three parties or factions : the Plain (Pedieis), the Shore (Parali), and the Mountain (Diacrieis). The names give some clew to the composition of the parties. The Pedieis were probably the rich Eupatrid land-owners of the plains before Athens and Eleusis, who stood by the constitution. The men of the Shore were fishermen and merchants, fairly prosperous, and more anxious for peace than for reform. On the hill pastures of the north dwelt the Diacrieis, radical and revolutionary, confident that their poor lot could not suffer from any change of government.

In course of time Athens began to show an interest in the affairs of the world. Attica was a country of husbandmen, but the sterile soil could scarcely feed the population. Yet its cold clay was fit for pots, and when Athens made her first ventures in foreign commerce these jars, or amphoræ, were her chief export. There was foreign demand also for her olive oil, and for the silver from her mines at Laurium. For herself she needed bread-stuffs. Thus in the seventh century we find the Athenians endeavoring to participate in the cereal trade of the Black Sea, and even at war with the tyrant of Mitylene. But even the beginnings of commerce brought hardship, for they augmented the population, and embittered the strife between the people and the ruling class.

A main ground of popular grievance was the absence of any check upon the Eupatrid government. There were no written laws, and the magistrates were governed by the inter-

ests of their class. The masses demanded that the law be published for the guidance of judges and the instruction of citizens. We do not know what means extorted this great concession from the Eupatrids, nor can we state with certainty its date; but we know that about 620 B. C. the archon Draco did make and publish a code of laws. Only one clause of this statute-book has survived, but the Greeks looked back to the Draconian laws as terribly severe. So cruel were the penalties that they were said to have been written in blood. It may be that the aristocrats, chagrined at their forced concession, and determined not to lose by it, prescribed the extreme penalty for each offense, but it is scarcely to be believed that the people were worse off under the new code than under the old.

Whatever may be the truth about Draco's laws, it is evident that they did not satisfy the people, for about this time Cylon, the Eupatrid son-in-law of Theagenes of Megara, who had won a foot-race at Olympia, relying upon his father-in-law's assistance and the support of the disaffected elements, made a bold push for the tyranny of Athens. He and his partisans seized the Acropolis. But Athens was not ripe for a tyranny, and the commons did not rise. The government acted with energy, besieged the citadel, and starved out the conspirators. Cylon escaped over the border; his men surrendered on the one condition that their lives should be spared, but were mercilessly cut down by the clan Alcmaeon in defiance of the capitulation—a piece of sacrilege long odious to gods and men. Cylon's attempt left the aristocrats suspicious of one another, and the citizens shocked by the bloodshed and religious outrage of the Alcmaeonidæ. For a generation Athens stood still, her warring elements wasting their strength in party strife. The lawgiver Solon made the first successful attempt to establish order.

Solon's first move toward the rehabilitation of his country was a patriotic appeal to his fellow-citizens to recapture

Salamis, which had been occupied by Megara. Its success was calculated to give her confidence in her own powers, to silence her nearest and most dangerous competitor, and to foster her infant commerce. The second placed his state beside her sisters in Greece in the defense of the Hellenic faith as represented in the national temple of Apollo at Delphi. The people of Crissa had asserted their control over the holy city, which had grown up in territory originally theirs, and had vexed the god by taxing his pilgrims who landed at Cirrha, the port of Crissa. Solon, speaking for Athens in the council of the protectorate, persuaded the states to obey the oracle by punishing the offenders. An allied army, in which the Athenians were led by Alcmaeon, destroyed the impious cities, and dedicated their plain to Apollo, to lie waste forever, as Joshua devoted Jericho to Jehovah. Delphi became a member of the league of Phocian cities. The activity of Solon in this, the First Sacred War, raised the young statesman in the estimation of his countrymen.

The party of Cylon was not exterminated by the slaughter of its leaders. The lapse of time softened the harsh outlines of the insurrection, and set it in a rosier light. But around the Alcmaeonidæ and their partisans, who had slain the Cylonian captives in cold blood, hung dark clouds of distrust. They were spoken of as the "accursed," and in the end their opponents had them tried by a commission of three hundred nobles, who sent them into exile. The bodies of the guilty who had already died were dug up and cast beyond the boundary. Yet the foul stain of sacrilege tainted the city until Epimenides of Crete, a wise and holy man, came by invitation to purify the state.

Solon's faithful labors for Athens had not yet touched the aristocratic government, which was a fountain of ills. The high-born alone held office, and the capitalists had land and body of the peasant at their mercy. Even the well-meant laws deepened the distress, the introduction of coined

money unsettled finances, and the importation of bread-stuffs, however they may have benefited the artisan class, beggared the small farmers of Attica. Debts multiplied; the little stone posts which betokened mortgage were set up in the farms and garden plots, and many a freeborn citizen had to sell himself or his family into slavery to satisfy his creditors. Only one man stood between Attica and a revolution.

In the same stirring verse by which Solon had advocated the recovery of Salamis he now pleaded for reform. His friends urged him to assume the tyranny by the right of competence, but he waved aside the offers, whereupon the patricians, to save themselves from the desperate populace, chose him first archon (594 B. C.), with full powers to bring order out of the chaos in the state.

The man was worthy of the position. Of noble birth, broad sympathies, and lofty principle, he belonged to no party, and sought only the good of the state. His first measure was for the relief of the intolerable condition of the enormous debtor class. His relief law (*Seisachtheia*) was primarily a forgiveness of the debts which were crushing the peasantry. By it all loans secured by mortgage on the property or body of a citizen were canceled; the coinage was changed from the Æginetan to the Eubœan* standard, thus increasing the value of property in drachmas twenty-seven per cent.; a maximum was set to individual property in land to protect the small farmers from absorption in great estates; the rate of interest was cut down, and body-mortgage forbidden; many debtor slaves were restored to home and freedom. The *Seisachtheia* was the achievement of his first term as archon. At its close he was continued in office with the consent of all parties. The product of his second term was the Solonian constitution.

To Solon's mind the fatal defect of the old Athenian gov-

* Seventy-three drachmas of the old money were recoined into one hundred drachmas.

ernment lay in its ironbound exclusiveness. The bar of noble birth confined all power to a small and selfish minority in the state. It is the merit of his innovations that they removed this bar and "mixed the government." They substituted property for birth as a qualification for office. Solon divided the whole body of the citizens into four classes—according to their income from landed property: (1) Pentekosiomedimni, (2) Hippeis, (3) Zeugitæ, and (4) Thetes.

The first class, or "five hundred bushel-men" (as their name implies), were those whose land yielded at least that quantity of grain or its equivalent in wine and oil. The Hippeis, "horsemen" or knights, comprised those citizens whose income from their lands ranged from three hundred to five hundred medimni. The Zeugitæ—"owners of a yoke"—included a majority of the peasant farmers, all who cropped from one hundred and fifty to three hundred medimni. The owners of less productive patches, and those artisans, merchants, clerks, and sailors who held no property in land, were lumped together in the fourth class—the Thetes.

Solon assigned the functions of the government on the basis of this property-qualification. The first destroyed the Eupatrid monopoly by the rule that all the higher magistrates should be selected annually in the Ecclesia or general assembly of all the people of Attica. The Ecclesia had, moreover, the right to call its public servants to give account of their stewardship at the close of their terms. As it was not practicable for a general assembly of city and country to meet frequently, their power was usually delegated to a senate or council of four hundred members, one hundred from each of the ancient tribes. As another restraint upon the arbitrary decisions of the archons, he established the Heliaea, or jury-courts—an institution which was afterward widely extended. Citizens of every class were eligible to this service, and they had jurisdiction in cases of appeal.

Only members of the three landed classes were eligible to

office, and the choice of the highest magistrates was probably confined to the Pentekosiomedimni and possibly to the noble families whose valuation placed them in that order. At the head of the state stood the nine archons with their authority but slightly diminished. The aristocratic element was further placated by the enlargement of the powers of Areopagus. It appears that on the hill of Ares west of the Acropolis was the oldest judicial tribunal in Attica. Here, it was said, the god Ares had been tried for killing Halirrhothius, and Orestes for the murder of his mother. Solon took advantage of the legend to form a patrician court composed of the archons and ex-archons which should hear and decide capital causes on this historic spot. The court of the Areopagus, thus constituted, or reconstituted, became the most respected law-court of antiquity. But the Areopagus had wider functions. Its members represented the historic Attic families who had held high elective office and were life-members of this court. Thus they were removed from the impulses which swayed the emotional populace, and constituted an intelligent conservative force in the community. They were also clothed with a certain censorship over the lives of citizens which they exerted to maintain the laws and to suppress luxury, idleness, and vice.

In time of war the entire political body was under arms. The three upper classes fought as hoplites, or heavy armed soldiers, supplying their own armor save the spear and shield which the state put into the hands of every young man of them when he became of age. The war-archon, or polemarch, was commander-in-chief of the forces. The Hippeis, each of whom was responsible for one horse and its equipment, composed the cavalry troop. If the Thetes fought at all it was as a light armed contingent, but in the navy their muscles supplied motive power for the Attic vessels.

Such was the constitution of Solon in its leading features, a wonderful political instrument, and one well calculated to

bring an organic and useful unity out of the disorganized and hostile elements which had rent the state. Solon also added to his constitution a number of specific laws defining and setting penalties upon crimes, and regulating existing abuses. These laws, engraved on tablets, and fixed in revolving frames, were preserved in Athens for centuries.

After the adoption of his laws and political arrangements the lawgiver is said to have traveled widely through the East, visiting Egypt, Cyprus, Lydia, and every-where astonishing monarchs and people by the simplicity of his life and the wisdom of his answers. After many years of absence he returned to find his city in fresh straits. The strife of parties had burst out afresh.

The Diacrieis, or Highlanders, were the most revolutionary of the three factions. The men of the Plain and the Shore being comparatively well-to-do, ranked high in the property classes, and living near the city could participate in the meetings of assembly, council, and courts, but the shepherds and herdsmen who ranged the hills of the north and east were at the bottom of the scale, with few opportunities to rise. They were in precisely the proper condition to be wrought upon by a skillful and ambitious demagogue. Such a leader was not wanting.

Pisistratus, who made himself the champion of the Hillmen, was of the best blood in Attica—the house of Codrus. Solon was his relative, and it was said that the two noble kinsmen distinguished themselves equally in the wars with Megara. Pisistratus, however, had none of that lofty unselfishness which distinguished Solon. He was devoted to his own aggrandizement, and unscrupulous in the means which he employed. Although dissevered from the aggrieved Hillmen by birth and fortune, he espoused their cause with unusual vigor. They did not see, or perhaps they saw but heeded not, his purpose, though Solon's warnings against “the fox” were clear and shrill. Arrayed against him were

the conservatives of the Plain and Shore—the former led by a Lycurgus and a Miltiades, the latter by Megacles, of the noble house of Alcmæon. Their union excited the populace beyond restraint. They granted a life-guard of fifty citizens to their leader to protect him from these Eupatrids. Adding other troops to these, Pisistratus seized the Acropolis one night and held the city at his mercy (560 B. C.).

There was a wild flight of the nobles from the country to save themselves from the vengeance of the new tyrant, but Pisistratus seems to have ruled with moderation and mildness. He did not disturb Solon's constitution, but took precautions to have the offices filled with his own agents, so that the aristocratic republic was in reality governed by an absolute monarch. The Shoreman, Megacles, whose grandfather had been archon in Cylon's year, went abroad. Lycurgus went into exile. The leader of the Plain, Miltiades, accepted the invitation of some Thracian envoys (directed to him by the oracle) to become their general, and built up a tyranny for himself in the Chersonesus north of the Hellespont. Solon died in the first months of the Athenian tyranny, broken-hearted over the subversion of his cherished plans.

The state could not be permanently pacified by repressing its explosive forces, and the factions, whose dissensions had given the tyrant his opportunity, soon united for his overthrow. Lycurgus and Megacles sunk their jealousies and drove Pisistratus from the city. But they soon fell out, and Megacles, forming an alliance with the deposed tyrant, restored him to his old authority.

The second tyranny was as insecure as the first. The tyrant's neglect of the daughter of Megacles, whom he had married to strengthen the alliance, made her father again his foe. Once more the nobles and merchants expelled Pisistratus (549 B. C.). But they had only scotched the snake. From his retreat in Eubœa, like Napoleon at Elba,

Pisistratus continued to lead the Highlanders, whom his administration had favored, and vex the aristocrats. He seems to have entered upon wide commercial ventures, and to have formed connections with the tyrants of other Greek cities.

About 538 B. C. Pisistratus crossed with a mercenary force to Marathon, where he was joined by his partisans. They advanced upon Athens, which was ill-prepared for defence. The aristocrats, who marched out to meet the insurgents, were outgeneraled and defeated at Pallene, and immediately gave up the country for lost. There was a great emigration of noble families, that of Megacles, the Alcæonid, among them.

The victor took every precaution against a third expulsion. He kept a garrison of foreign troops in the city, and held four hundred of the Eupatridæ as hostages for the good conduct of their fellows. But he shed no blood in vengeance, and his policy, though it bore hard upon the wealthy, was mild toward the masses, and increased at once the fame of his house and the prosperity of Athens. He adorned the city, and provided work for the artisans by erecting a series of noble public buildings; he honored the gods, and won the favor of the pious, not only by the temples which he built, but by adding splendor to their festivals and solemn rites; and by opening connections with fresh foreign countries he opened a new channel for enterprise and wealth.

It is noteworthy that several of the Greek tyrants, who owed their elevation to the favor of the common people, made a fresh bid for popular support by cultivating the religion of the humbler classes at the expense of the favorite gods of the aristocracy. Thus Pisistratus honored Dionysus, the best-loved deity of the country-side, where he was worshiped as the god of luxuriant vegetable growth, and especially as the god of the vine, by establishing within the city the annual festival of the Greater Dionysia. The pro-

cessions, songs, and dances lasted through six days (at the end of March and the beginning of April), and possessed one peculiarity which attracted sight-seers from the whole world. For with the inauguration of these games the choral songs describing the adventures of the god began to take on literary polish and to be presented on the stage. Thespis, sometimes called the founder of tragedy, was the first dramatic poet and actor whose works took the prize at the Dionysia. Half a century later the drama was one of the characteristic glories of Athens.

In losing Salamis, Megara lost her grip on the Black Sea trade, for the island covered her only eastern port, Nisæa. Under Pisistratus Athens began to figure in foreign commerce. The colony which Miltiades had established on the Hellespont became friendly to the mother-city. Pisistratus sent his son Hegesistratus to Sigeum, at the entrance of that passage, to uphold Athenian interests, and perhaps to cultivate the friendship of the Persians, who had begun to come down to the coast cities of Asia Minor. Trade with Thrace enriched the state, and alliances with Thessaly, Thebes, Naxos, and Argos assured the personal security of the tyrant. He died full of years about 527 B. C.

Hippias, the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus (the Pisistratidæ), who succeeded to his father's authority, associated his brothers Hipparchus and Thessalus with himself. For a few years the old policy was continued. The Pisistratidæ were tyrants, ruling through the constitutional forms. The building of temples went busily on, the gymnasium (*academia*) was beautified. Hipparchus was a lover of music and poetry; by his order prize recitations from the Homeric poems were introduced in the programme of the Panthenaic festival which his father had newly established, and on his invitation the two famous poets of the time settled in Athens—Anacreon, who praised women and wine in graceful lyrics, and Simonides, of Ceos, whose epigrams were on every lip.

Greek tyrannies were invariably short-lived, and that at Athens did not outlive the second generation. The licentious Hipparchus grossly insulted Harmodius, a young noble. Aristogiton, the latter's friend, plotted with him to rid the state of the Pisistratidæ. They gathered a handful of confederates, and prepared to kill the tyrants on the day of the Panathenæa (514 B. C.). The attack miscarried. The youths slew Hipparchus, but the guards cut down Harmodius, and Hippias with rare courage and decision quelled the threatened outbreak. Aristogiton was tortured and executed, but he did not reveal his accomplices, and Hippias lived on in constant terror of assassination. He became cruel and morose, and abandoned the liberal principles which had enabled his father to finish his reign in peace. The emigrant nobles, egged on by the restless Alcmaeonidæ, Clisthenes and Hippocrates, the sons of Megacles and Agariste, made a fruitless incursion into Attica, but the people remained loyal to their benefactor, and would not join the aristocrats against the tyrant. The baffled Alcmaeonids then had resort to the strongest military state in Greece—Sparta of the Dorians.

During the centuries of political turmoil at Athens the state which Lycurgus had founded in the valley of the Eurotas suffered no violent change. The ephors had slowly risen to a position of equality with the two kings, but otherwise scarcely any change can be detected in the government. The training of the men and women had produced a hardy, courageous race of invincible soldiers. By means of her army Sparta had lifted herself above every rival in the Peloponnesus, until she was the real head of a southern confederacy. She was, moreover, influential throughout the Greek world through her connection with Olympia and Delphi. Powerful as she had become, she retained her Dorian simplicity, and except for the cultivation of martial and gymnastic music, with poetry of the same sort, the human accomplishments got little attention at Sparta. To this

soldier-state, which had taken the oligarchies of Megara and Corinth under its wing after the overthrow of their tyrants, Clisthenes now appealed for help against the Athenian tyranny.

The direct appeal was futile. Pisistratus included Sparta among the states whose friendship he had courted, and the ephors were loath to oppose his son. Clisthenes next had recourse to diplomacy. His family, the Alcmaeonidæ, stood high in the favor of Delphi. An early Alcmaeon had been the general of Athens in the Sacred War against Crissa, and when the Delphic temple was burned and all the Hellenic and Philhellenic world had contributed money for a new building, the Alcmaeonids, who took the builder's contract, graciously substituted the choice marble of Paros for the cheap limestone specified. The god, not unmindful of these benefits, took sides with Clisthenes, and his oracle had but one reply for the Spartans whenever they sent to consult Apollo—"Athens must be set free, Athens must be set free." This reiterated revelation had its effect. For the first time in her history Sparta entered Middle Hellas, and sent out a fleet to Attica. Hippias, re-enforced by a troop of horse from Thessaly, beat it off. On a second attempt the Spartan king, Cleomenes, led an army to Athens, and compelled the tyrant to capitulate. Hippias fled to his friends in Asia. Cleomenes retired to the Peloponnesus. The Alcmaeonidæ, whose craft had liberated the city, returned to Athens as its foremost citizens (511 B. C.).

Clisthenes at once took the helm of the drifting state, and proposed a series of changes in the Solonian constitution looking toward the establishment of a complete democracy. At this the wealthy Eupatrids put forward Isagoras in defense of their privileges. They moreover entreated Cleomenes to return and save them from their liberator, a summons which the Spartans, now aware of the collusion between Clisthenes and the oracle, gladly obeyed. They reminded

the Athenians that the Alcæonidæ were stained with the blood of the Cylonian massacre, and the curse then placed upon them had never been expiated. The powerful family was sent into exile a second time. Isagoras was chosen archon (508 B. C.), and with the support of Cleomenes and his troops the state was purged of seven hundred dangerous families. Political life still existed among the people, and the archon's attempt to set aside the popular features of Solon's system and put an oligarchy in its stead aroused the spirit of liberty. The populace, guided by the council, overcame the oligarchic party, and sent the king home in disgrace. The exiles returned from their brief banishment and Clisthenes again took up his work of reform.

Difficulties multiplied about Athens. Cleomenes, called in to adjust a feud between Thebes and its subject town Plataea, advised the latter to ally itself with Athens, thus embittering all future relations between Bœotia and Attica. Thebes and Chalcis, of Eubœa, invaded Attic territory, and the Lacedæmonians re-entered it from the south determined to set Isagoras in his old place. But Corinth, which had suffered much from her tyrants, withdrew her troops, and King Demaratus quarreled with his colleague. The allied army disintegrated near Eleusis, and Cleomenes had to retire a second time ingloriously. Admonished by this experience, Sparta decreed that henceforth but one king at a time should accompany her armies. Relieved from her southern enemy, Athens turned northward and defeated Thebes and Chalcis in succession. On the Lelantian plain before the latter city she granted four thousand homestead farms to Attic citizens. This colony, or *cleruchia*, was the second sent out from Athens; the first was planted in Salamis. At this time, also, the ships of Ægina preyed upon the almost defenseless Attic coast. Sparta made a final attempt to nip in the bud the democracy which Clisthenes was moulding in Middle Hellas. The Peloponnesus was a patchwork of oligarchic states and

monarchies dominated by the influence of Sparta. The latter state summoned her allies to meet in congress with her to determine what should be done with the new government at Athens. The ex-tyrant Hippias came over from Asia Minor to advocate his cause. Sparta confessed that she had been duped by the oracle into becoming the catspaw of Clisthenes, and she now proposed that Hippias be restored. But Corinth, smarting from the memories of Periander's cruelty, refused to aid in saddling any Greek city with a tyrant. Her strong position on the Isthmus gave weight to her protest. The allied states of Peloponnesus pronounced against the proposals of Sparta. Hippias returned to Asia to enlist barbarian aid. Athens was left free to build up her democracy.

Solon's constitution had greatly increased the power of the wealthy at the expense of the nobles, and now Clisthenes, who owed nothing to either section, removed the privileges which hedged in both classes. His constitution took no account of birth or property, but admitted rich and poor, noble and commoner, to share in the government. At the root of his arrangements was the people, or *Demos*, composed of all the free citizens of Attica without distinction. Even naturalized alien residents and emancipated slaves were included. He next divided all Attica, city and country, into one hundred *demes* (townships or districts), which enjoyed a measure of local self-government, choosing their own mayor (*demarch*), who was also a local agent of the central government. Clisthenes next apportioned these townships among ten new tribes which took the place of the old fourfold tribal classification. In order to prevent any single tribe from becoming the stronghold of one of the old parties, he "gerrymandered" the state, assigning Plain-demes, Mountain-demes, and Shore-demes to the same tribe. Thus Athens itself, the only large city, was split into numerous districts allotted among different tribes, and it must be remembered that the

municipality had no separate municipal government. It was not a political unit, but simply a more thickly settled section of the Attic commonwealth.

The ten tribes meeting together formed the *Ecclesia*, or assembly of citizens. This *Ecclesia* met at least ten times a year. The *Pnyx*, a hill west of the *Acropolis*, was its assembly-ground. The citizens deliberated in the open air, and their speakers addressed them from a rock-cut *bema* or platform. The *Ecclesia* was the center of authority in the state. It selected the members of the higher councils, chose the magistrates and generals, and had the power of impeaching them for misconduct in office. But it was not convenient for all the citizens to remain constantly in Athens for the transaction of public business. Consequently each tribe selected a delegation of fifty men, who together made up the *Council of Five Hundred*.

The *Council of Five Hundred* was a permanent executive committee of the *Ecclesia*. The year was divided into ten equal parts, and one tribal delegation (fifty members) was assigned to the presidency of each tenth. During its presidency the presiding fifty (*Prytanes*) lived in Athens and met daily in the *Prytaneum* to transact such business as might arise. They prepared legislation for the decisions of the popular assembly, summoned that body when occasion demanded, and acted as its presiding officers. Distinctions arising from birth or property seem to have carried no privileges in the assembly or council. All men who were enrolled in the tribes were equal in the eye of the constitution.

The tribesmen were not only the source of political authority; as the *Heliaæ* they exercised the supreme judicial authority. Six thousand citizens, called *Dicastæ*, or *jurymen*, were chosen annually by lot. Large panels of them attended at the courts, over which the archons presided, heard the evidence and decided the cases.

The chief magistrates of the state continued to be the

nine annually selected archons, but the dignity of the office was diminished by the method of election and by the distribution of its many duties among other officials. Thus the *Heliæa* trespassed upon their ancient judicial functions, and the institution of a board of ten tribal generals, or *strategi*, took from the archon polemarch his undivided command of the state troops. At this time, perhaps even before Clisthenes, the archons were elected by lot from the citizens who offered themselves—a provision which indicates that no especial fitness was now required for an office which had once been the most influential in the state.

The council of the *Areopagus* still received the ex-archons into its membership, but when all citizens became eligible for the archonate the *Areopagus* was no longer an exclusive patrician body, though it continued to enjoy a deserved reputation for the equity of its acts and its patriotic spirit.

The ten tribes were the army as well as the legislature and judiciary. Each tribe was responsible for putting in the field a regiment of heavy armed infantry and a battalion of cavalry, choosing its own officers every year. The ten *strategi*, or tribal generals, were with their chairman, the archon polemarch, at the head of military affairs, and in the field the chief command passed by rotation to each general for a single day at a time.

All these military, judicial, and political rights which Clisthenes secured to the ten tribes which he formed were taken away from the four ancient tribes which had been the strongholds of the aristocracy. The old tribes persisted as religious unions, but they retained no other significance in the state. To give a sentimental coloring to the artificial arrangements of the new tribes each was named from some mythical hero or early king of Attica, and a spot was reserved in Athens for the worship of these ten divinities—Cecrops, Erechtheus, Ajax, etc.

Solon had sought to limit civil strife by a curious enact-

ment disfranchising any citizen who refused to take sides in case of party warfare. Clisthenes aimed at the same evil ✓ the famous law of ostracism. The Prytanes might interro-
gate the Ecclesia whether the welfare of the community
demanded the banishment of any citizen. If the people said
yes, an extraordinary session of the assembly was convened
at which each citizen wrote upon a tile or sherd the name
of the objectionable man, and cast it in the voting urn.
If as many as six thousand ballots were cast the man whose
name was written upon a majority of the ballots must go into
exile for a period of ten years. This device was frequently
invoked to rid the state of dangerous citizens, but it did
more harm than good, and when it was discovered that two
warring factions might evade its stroke by combining to ex-
pel the leader of a third party it was abandoned.

Under the democratic constitution, which was a new po-
litical thing under the sun, Athens entered upon her great
career. Scarcely a generation after Clisthenes the democracy
was subjected to a fearful test. — Persia—the young and
virile nation which had conquered eastern Asia and northern
Africa—turned in wrath upon the feeble states of Greece.

CHAPTER IX.

GREEK VS. BARBARIAN.

THE Greek cities of Asia Minor followed much the same course of political development that marked the history of continental Hellas. They had the same distaste for union, and the same discontent with kings, oligarchs, and tyrants. Their commerce with Egypt and the Black Sea colonies poured wealth into their treasuries, and their intimate connection with the non-Hellenic civilization of the east corrupted their morals while it enlivened their fancy and opened their minds. These cities—Miletus, Ephesus, and Smyrna, chief among them—were situated on the Ægean at or near the mouths of the rivers which came down from the central highlands, the seats of the old Asiatic monarchies. The roads followed the rivers, and streams of trade flowed in the valleys.

The nations of the interior seem to have suffered the Greek coast cities to increase in power unmolested until the seventh century B. C. In that century a new dynasty, the Mermnadæ, usurped the throne of Lydia, the ancient kingdom (possibly a remnant of the Hittite realm) which occupied the basin of the river Hermus, with its capital at Sardis. King Gyges (685–660 B. C.), the founder of the dynasty, was a restless warrior who immediately undertook to extend his domain to the sea-coast, and so to acquire Smyrna and Ephesus and the other Greek ports through which passed the foreign trade of his pent-up kingdom. His successors down to Cræsus (568–546 B. C.) pursued the same policy.

The Lydians wove fine cloths of wool, they dyed in scarlet and purple, and they were cunning workers in metal;

the sand of their river Pactolus yielded gold-dust, and the subject cities paid heavy tribute. From these sources Cræsus accumulated the greatest treasure with which the Greeks had yet come in contact. The splendor of his hoards at Sardis and his lavish gifts to Delphi struck them with awe. Nor was he simply a luxurious despot. He had in full the energy of his family, and he pushed the Greek cities harder than ever. Ephesus, where the great Artemis temple, a world wonder, was still half finished, surrendered to the fortunate king. City after city followed her example and became tributary. The Lydian king was on the point of organizing a fleet to conquer the great islands off the shore when a fresh peril from the east caused him to face about and fight for the very existence of his empire. While the Mermnadæ from Gyges to Cræsus were making Lydia the mistress of western Asia Minor tremendous changes were taking place in the valley of the Euphrates.

In the middle of the sixth century B. C. Cyrus the Great established the Persian empire. His conquest of Media brought him to the Halys and threatened Lydia. Cræsus hurriedly prepared for resistance. The kings of Babylon and Egypt joined him to save their own dominions, and he even sent presents of gold to Sparta to win over the soldier-state, and to Delphi to propitiate the gods. The oracle declared, "If Cræsus should cross the Halys he should destroy a great empire." The king who had never seen a frown on fortune's face did not wait for his allies, but hurried into battle. The first meeting was indecisive, but the hardy Persians followed Cræsus to Sardis, defeated him under the walls, and after a brief siege (546 B. C.) captured city, citadel, and king. The fall of Cræsus from his pinnacle of wealth and power was a fearful shock to the mind of the Greeks, and they never ceased to use it to point the moral of their homilies on the deceitfulness of riches.

The Greek cities were now in extreme peril. Miletus made

alliance with Cyrus on the same friendly terms which she had made with Lydia, but the other colonies were less fortunate. When Cyrus prepared to reduce them to submission they fortified their towns and sent messengers across the Ægean beseeching Sparta for succor. The Spartans, who had promised aid to Cræsus but had not sent it—possibly because of their entangling war with Argos—sent no substantial assistance. Their envoys came, examined the situation, and commanded Cyrus to touch no Hellenic city. The conqueror laughed at this effrontery and retired to Babylon, intrusting a lieutenant with the reduction of Æolis and Ionia.

If the Ionians could have stood together, their resources of money, men, and ships might have made an effectual resistance, but true to their racial traits they could not unite. Thales, the philosopher and statesman of Miletus, urged upon them the advantages of forming a federal state with secure head-quarters, but no city would sacrifice its independence to the common weal. Bias, the sage of Priene, vainly urged his countrymen to migrate to Corsica. The lieutenants whom Cyrus left in charge of Lydia attacked the colonies piecemeal and soon overcame them (546–544 B. C.). Harpagus, the Mede, was the conqueror of most of the cities. The Greek towns commonly retained their form of government, paying an annual tribute to the Great King—as the Persian king of many kings was called—and furnishing troops and triremes for his forces. Some free-spirited cities emigrated rather than bear the barbarian yoke.

Cyrus died (529 B. C.) the most powerful monarch in the world. His son and heir, the cruel Cambyses (529–522 B. C.), added Phenicia and Egypt to his inheritance and conquered the north of Africa as far westward as the Greek colony of Cyrene.

A few months after the suicidal death of Cambyses, Darius (521–485 B. C.), a prince of the Persian blood royal, killed the impostor who had usurped the throne, and made

himself king. The loosely knit aggregation of subject races which Cyrus had laid under tribute revolted at the death of Cambyses, and the first care of the new monarch was to reconquer them, his second to mold them into a centralized empire with a splendid capital at Susa. By 515 B. C. the reorganization was complete. The realm was divided into twenty-three governmental departments, each under a satrap. Three of these satrapies were in Asia Minor west of the Halys—Ionia, Sardis, and Phrygia—though the first named, which comprised the Greek settlements of Æolis, Ionia, and Doris, was commonly subject to the satrap of Sardis. The tribute from the Greek towns became a regularly assessed and collected tax. The old city governments were displaced by hereditary governors whom the Greeks considered tyrants, but who ruled in the interest of Persia.

This period of political subjection was nevertheless a time of material prosperity for the Asiatic Greeks. Already they had gone beyond the Hellenes of Europe in poetry, art, and thought. They now garnered a golden harvest from their part in the trade of the empire of Darius, and lavished their revenues in embellishing the temples of their gods with statuary. Philosophy, which had already grappled with the primary problems of matter, force, life, advanced another pace when Heraclitus, the Ephesian, began to study into the divine cause of natural phenomena, and protested against the popular worship of images and against the immoralities of the current mythology.

While the Ionian satrapy was being organized Darius was absent in the far east. After overrunning the Punjab in India he returned to the west with a great army which he required the Greek cities to supplement with a fleet. He threw a bridge across the Bosphorus near Byzantium, and crossed into Europe with an army which Herodotus puts at seven hundred thousand men. The Greek fleet commanded by the city tyrants sailed through into the Black Sea, and thence to

the mouth of the Danube, where it rejoined Darius and guarded the bridge by which he crossed into Scythia (515 B. C. ?). The Persians were in dire peril among the Scythians, who lured them on into their pathless wilds, harassing them with their light cavalry, but never giving battle. Meanwhile mutiny was brewing among the Greek tyrants at the Danube bridge. Scythian riders urged them to strike the king in the back. The Athenian Miltiades—a name to be remembered—who under Persia ruled the cities of the Chersonese, had nearly persuaded the other commanders to break down the bridge and sail homeward, leaving the Great King to the mercy of the fierce northern tribes and the winter's cold. But the tyrant of Miletus, Histæus, reminded his colleagues that they owed their power to the favor of Persia, and if Darius should perish the populace would rise and cast them out of the Greek cities. This selfish counsel prevailed, and when the king fought his way back to the river he found the ships awaiting him at the bridge. Darius returned into Asia by sea, leaving Megabazus with eighty thousand men to establish Persian influence north of the Hellespont. The saving counsel of Histæus was rewarded by a grant of valuable territory on the Strymon, in Thrace; but the prosperity of the Greek's colony at that point excited the suspicion of the Persian general, and at his suggestion Histæus was summoned to court at Susa, where he was detained for several years, living in luxury and apparent freedom while his ambitious spirit fretted to return to his countrymen of the coast. Megabazus and his successor, Otanes, ably carried out their lord's instructions, and the Greek colonies of the northern Ægean and the Thracian tribes in their rear were rapidly incorporated in the Persian empire. When Amyntas, king of Macedonia, submitted without a blow, the frontier of Persia touched the northern boundary of Hellas.

In the natural course of events the Persians and the continental Hellenes must have come in conflict. There was no

limit to the ambition of Darius so long as there were worlds to conquer, and what he had seen of Greek civilization in Asia was enough to tempt him to cross the Ægean had not the open interference of Athens with his affairs made war inevitable.

While Histiaëus was detained at the Persian court in tedious splendor, his son-in-law, Aristagoras, ruled Miletus as his regent. The latter took advantage of a civil war in Naxos to propose a naval expedition against that island and others of the Cyclades. He pledged himself to conquer there a new domain for Persia, and Artaphernes, the satrap at Sardis, secured the royal approval for the undertaking. The attempt failed utterly, and Aristagoras, fearful of the consequences to himself and urged on by the secret messages of his father-in-law, determined to put Miletus at the head of a general insurrection against Persia. Hecataëus, a Milesian traveler who knew the resources of Darius, tried to dissuade his countrymen from the vast venture, or at least to seize upon the immense treasure of Apollo's temple at Branchidæ for a war-fund. He was overruled, and Aristagoras hurried his ill-prepared city into war. The sailors of the fleet which had just returned from Naxos hailed the revolt and deposed their tyrant. Democracies sprang up in nearly all the cities as the insurrection spread up and down the coast from the Hellespont to Cyprus (500 B. C.). The Dorian cities with Ephesus and two other Ionian towns remained true to the Persians.

The winter (500-499 B. C.) was spent in hurried armament. Ship-yards and armories worked over-time, and the leaders hastened from point to point organizing the revolt and seeking assistance. Aristagoras himself crossed over to Sparta in quest of armed aid in the name of Hellas, but the conservative Dorians sent him on his way empty-handed. But Athens, just beginning to feel the new life which the constitution of Clisthenes had breathed into every department of the de-

mocracy, received with favor the envoy of her Ionian kin beyond the sea. To assist Miletus was at once to help a daughter-city, and to oppose the vengeful Hippias, who hoped to re-instate himself in the seat of Pisistratus through the kind offices of his friend Artaphernes. The Ecclesia decided upon war and sent twenty ships to the help of the insurgent cities. Eretria of Eubœa sent other five triremes. These five and twenty vessels carried the only succor which the main-land Greeks afforded to their fellow-Hellenes in the hour of danger.

The insurgents struck their first blow at Sardis, the Persian headquarters in the west, which lay three days' march from the coast. They captured the city of Crœsus, but Artaphernes in the citadel held them at bay until the approach of Persian re-enforcements. Then the Greeks set fire to the dwellings and retreated toward their fleet. The Lydians, outraged by the burning of the temple of their patron goddess Cybele, turned against the insurgents, and, fresh troops coming up from the east, the Ionians and their allies were overtaken and defeated before they regained the shore. The remnants dispersed to their several cities, and the Athenians hastened homeward dismayed by the outcome of their expedition.

The Persians at once commenced a series of vigorous movements against the rebels. City after city fell, and Aristagoras, perceiving the hopelessness of his cause, fled to Thrace, where he and his companions were killed by the natives (498 B. C.). About the time of his son-in-law's death Histiaëus persuaded Darius to send him to Ionia to help quell the outbreak, but the satrap at Sardis accused him of treason. Suspected by both Greeks and Persians, he was turned away from every city until, having collected eight ships of war, he seized Byzantium, and from its citadel preyed upon the commerce of the Bosporus.

In the spring of 497 B. C. an immense Persian force was prepared to encompass Miletus by sea and land. The Ionians,

straining every nerve, assembled a fleet of three hundred and fifty-three ships to oppose the six hundred vessels which Darius had levied from Phenicia, Egypt, and other maritime dependencies. The Greek squadron anchored off the island of Lade, which lay before the harbor of Miletus. Dionysius of Phocæa was chosen admiral, but his stringent discipline vexed the sailors, and mutiny soon spread through the fleet. In the great sea-fight off Lade the greatest confusion fell upon the rebels, bringing with it desertion, disaster, and defeat. The Persians now beset Miletus by land and by sea. In the third year (494 B. C.) the city fell. Many of its inhabitants were slain, the rest were deported to the far east and settled in the valley of the Tigris. The Athenians had not lifted a finger to save their ally, but when Phrynichus showed a tragedy, "The Fall of Miletus," at the next Dionysiac festival, the people were moved to tears, the play was condemned, and a heavy fine was exacted from the poet for harrowing the people by such memories.

Miletus, now a Persian and Carian city, became the center of the royal operations. In the course of the next year the land armies completed the reduction of the coast cities, and the invincible fleet cruised among the islands accepting their submission. Panic seized the few free spirits which remained. Some embarked for Sicily and the distant west; others, like Miltiades, the tyrant of the Chersonese, who had advocated the destruction of the Danube bridge, escaped with his household to Athens, whence his ancestor, Miltiades, had emigrated. The Ionian revolt had collapsed utterly; the cities suffered terrible losses; Miletus as a Greek city was no more; and the Persian shackles were firmly riveted upon the members of the short-lived Ionian confederation.

Darius never forgot that Athens and Eretria shared the guilt of the burning of Sardis. The ancients said that one of his cup-bearers was ordered never to let a meal pass without bidding his master "remember the Athenians." As soon

as the Asiatic Greeks were under his yoke he dispatched a force under his son-in-law, Mardonius, to wreak vengeance upon Athens (492 B. C.). A multitude of vessels skirted the coast of Thrace, keeping pace with the land army. On the main-land Alexander of Macedonia renewed his father's pledges of friendship with the Persians. Every thing foreboded an easy entrance into Hellas until a north-east gale flung the ships upon the iron-bound coast of Mount Athos. Three hundred triremes were wrecked, and twenty thousand men perished in the waves or on the inhospitable shore. At the same time the army suffered such losses from a night attack of Thracians that Mardonius deemed it best to turn back, fortifying for future use the strategic points of Thrace. Darius took the command from him, and immediately (491 B. C.) prepared to renew the attack.

According to the revised plan of invasion a fleet of Persian war vessels and transports was to cross the Ægean, and land in the immediate vicinity of offending Athens. Royal heralds were sent to the individual states demanding earth and water, the tokens of submission. But the Athenians cast the envoys into a pit, and at Sparta they were thrown into a well and bidden to take water from it to their master. Other states were more prudent. Most of the Greek islands which lay in the path of invasion sued for peace.

Early in the year (490 B. C.) the second Persian expedition against Greece left the coast of Asia. Fully sixty thousand soldiers and an immense concourse of ships composed the armada. Datis and the junior Artaphernes held the joint command, and no man of them was more eager for the conquest of Greece than the aged Hippias, whom every stroke of the oars seemed to bring nearer his long-deferred vengeance. The fleet took Naxos, and burned its temples, stopped at Delos to propitiate Apollo by sacrifices, and then pushed on to Eubœa, where dwelt the Eretrians, still unpunished for their part in the firing of Sardis.

Treason within the gates gave up Eretria to its foe after six days of siege. The Persians hinted at the punishment in store for Athens when they laid the city in ashes, and carried most of the inhabitants into captivity. Having finished their work here they crossed the channel and landed in Attica. Hippias is said to have selected their first camping-grounds, the plain of Marathon, about twenty-five miles from Athens, near the estates of his father Pisistratus.

As soon as the Athenians knew that the invasion of Attica had begun they sent the runner Phidippides to Sparta to summon aid. He covered the one hundred and fifty miles in two days, but the ephors robbed his foot of speed by deciding that religious custom forbade the troops to set out before the full of the moon. Thus Athens stood alone, untried in war, and unsupported by the only Greek state which had achieved a military reputation. But twenty years of freedom had wrought a great change in Attica. The republican constitution bred in each citizen a feeling of love and loyalty for the commonwealth. If he fought it was in the defense of his own interest; if he surrendered, he gave up his own liberties, not those of a favored few. It is true that a strong party in the city, including, perhaps, the Alcmaeonidæ, were opposed to the democracy, and were in treasonable communication with Hippias and the Persians; but the great majority were earnestly resolved to protect their liberties to the last drop of blood. Two decades of Athenian freedom had saved Greece.

Miltiades led the forlorn hope as if victory were certain. He was a nephew of that Miltiades who had quitted Athens at the first success of Pisistratus, and devoted his talent for war and politics to the erection of a kingdom or tyranny, half Greek, half barbarian, in the so-called Thracian Chersonesus, north of the Hellespont. It was this younger Miltiades who would have left Darius to perish in Scythia beyond the Danube. He had joined heartily in the Ionian revolt, and

conquered Lemnos and Imbros and shared their lands with colonists (*cleruchi*) from Athens. When the Persians invaded Thrace this tyrant removed to the city of his ancestors and became a simple Athenian citizen. His enemies, the friends of Persia, failed to drive him from the city, and his executive ability, together with his inflexible hatred of the Persians, quickly set him in the forefront of affairs. On his motion the assembly voted to oppose every advance of the invader. The citizen army of perhaps ten thousand heavy armed infantry soldiers marched out and took position on the heights which border the plain of Marathon and cover the roads to Athens. Soon after their arrival the little city of Plataea gladdened the camp by sending its entire armed force, one thousand men, to the help of her neighbor and ally.

The Athenians were commanded by the ten tribal generals (*strategi*) and by Callimachus, the archon polemarch. The war council was rent by various opinions. The voice of Miltiades, who was the strategus of his tribe, was for giving battle, but in the face of such odds others were timid. Finally the casting vote of Callimachus broke the deadlock in favor of an attack. By common consent of the generals Miltiades assumed command. He arranged his men on the hillside above the plain in two strong wings connected by a weaker center. The polemarch led the right column; the Plataeans headed the left division; Aristides, the purest patriot in Athens, commanded the center. The Persians in a long and dense array occupied the level ground between the Athenians and the sea, their flanks being protected by marshes. Behind them was their camp and the beach, on which they had drawn out their flat-bottomed vessels. Doubtless the Persian party in the city kept Hippias well informed of the movements of Miltiades; and it is not improbable that the Persians, warned by the bright signal shield which these traitors hoisted on Mount Pentelicus,

were already embarking for a sudden descent upon Athens by sea when the patriot army burst upon them.

The Greeks ran down the long intervening slope and crushed the ends of the Persian line with the impetus of their onset. Armed with swords and spears and protected by metallic armor, the Athenians and Platæans inflicted terrible slaughter upon the light armed and unarmored Persian bowmen. After long-continued hand-to-hand fighting, Callimachus and the Platæans drove back their opponents. The weaker Athenian center was at first pushed aside by sheer force of numbers, but the re-enforcements coming up from the ends of the line soon completed the repulse of the Persians, who broke and fled. Datis recalled his men to their ships, and after a bloody battle on the beach, in which Callimachus received his death-stroke, the invading fleet put to sea with a loss of seven vessels and over six thousand men. Repulsed, but by no means dismayed, the Persians set sail for Athens, but Miltiades, who had seen the white shield on Pentelicus and divined its significance, made all haste for the city. His soldiers were weary, but the exultation of victory nerved them for heavier work. When the Persian armada came in sight of Athens its commander found the victors of Marathon prepared to defend their homes. Without venturing to make a second landing, the Asiatics gave up their attempt and turned their prows to the east, taking with them the spoil and the captives of Eretria as trophies. Hippias is said to have died on the homeward voyage.

The invasion which was shattered on the plain of Marathon was no more satisfactory to Darius than its predecessor, which was wrecked on the rocks of Mount Athos. The Great King had lavished men and money upon the chastisement of one Greek city, and the only result had been to add fresh insult to the original injury at Sardis. Darius, according to Greek accounts, was wild with rage at the second failure. He was master of the grandest empire in the world,

and he set himself to prepare an armament which should wipe the Greeks from the face of the earth. In the fourth year of his enormous preparations Egypt revolted from Persia, and when (485 B. C.) Darius died his son Xerxes received with the realm the sacred charge to conquer Greece.

The Athenians did not underrate the importance of Marathon and the deed which was done there. The one hundred and ninety-two slain citizens were buried with all honor on the spot where they fell, monuments were set up, and every year a solemn memorial service was held on the battle-field. The Greek gods were duly rewarded. Apollo at Delphi received a bronze group, paid for from a tithe of the spoil. Annual sacrifices were paid to Artemis, and a grotto in the hills was dedicated to Pan in grateful recognition of the "panic" fear which seized the Persians. Save for the share of loyal little Plataea, to Athens belonged all the glory of the day. On the third day after the full moon two thousand Lacedæmonians came in hot haste from Sparta, but the fleet was already eastward bound and the disciplined Dorians could only wonder at and applaud the valor by which the free citizens of Athens had flung themselves between Hellas and slavery.

The death of Darius, the Egyptian revolt, and the magnitude of the armada which Xerxes was fitting out for the third and decisive attack upon Hellas left the Greeks unmolested for ten years. But while all the Orient was forging chains for her Athens was not oblivious of her danger. Her government continued to produce men capable of shaping her course to meet and withstand the gathering storm. The people could deny nothing to the hero of Marathon, and when Miltiades (489 B. C.) asked for a fleet for a secret purpose which should be for their profit the assembly gave him seventy ships with men and money. With these forces he attacked several of the Cyclades which had allied themselves with Darius. Paros, which resisted his demand for one hun-

dred talents, he besieged. Failing to take it, and suffering from a wound, he returned to Athens, where Xanthippus, of the hostile house of Alcmaeon, accused him before the assembly of deceiving the people. Whether the general's purpose was to build up such a maritime confederation as was formed a few years later, or whether he used his fame to levy blackmail, we cannot say, but notwithstanding his inestimable services the court pronounced him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty talents. The great man died miserably of his wound a few months after his conviction, but his son Cimon, who inherited much of his father's military genius, gave himself no rest until he had discharged the last drachma of the debt.

Every one at Athens knew that sooner or later the city must again measure strength with Persia. There were two well-defined and opposing theories in regard to the best means of preparing for the struggle. The conservative party, whose very bone and sinew were the Eupatrid land-owners of Attica, pointed to the success of the hoplites at Marathon, and to indomitable Sparta, and urged the people to place their main reliance in a citizen army. The liberals, recruited from the merchants and shop-keepers of Athens, argued that the future prosperity of Athens in war as in peace depended upon a possession of a fleet powerful enough to dominate the neighboring coasts and islands, and to contest the progress of the navy which Xerxes was collecting in Phenicia, Cilicia, and Ionia.

The leader of the conservatives was Aristides, a man of moderate means, but of good family, and far above the average of his countrymen in probity. Indeed, one man is said to have voted for his ostracism merely because he was sick of hearing Aristides continually called "The Just." His tribe recognized his ability and patriotism by making him its corps commander, and at Marathon he was intrusted with the delicate duty of engaging the Persian center with a few troops,

while the main force of his countrymen hammered the enemy's flanks. His services in the field increased his popularity and gave his word weight in the assembly, where he represented the simple old-fashioned order of affairs, believing that the strength of Attica lay in her citizen farmers—men who had a land-owner's interest in the welfare of the state. Let the Persians come when they would, a citizen army should meet them, as it had already met them on the illustrious plain.

Themistocles led the party of progress. He was not of pure Attic descent—his mother was said to be from Acarnania, or perhaps a Thracian—but this disadvantage only whetted his ambition. A keen observer of men and things, a statesman of remarkable sagacity, prudence, and foresight, quick to decide and grimly tenacious of purpose, shrewd beyond the limits of trickery, and a giver and taker of bribes, he became the controlling force of the democracy.

Themistocles attacked the old-fashioned policy of Aristides at its foundation. Instead of drilling the citizens into an army, and so making Athens military leader of Middle Hellas as Sparta was of the Peloponnesus, he proposed to strengthen the fleet, improve the harbor and dock-yards, fortify the capital, and to match the Spartan land empire with the sovereignty of the Ægean Islands. The partisans of Aristides condemned this policy as crack-brained. Whatever glory Athens had in Greece she had won on the land. The colonizing and trading spirit of recent years had not touched her. Furthermore, she had seen so great a maritime city as Miletus fall before the Persians despite its wealth and the number of its ships. The only naval wars on which the Athenians had ever ventured were Miltiades's fatal raid on Paros and a long-drawn struggle with Ægina, which neither side seemed able to terminate. If these feeble maritime states could defy them, how could they hope to cope with Persia?

Themistocles persisted. He gathered clubs of citizens de-

voted to his ideas and waged a fierce political war in the popular assembly. The city crowd—merchants, tradesmen, and sailors—followed the leader who could promise a new era of growth in population, wealth, and trade. Aristides found his support mainly among the steady-going husbandmen of the country demes. These were less numerous, and it was more difficult for them to attend to their political duties in the city. Accordingly, when, in 483 B. C., it was decided to silence the factions by ostracism, it was the just Aristides who was sent into exile.

Themistocles, upheld by the throngs of voters in the city whom his plans had captivated, hurried his measures through the Ecclesia. The vexatious war with Ægina was the most pressing trouble, though high above it loomed the might of Persia, for every east wind brought rumors of coming doom to Hellas. To crush Ægina the fleet must be augmented. Now it so happened that the Attic silver-mines of Laurium yielded a surplus revenue, which the state proposed to distribute among its citizens. At Themistocles's motion the people appropriated one hundred talents of this money to build ships of war. By 481 B. C. one hundred triremes were afloat, a force outranking those of Corinth and Coreyra, hitherto the chief naval states of Hellas. At the same time, apparently, the dock-yards and naval stations were removed from the exposed bay of Phalerum, hitherto the city port, and established upon an enlarged scale a few furlongs further west in the secure basin of Piræus, which rapidly became the center of a busy community, and which is to this day the harbor of Athens, four miles inland. Before the fortification could be carried far the Persian war-cloud burst over the land.

After suppressing the Egyptian revolt, Xerxes applied himself anew to the war against Greece. He determined to enter Europe with an army which should exhibit the full resources of his world-empire and paralyze resistance. In the autumn of 481 B. C. the host mustered on the plain of Cri-

talla in Cappadocia. There never has been, scarcely can be, another army so numerous, so diverse. The three known continents were represented in its ranks with men and weapons of every sort from India to Cyrene. The historians of the Persian wars lingered fondly over the number of these multitudes. Some have placed the figures as high as five million. But the truth is probably far within that limit. Three hundred thousand were selected soldiers of Persia, Media, and Bactria. The fleet which rallied in the ports of Ionia comprised one thousand two hundred and seven triremes and perhaps as many transports. The Phenicians, Egyptians, and the Greek subject cities of Asia Minor furnished and manned most of the vessels, but a detachment of Persian marines was stationed on board of each ship as a precaution against mutiny.

Three years before the invasion the plans of campaign were adopted. The army was to proceed by land, following the route of Mardonius. Five immense magazines of food and forage were accordingly established at intervals along the road. To rob Mount Athos of its terrors, a ship-canal was dug through the isthmus; a bridge was flung across the Strymon, and a broad earth-covered roadway, supported on a double row of pontoons, and held in position by cables, was built across the Hellespont at Abydos. When the preparations were complete Xerxes came down from his capital to Sardis, ready to cross the Hellespont at the dawn of spring. From his winter quarters he sent heralds across the sea to demand the submission of the Greek states. But this time no herald ventured to appear at Athens or at Sparta.

Under the stress of a common danger, the Greek states drew together. At the suggestion of Athens, where Themistocles's hand was on the tiller, Sparta, as the senior city, summoned all the countries of Hellas to send delegates to a council to take such measures as should seem advisable. The congress met in an old temple of Posidon on the Isthmus of Corinth

while the natives of Asia were mustering at Critalla. With the exception of Thebes and Argos, most of the states of continental Greece were represented. There they confederated themselves to lay aside jealousies and intestinal strife, and to co-operate for the preservation of Hellas from the barbarians. Upon the cities which voluntarily joined the Persians, they pledged themselves to execute the vengeance of Apollo the purifier. All acquiesced for the present in the hegemony of Sparta; her king, Leonidas, was to be chairman of the military council, and her representative, Euænetus, was to be admiral of the fleet. Spies were dispatched to Sardis, and embassies were sent to the foreign Greeks in Crete, Sicily, and Coreyra soliciting aid in the name of Hellenism. Crete would venture nothing; the Syracusan tyrant, the most powerful of the Sicilian Greeks, refused to help unless he might have the supreme command; and though Coreyra promised aid she timidly withheld her sixty ships until they were no longer needed. As it became evident that Greece must stand or fall by herself the voice of Apollo wavered, and his Delphic oracle, doubtless well informed of the measureless armament, gave forth despairing answers, thereby impairing forever its high repute as the mouth-piece of Hellenic nationality. Xerxes captured the spies who came to Sardis, but dismissed them unharmed after having them conducted through his cantonments, thinking that nothing could dishearten the Greeks more than a truthful report of the magnitude of the invading army.

In the year 480 B. C., in early spring, the army of Persia began its march. The winter storms had shattered the bridge over the Hellespont. It was rebuilt, but the offended king is said to have had the engineers beheaded, and the waters lashed and chained, in token of his displeasure. Thence, using the roads parallel to the coast, the army of invasion swept westward through Thrace unresisted, the myriad vessels of the fleet following at a safe distance from the shore.

When Xerxes reached Macedonia the Greek army of ten thousand men, under Euænetus and Themistocles, evacuated the first line of defense, the Vale of Tempe, and returned to the Isthmus. There the Spartans insisted that they should remain, abandoning Middle Hellas, as they had already abandoned Thessaly. But Athens lay beyond the Isthmus, and Themistocles cast all his influence against the proposal. Almost alone he induced the allies to station a fleet at Artemisium, guarding the inside water route to Attica, and a land force near by where the road by which Xerxes must enter Middle Hellas ran for two miles along a narrow shelf between the sheer cliff of Mount Cæta and the waters of the Gulf of Malis—the Hot Gates or Thermopylæ. The pass was admirably adapted for defense, for mere superiority of numbers was of no advantage where barely a score of men could fight abreast.


Eurybiades, the Spartan, was chief admiral of the allies at Artemisium, but Themistocles, with the one hundred and forty-seven triremes which his own foresight had provided, commanded the Athenian division and was the mainspring of every aggressive movement. When the Persians came coasting down the Thermaic Gulf the allies weakly retreated to the Euripus, but, getting news of a fearful three-days' storm which had wrecked four hundred of the enemy's ships, they resumed their former post, making thank-offerings to Posidon, who was evidently fighting for Hellas. When, however, they saw the remnant of the armada, still many times outnumbering them, round the promontory and enter the strait, they would have retreated again. But deserters told them that a battle was inevitable, because a picked squadron of the enemy was already hurrying southward to round the capes of Eubœa and cut off their means of escape. Thereupon a council was held and the Greeks determined to attack. The story was afterward circulated by the opponents of Themistocles that the Eubœans, fearful of their

safety, bribed him with thirty talents to hold the Greek fleet at Artemisium, and that with eight talents of this money he won over Eurybiades and the Corinthian commander. At all events the Greeks remained steadfast, and, striking the enemy by a sudden dash, inflicted some damage. That night Boreas and Posidon fought again for Greece and strewed the back-side of Eubœa with the fragments of the Persian detachment. The tidings of this fresh disaster, and the advent of fifty-three additional triremes from Athens, nerved the Greeks to new efforts, and for two successive days they engaged the main body of the enemy. The skill of their maneuvers, and the desperation with which the volunteers went into battle for their liberties, overmatched the dogged stubbornness of the seamen whom the Persian despot had impressed from every port of the Orient. Yet when wind and wave and steady courage had done their worst the hostile fleet was larger and apparently stronger than any navy which the Hellenes could muster. The sea-fights off Artemisium were still undecided when a scout ship brought dreadful news from Thermopylæ. Xerxes had captured the pass, and all Middle Hellas was at his mercy. Eurybiades hastily withdrew the fleet to the Saronic Gulf, where he was in close communication with the Peloponnesians, who were destroying the roads of the Isthmus and fortifying its passes.

The garrison of Thermopylæ consisted of three hundred Spartan citizens (married men, it was said, who had sons to succeed them should they fall), three thousand eight hundred other Peloponnesians, seven hundred Thespians, and four hundred Thebans, these last rather as hostages than as helpers, together with the armed citizens of Phocis and Locris. The entire army did not exceed ten thousand men. Greece might have put one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers in the field, but it is said that the Olympian games and the Carnean festival at Sparta detained the flower of Hellas from the war. King Leonidas, who commanded the garrison, stationed one

thousand Phocians near the summit of Anopæa to guard the obscure footpath which led over the heights and down to his rear.

The Greek evacuation of Tempe at his approach was so in accord with the expectations of Xerxes that he was amazed to find Leonidas at Thermopylæ. For four days after his



THE VICINITY OF THERMOPYLÆ.

arrival at Trachis he postponed the attack, thinking that the Greeks would withdraw in the presence of an army outnumbering them one hundred to one. But Demaratus, the fugitive Spartan king, knew his countrymen better, and Herodotus records how he said to the monarch, "Be assured, O, king, that if you conquer these men, and those behind them in Sparta, no other nation in all the world will dare lift a hand against you."

On the fifth day Xerxes sent a troop to fetch the rash Greeks to his camp alive. But in the narrow roadway the Greek hoplites, cased in brass, protected by broad shields,

and wielding long spears, opposed an impregnable wall to the light armed Persian infantry, who poured into the pass only to choke it with their corpses. Next the king hurled his favorite corps, the ten thousand "Immortals," into the fatal road, but though fighting under the royal eye they could not push the desperate Greeks out of the path. After a second day's fighting, in which the disciplined Greek freemen again held their ground against the Asiatic hordes who were driven against them under the lash, the Persians fell back disheartened. News of the successive calamities which had befallen the fleet must have reached the camp. The expedition which was to astound Europe with the splendor of Asia was brought to a stand-still by a handful of Greeks in the first encounter.

That night a Greek traitor (Ephialtes of Malis, according to Herodotus) piloted Hydarnes with a strong division, perhaps twenty thousand, up the path over Anopæa. At dawn they surprised the unwary Phocian guards, and slipping by them descended in the rear of Thermopylæ. Word came to Leonidas that before noon he would be hemmed in between the two foes. All hope vanished. The king forthwith dismissed all his troops, except the suspected Thebans (who deserted at their first opportunity) and the Spartan three hundred, whose duty kept them with their king. The seven hundred Thespians also chose to stay. In the middle of the forenoon of the third day Xerxes gave the order, and a close column of barbarians swept down upon the devoted band. Four times the Spartan and Thespian spear-points flung them back, killing ten men for one. At length shouts from the east end of the pass showed that Hydarnes had accomplished his purpose. The heroic remnant, blood-stained and weary, gathered on a little knoll and fought with weapons, hands, and teeth until the last life went out in blood. On this slight eminence the Greek states afterward erected a marble lion in memory of Leonidas, and over the common tomb of the slain were placed monumental pillars, bearing engraved inscriptions.

The brave stand at Thermopylæ showed the Greeks that man for man they outmatched the Persians, but the loss of the pass gave the Great King a clear road to the Isthmus. Ten days after Thermopylæ Xerxes's headquarters were in Athens. It was an almost empty city that Xerxes took. The oracle had warned Athens that her safety lay in a "wooden wall," and while a few defenders barricaded the Acropolis the mass of the population accepted Themistocles's interpretation—that the fleet was the wooden wall—and embarked with their movables. The council of the Areopagus seems to have taken a leading and patriotic part in raising funds and animating the people in these dark days. Some of the Athenians were set down on the island of Salamis, others in the Peloponnesus, that last compartment of the ship of state from which the Isthmian bulkhead still excluded the barbarian flood. The Acropolis was taken by the Persians, its garrison destroyed, its temples burned.

The allied army mustering at the Isthmus comprised the full fighting force of loyal Greece. A wall was constructed across the narrow spit of land, and the rugged road through Megaris was broken up and heaped with obstacles. Nevertheless the Greek army was not one fifth of the Persian, and the king's navy was double that of Greece. The Persians anchored in the bay of Phalerum, near Athens; the three hundred and seventy-eight Greek ships lay a few miles farther west in the strait which separates Salamis from the main-land of Attica. Eurybiades, the Spartan, was admiral of the fleet, but Themistocles, the Athenian commander, was most influential in the council. He needed all his eloquence and cunning; for now that all Middle Hellas was held by the enemy the Peloponnesians were resolved to abandon the Attic coast and take a new position at the Isthmus. Against this the Athenian urged the folly of giving up Salamis, Ægina, and Megaris without a struggle. Better give battle in these narrow waters, where, as at Thermopylæ,

the numbers of Persia would count for little. Better fight here, and then, if need be, retire upon the Isthmus as a last resort. The council voted to retreat, and Adeimantus, the Corinthian leader, bade Themistocles be silent, for, since Xerxes was in Athens, he was a man without a country. Themistocles retorted that the ships of Athens were country enough, and if the allies forsook the Athenians in their hour of peril his countrymen would embark their families and their goods and found a new Athens in the West. Such arguments prevailed, and the former decision was reversed. The



next day the Greeks prepared for the battle, invoking the aid of the gods on their desperate situation. Great activity was visible also at Phalerum, for Xerxes, too, had given orders for his admirals to advance on the morrow. The Greeks were wavering. Some weak hearts deserted. After noon the council of commanders re-assembled with full purpose to overrule Themistocles and escape while there was yet time. But the Athenian perceived their object and sent a trusty slave to acquaint the Persians with their plans and in the guise of a traitor to point out that by a prompt extension of the Persian fleet so as to occupy both outlets of the

Salaminian strait Xerxes might surround and destroy the allied ships as he had entrapped the garrison of Thermopylæ. The advice was taken, and under cover of the darkness the Phœnician ships crept along the coast of Attica past the Greek vessels to a position in the western narrows, while the rest of the armada formed a continuous line to the eastern mouth, where the little island of Psyttaleia was also occupied by Persian soldiers. The Greek council wrangled far into the night. Very late came a man in a small boat seeking an audience and a chance to fight for his country. It was Aristides, whose ostracism had been revoked, and who now came from Ægina with the report that the Persian ships were everywhere in motion and that the Greeks were already surrounded. Others confirmed the tidings. Dissension was silenced, and sailors and captains determined to win next day or die.

Morning showed the Greeks crowded in the recesses of the bay with the enemy ranged in front of them. A tradition said that a Greek captain opened the battle by ramming a Phœnician vessel with his trireme. The fight soon became general, the Greeks advancing in well-preserved lines and executing skillful maneuvers while the Persians fought without concert of action. King Xerxes, sitting on the rocky brow of Mount Ægaleus, overlooked the scene of the combat, confident of the issue. But the fortunes of the day drove him from his throne in rage and terror, for the fierce attacks of the Athenians shattered the right wing of his fleet, and the retreating ships, becoming entangled with the swarms of fresh vessels behind them, disabled both. Inspired by the promise of victory, the Greeks redoubled their efforts, breaking oars and staving in the planking of their foes. Aristides with a small band took Psyttaleia and saved their countrymen who swam ashore from their foundering triremes. Toward evening the remnant of the Persian navy withdrew to Phalerum to count up its losses and refit. Of the six or

seven hundred vessels of Asia that entered the fight only about three hundred seaworthy ships survived. Discipline and desperation had conquered.

The Greeks, whose loss was slight, made ready to renew the battle on the following day, but they were not molested. On the second day after the battle of Salamis they discovered that the Persian fleet had put to sea and was now well on its way to Asia to protect the bridge over the Hellespont; for the cowardly Xerxes had no stomach for more fighting. Thermopylæ and Salamis had taught him that the conquest of Hellas was no holiday excursion. The horseman who was posting over the roads to Susa with the news that the Great King had taken Athens had but a few days' start of the royal messenger who should announce to the proud queen-mother, Atossa, the news of Salamis. Upon the departure of the ships the land army commenced its retreat, back over blackened Attica, back through friendly Bœotia, back through bloody Thermopylæ, and into the great pasture-plain of Thessaly. Here Mardonius, at his urgent request, was left with three hundred thousand selected soldiers to complete the conquest of Hellas. The others continued their retreat, on which it is said they suffered terrible losses from frost-bite and famine. The king found his bridge broken by storms, but the fleet took him across the Hellespont and he reached Sardis in safety.

The victors of Salamis followed the Persian vessels some leagues across the Ægean. Themistocles would have had them make for the Hellespont and so intercept the retreating king, but the council rejected his proposal, and after attacking a few island cities which had favored Persia the ships returned to the Isthmus. Here it is said the commanders balloted for the prize of merit. With the petty jealousy of their race the commanders voted each for himself, but the second prize was awarded, with marked unanimity, to Themistocles, to whose foresight and energy were due both the existence and the masterly management of the fleet

which had saved Hellas thus far from the barbarian. Even Sparta, seldom the friend of democratic heroes, heaped honors upon him. The protecting gods received their share of the spoils of war, and memorials were erected at Delphi and elsewhere. The Athenians who had fled before the Persians now returned from their exile and re peopled Attica. Thus the year 480 B. C. closed upon a hopeful country, exultant in the achievements of the summer campaign and confident that the gods of Olympus would not leave their favorite children to perish by the sword of Mardonius.

Perceiving that Athens was his stoutest foe, Mardonius from his winter camp in Thessaly sent the Macedonian chief, Alexander, to the city in the king's name, offering pardon and indemnity. Sparta got wind of the negotiations and exhorted the Athenians to stand firm. The mission of Alexander having failed, Mardonius brought his troops into Attica, the inhabitants retiring before him to Salamis. Still the Persian spared the farms and dwellings and made tempting offers to the inhabitants. These seem to have wavered for a moment. They sent Xanthippus with Myronides, and Cimon, Miltiades's son, to Sparta, asking immediate aid. The ephors put them off from day to day, while the work of fortifying the Isthmus was rushed to completion. On the morning when the exasperated ambassadors announced their decision to return and advise their countrymen to accept the gracious Persian terms the ephors surprised them by the news that a Spartan force was already on the march to Attica. An Argive spy brought tidings of the Spartan decision to Mardonius, who, despairing of peace with Athens, burned the remnant of the city, and then in July, 479 B. C., withdrew his forces to the fertile plain of Bœotia, where he built a fortified camp not far from Plataea. Here was forage for his cavalry, water for man and beast, and safe means of retreat by the well-garrisoned passes in his rear.

Pausanias, who was regent of Sparta during the infancy of the son of Leonidas, commanded the forces of the allies at the Isthmus. With over one hundred thousand men, chiefly Peloponnesians, with Athenians, Plataeans, and Megarians, Pausanias entered Bœotia and encamped not far from the Persian stockade. The Greeks had no mounted soldiers to oppose to the excellent cavalry of Persia, and were obliged to occupy rough ground in order to protect themselves from their keen cimeters. Twice Pausanias changed his position in order to shield his men. The second maneuver was bunglingly executed ; for while the Athenians on the left wing, and the Lacedæmonians on the right, slowly fell back toward the new base the mixed troops in the center of the line retreated in confusion to the walls of Plataea. Mardonius, whose cavalry needed the plain for action, and who had therefore been waiting for the Greeks to come down from the hills, interpreted the backward movement as a retreat, and gave the order of pursuit. His men came on with a fierce rush but without the discipline of Greeks. Within bow-shot they halted and set up their shields in the ground for a breastwork, letting fly their arrows. Pausanias received their fire without answering, until the sacrificial victims which he was offering gave promise of success. Then the solid Spartan phalanx plunged against the light breastwork of shields, and engaged with the Persians hand to hand with sword and spear and knife. The Asiatics were recklessly brave, and many on both sides fell, but the Spartans were invincible, and when they slew Mardonius his followers broke and sought refuge in their camp. Meanwhile Aristides, who commanded the Athenians, had engaged the Bœotians and other Greek auxiliaries of Persia, overcoming them after a bloody contest. The remnant fled to Thebes. The victors of both battles met under the walls of the stockade, which was filled with panic-stricken soldiers, with many camp-followers, and the plunder of Hellas. The Athenians

were the first to scale the palisade ; a breach was quickly made, through which poured the conquering Greeks, crazed with the ardor of battle and the joy of their tremendous victory. The fugitives in the camp were slaughtered, and of the army of conquest which Xerxes had left with Mardonius only forty thousand under Artabazus escaped. They had not waited the issue of the battle, and they alone, though sorely beset in Thrace, reached Asia in safety.

One tenth of the spoil was dedicated to the gods. Zeus, at Olympia, received a statue, another was erected on the Isthmus in honor of Posidon, and at Delphi the thirty-one allied cities set up a memorial tripod. The Greek dead (said to number thirteen hundred and sixty) were buried with all honor before Plataea, and that high-spirited city was intrusted with the duty of cherishing their tombs. She was made a free city with all Greece for a protector. Outside her gates was set up an altar to Zeus "the liberator" (Eleutherius), and in his honor the Eleutheria, or festival of freedom, was to be celebrated every four years. When the formalities were ended at Plataea the allies marched on Thebes and took thence the leaders of the Persian party. They were sentenced to death for treason.

In the early part of the year 479 B. C. naval operations were at a stand-still. The Greek states were exerting themselves to swell their armies. Themistocles was in private life, and Leotychidas, the Spartan king and admiral, had barely one hundred and ten triremes at his command. With these he dared not cross the Ægean, though invitations from Ionia were not lacking. Making his head-quarters at Delos, he was prepared to support the land army or repel a descent of the enemy by sea. But the enemy were no more aggressive than their opponents. Artemisium and Salamis took the heart out of the Persian sailors, and their admiral, Mardontes, preferred guarding Ionia to venturing again in the waters of Hellas. His ships lay off the island of Samos, in close com-

munication with a Persian land army under Tigranes, which was encamped on the promontory of Mount Mycale.

To Leotychidas at Delos came leading men of Ionia with news that the Persian fleet was weak and that the subject Greeks, especially the Samians, would revolt from Xerxes at first sight of the ships of Hellas. The admiral was persuaded and crossed from Delos to Samos. At his approach Mardontes avoided a combat, and, dragging his flat-bottomed vessels out on the shingle, built a palisade around them. The Hellenes also left their ships and attacked the united forces of the Persians. Both Mardontes and Tigranes were killed, the camp was taken and burned, the Samians and Milesians turned their arms against their masters and slew the Persians by scores and hundreds. Thus the chief defenses of the Persian power among the islands and coast cities of Asia Minor were wiped out at one sweep. Tradition said that the battles of Mycale and Plataea took place on the same day, and that the marines on the Ionian promontory were encouraged in their attack by a rumor that ran through their ranks that Mardonius had been defeated in Bæotia. Some said the gods had carried the news, and some had seen the staff of an invisible herald lying on the beach.

Marathon, Thermopylæ, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale mark the successive stages of the great war. Marathon has been called one of the decisive battles of the world, for it was the victory of Miltiades that put heart into the Athenians and the truest Greeks to fight to the last, whatever might be the odds. Leonidas at Thermopylæ first touched the weak spot in the host of Xerxes and displayed to the Great King what spirit was bred by liberty and law. Salamis put an end to the naval division of the armada, and Plataea destroyed the land army. The forenoon of that day liberated Hellas, and before the sun went down behind Mount Mycale the Greeks of Ionia were renouncing their allegiance to the Great King.

The contest had seemed unequal at the outset. Against the Persian realm, enormous in extent, in wealth, and in armed men, were arrayed the discordant states of continental Hellas, of scanty population, small means, and no experience in foreign war. Many Greeks joined the invaders and fought without compunction against their brethren. The wealthy cities of the Hellenic west—Corcyra, Magna Græcia, Sicily—ignored the bond of blood. But the free democracy of Athens, guided by Themistocles and Aristides, and the stern warriors of Sparta, formed a nucleus about which the loyal Greeks rallied and saved Europe from becoming an Oriental satrapy. It was our battle which those heroes fought—the battle of law and liberty and intellect against despotism, dullness, and mental stagnation.

CHAPTER X.

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

THE second revolt of the Ionian cities, for which the victory at Mycale was the signal, set in motion a train of events of the greatest importance to Hellas. The sense of common interest which had animated the allies so long as they were menaced by Xerxes died out after Plataea, and the old dissensions crept in among the members. There was no general willingness to complete the war of liberation by lending the hand of Hellas to the Hellenes of Asia in their struggle against Persia. But Athens, guided now as in the days of Marathon and Salamis, by enlightened statesmen, stepped forward as the champion of the race, and reaped the reward of her foresight. She became first the acknowledged leader of a naval confederacy and then the sovereign of a maritime empire. Up to Marathon she was the struggling market-town of meager Attica, scarcely holding her own in battle with the states around her; men who fought for her that day lived to see her become the most powerful city in the world.

After Mycale the officers of the federal fleet had a difficult question to decide. Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and other Greek islands threw off the Persian supremacy and sought the aid of the Greeks. The Spartans, averse to entangling alliances with foreign states, proposed to abandon Asia to the Persians and to remove the revolted Ionians to continental Hellas, assigning homes to them in those states which had forfeited their lands by taking side with the invader. The Athenians, however, espoused the broad view that all Greece should make common cause against the barbarian. Accordingly the allies admitted the insurgent islands to the Greek

confederacy, but left the main-land cities to the protection of Athens. The federal fleet then sailed to the Hellespont. The storms had already broken the bridge which they came to destroy. Leotychidas and the Peloponnesians then sailed for home, deeming their duty done, but the Athenians and Ionians besieged and took the city of Sestus (early in 478 B. C.). The fleet then dispersed, leaving the Asiatic Greeks mindful of the good-will of Athens.

In the early autumn of 479 B. C. the Attic population came back from their second exile and hastened to rebuild their capital. Themistocles's voice, which jealousy had silenced for a year, was again weighty in council, and his policy had been so brilliantly vindicated at Salamis and Mycale that even his old rival Aristides could not gainsay its worth. With the same far-seeing statesmanship Themistocles persuaded the people to adopt his plan for the new fortifications. In order to save the Attic community from the humiliation and loss of another evacuation the walls of Athens were to be extensive enough and strong enough to afford shelter and safety for the entire population. A similar rampart was to include the ship-yards, docks, and warehouses of the commercial and naval settlement at Piræus.

The jealousy of Corinth and Ægina rose with the rising tiers of stone. The city which had robbed them of their naval superiority was preparing to make herself invincible. They bitterly complained to the Peloponnesian league, of which Sparta was the leader. The Spartans remonstrated with Athens for raising a fortress which, in the hands of the Persians, might be used against the Greeks. In short, as the head of the anti-Persian confederacy, Sparta commanded the Athenians to cease from building. Such interference in her affairs could not be tolerated by Athens, yet she was too feeble to resist by force. The talent of Themistocles came into play. He was appointed with Aristides and a third to go to Sparta with his city's answer. He went forthwith, but

would not treat with the ephors until the arrival of his colleagues, who were purposely delayed. Meanwhile every Athenian who could lift a block or push a barrow was working on the walls. In the scarcity of building-stone, temple-columns and cornices, grave-stones and door-steps were utilized. When Aristides and his companion reached Sparta the walls were defensible, and Themistocles frankly declared that the work was completed ; it had been done for the common good, and it would not be undone unless all the walled towns of the Peloponnesus should be similarly stripped. Sparta made a merit of necessity and withdrew her remonstrance, but she saw then, if not before, that her undisputed eminence in Hellas was at an end.

After the completion of the city wall the harbors at Piræus were improved by moles of masonry, and a circuit wall ten feet thick, faced with stone blocks clamped with iron, was thrown about the whole. Within this wall grew up a busy commercial population. Sea-faring men dwelt here, and thousands of the metics (*metæci*), or registered foreigners, in whose hands was much of the trade of Athens.

In the summer of 478 B. C., while Themistocles was skillfully contriving a basis for the greatness of Athens, her sailors in the East were framing the superstructure. The allies sent out a small fleet, thirty Athenian ships and twenty Peloponnesian, under the regent Pausanias to strike a double blow at Persia. They first liberated the Greek cities of Cyprus, the great island which commanded Cilicia, Phenicia, and Egypt, the triple seat of the Persian navy. Then, sailing northward, they besieged and took Byzantium on the Bosphorus. From the rich spoil Pausanias dedicated a monument to Posidon, inscribed "Pausanias, lord of Hellas." Counting upon his fame as the conqueror of Mardonius, he released certain captured Persian nobles and sent one of them to Xerxes with his promise to conquer Greece and rule it in the Great King's name, if supported by Persian men and money.

The monarch looked favorably upon the overture, but before Pausanias could accomplish his treason a summons from Sparta called him thither. His arrogance, his exchange of the simple customs of Lycurgus for the luxury of an eastern court, had disgusted the allies in the fleet, and they had complained to the ephors. Strangely enough, he obeyed the order to return. Though relieved of his command he was not otherwise punished, and soon recommenced his intrigues with Persia. Again haled to trial, no accuser would denounce the victor of Platæa, but when a few years later he added to his treasons an attempt to raise the helots against their masters his doom was sealed. By stratagem the ephors secured convincing evidence of his crime from his own lips. Warned of his danger, he sought sanctuary in a temple, where he was starved to the point of death and then dragged from the hallowed ground to die (469 B. C.).

The Athenian section of the allied fleet at Byzantium was commanded by the renowned Aristides. The second in rank was Cimon, the generous and genial son of Miltiades. Athens already stood well with the Ionians because of her friendly attitude after the battle of Mycale, when Sparta proposed to abandon them or force them to migrate. Their generals were as popular in the fleet as Pausanias was detested. Before the arrival of Dorcis (spring of 476 B. C.), whom the Spartans had appointed in the regent's stead, the representatives of the Ionian islands and coast cities had offered the chief command to the two Athenians. They accepted the trust in the name of their state. Sparta withdrew altogether from the naval operations. She retained the presidency of the land alliance, but Athens, which furnished the largest number of vessels and pursued the most enlightened policy, became the acknowledged leader of the maritime cities of the Ægean.

Athens immediately set about the organization of a new confederacy. Its members—Eubœa, Samos, Chios, Lesbos, the Cyclades, the Hellespontine cities, and such Greek towns of

Asia Minor as had been freed from Persia—bound themselves by an oath to unite their resources for the common purpose of liberating those Greek states which were still tributary to the Great King. Each was to make a fixed yearly contribution in money or naval force for the prosecution of the war. The treasury of the league was established at Delos, in the Cyclades, in the temple of Apollo, the ancient religious center of the island states. Athens was made warder of the treasure as well as leader of the fleet, but the interests of the several members were to be guarded by a legislative synod or congress at Delos, in which each state, great and small, had an equal vote. The first year's tax levy of this "confederacy of Delos" (\$460,000) was assessed upon the states by Aristides with eminent justice and with an incorruptible honesty that was the marvel of his age and country.

It may well be believed that one of Sparta's reasons for abdicating the naval supremacy was her desire to extend her influence by land. Her king, Leotychidas (476 B. C.), sailed northward with a Peloponnesian force and landed in Thessaly—which merited the vengeance of the allies for its adhesion to Xerxes. The expedition seemed to be on the verge of success when it was discovered that Leotychidas was too well supplied with Thessalian silver. He was recalled abruptly, and condemned for taking bribes, but saved his life by flight. The undertaking was abandoned. Before evacuating Thessaly, however, the Spartans seem to have made a bold stroke for the mastery of Middle Hellas.

Delphi, the most honored sanctuary in Greece, was controlled by a council or amphictyony of twelve tribes, of whom the Spartans were one and the Ionians of Attica another. The former proposed that those amphictyonic tribes which had joined the foe of Hellas should be expelled from the council. Such an act would have made Delphi, with its wide influence, subservient to Sparta. Themistocles, who represented Athens in the Delphic council for that year, successfully

opposed the project, and so added another to the score of offenses which the Lacedæmonians were laying to his charge.

Themistocles had foiled the schemes of Sparta for the last time. Henceforth the Peloponnesian influence at Athens, which was by no means small among the more conservative and aristocratic elements, was constantly exerted to drag him down. Cimon, the son of Miltiades, was the leading representative of this party. He was the political and military heir of Aristides, whose career was now closing, and, though an aristocrat by birth and training, he was so affable, so public-spirited, and withal so successful in the wars, that his plain speech alienated the confidence of the democracy from the more astute but less scrupulous Themistocles. The latter was ostracized (471 B. C.) by a popular vote. He went to dwell in Argos. He had not been there long when Pausanias returned the second time from Asia to stand trial at Sparta. Among his papers were found letters from Themistocles. The Spartans accused him of treason before the Athenian assembly. He was condemned to death unheard, and his splendid property fell to the state. To escape the executioner the exile fled to Coreyra, to Epirus, to Macedonia, thence across the *Ægean* through the swarming fleets of Cimon at Naxos, to Ephesus in Asia Minor. Thence he made his way to Susa to see the Great King. Xerxes was dead, slain (465 B. C.) in his palace. But the name of the great Athenian was remembered, and Artaxerxes I. received the fugitive with marks of honor and assigned him the revenue of three cities of Asia Minor. What return Themistocles promised for this kindness we do not know. He seems to have passed the remainder of his life in Magnesia in affluence and peace. There he died about 460 B. C. His noble enemy, Aristides, died some years earlier.

Under the command of the Athenian Cimon, the fleet of the confederacy persevered with its task of clearing the *Ægean* of Persians. The passages to the Black Sea were

kept open, and pirate nests on the coasts of Thrace and among the islands were broken up. Among these haunts was Scyros, which Cimon took (468 B. C.) and transformed into an Athenian cleruchy. He further won the favor of his city by finding on this island remains which were identified as the mortal part of Theseus, the ancient Attic hero. These he transferred to Athens in fulfillment of the Delphic oracle. Not content with voluntary accessions, the Delian league sought to perfect its control of the *Ægean* by coercing those island cities which, now that they were relieved from their dread of Persia, held aloof from the combination. The confederates made war upon them on the principle that those who profited by the labors of the fleet should share its burdens.

Instigated possibly by the treason of Pausanias, the Great King undertook another invasion of Greece, and collected a fleet and army for that purpose in Pamphylia. Cimon, with the powerful confederate forces, who had been conquering Caria and adding its cities as a fifth revenue district to the existing four (Thracian, Ionian, Hellespontine, and Insular), advanced to meet the enemy before the arrival of strong reinforcements which were said to be on the way from Phenicia. He overtook and destroyed the main fleet at the mouth of the river Eurymedon (autumn, 466 B. C.), and then disembarked his hoplites and won a second victory over the land army before set of sun. A few hours later he surprised and defeated the Phenician reinforcements. It is not a hazardous conjecture that this crowning exploit of the Greeks hurried Xerxes to his death. Disgraceful failures had smitten his every effort to execute his father's vengeance on the Hellenes. The flower of the empire and of the royal blood had fallen, the revenues had been wasted, and the dignity had departed from the scepter of Cyrus and Darius. Not many months after the woeful triple defeat at the Eurymedon, the captain of the guard and the chief eunuch of the palace slew the Great King while he slept.

The confederacy of Delos began to rot before it was fully ripe. At first a sense of common peril had animated each member with zeal for the common good. But when Cimon's victories had paralyzed the offensive power of Persia the cities began to neglect their federal duties. Instead of sending ships and sailors to the fleet they sent coin, with which the Athenian stewards of the league, or *Hellenotamiæ*, equipped vessels and manned them with Attic laborers. Thus the naval strength of Athens waxed with the waning of her associates, and at the very time when they desired to withdraw from the confederacy they found that they had stripped themselves and furnished Athens with the will and the weapons to hold them fast. Isolated by the channels of the archipelago, and without foreign allies, they were forced to submit. One by one the sovereign states of the old Delian confederacy became subject to Athens. The original contribution to the common defense fund became a tribute, exacted, if need be, at the point of the spear; and Athens, the generous leader of a noble Hellenic enterprise, became the tyrant of a maritime empire.

The transformation went on through a score of years. The wine-island of Naxos was the first member of the confederacy to secede. A fleet from Athens promptly overpowered her and took away her independence (466 B. C.). Henceforth she must pay tribute in cash and let her ships fall to pieces. This was several months before Eurymedon. Thasos, in the north, was the second offender. The Thasians resented an Athenian attempt to colonize the "gold coast" of Thrace. The colony was a failure, but after a vain appeal to Sparta for help the islanders were forced to submit to Cimon (465-464 B. C.).

Thus two states which had voluntarily entered the confederacy were detained as unwilling subjects. The story of the subjection of the other two hundred allies cannot now be told; but that it went on irresistibly and rapidly is indicated by the fact that the historians of the time do not

record its details, and that after 454 B. C. (?) Athens, and not Delos, became the capital city. In that year the treasury of the realm was removed to the Acropolis. What became of the Delian congress or synod is unknown. The demos of Athens (the body of Attic citizens) succeeded to its powers as the directing council of the empire.

For convenience in levying the tribute the five districts of the Delian confederacy were retained in the Athenian empire. Excepting Lesbos, Chios, and, for a generation, Samos, which continued to furnish contingents for the fleet, all the subject cities now paid yearly dues. Once in four years commissioners from Athens made a new valuation of the resources of the several cities, and every spring, at the festival of the Greater Dionysia, the envoys of the subject cities brought the tribute money to Athens. There it was used for the current naval expenditures, and any surplus was paid out in court fees to the citizen jurors or lavished upon the temples of the gods. The political relation of Athens to the individual subject states was fixed by separate treaties. Some few she left comparatively free, allowing them to enjoy their old oligarchic constitutions. Upon many others she forced a democratic form of government like her own. A few were permanently garrisoned with Athenian troops. The Athenian courts had furthermore to hear and decide all important law cases which arose in the subject cities. By an expansion of the constitution of Clisthenes the people of Attica thus became legislator and judge of the most populous and prosperous domain that had ever arisen in the Greek lands.

The work which the Athenian statesmen were bringing to pass could arouse only the bitterest jealousies in continental Hellas. Sparta, however, was in no condition to bar the progress of her rival. Outwitted by Themistocles in the matter of the walls, and chagrined by the treason and corruption of Pausanias and Leotychidas, the steady Dorian

state seemed to have fallen on a period of decline. Argos, which Cleomenes had crippled, plucked up new courage, and joined the Arcadian Tegea in an assault upon Laconia. The allies were defeated, and a few years later (469 B. C.) the Spartans met and vanquished all Arcadia. This victory gave new luster to their arms and strengthened their leadership of the Peloponnesus. Further, it left them free to work against Athens, whose harsh dealings with Naxos foreshadowed her aggressive policy. Then came in quick succession the revolt of Thasos, the appeal of the islanders, and the secret resolution to aid them by invading Attica, then (464 B. C.) the earthquake. The home-city of the Spartans and many outlying towns were thrown down and hundreds of citizens and thousands of pericæci were killed.

Sparta never suffered a defeat that did not kindle hope in the breast of her ill-treated helots, and the earth had scarcely ceased quaking when they revolted. The prompt action of King Archidamus saved the remnant of the citizens from their knives, but they sought refuge in that mountain fastness of Ithome where Aristodemus had held out in the first Messenian War. Fortunately the mass of the pericæci remained loyal, but even with them the few Spartans could not reduce the rebel citadel. The confederacy formed in 480 B. C. to oppose the Persians had not been formally dissolved. Sparta, as its leader, summoned its members, Athens among them, to stamp out this servile rebellion.

The request brought on hot debates at Athens. Since the death of Aristides and Themistocles the policy of Cimon had had free course. He admired Sparta and was her consul (*proxenus*) at Athens. He had long advocated friendship between the two leading states. Athens led the naval league; let Sparta lead the land confederacy, he said, and both together might defy the world in the name of Hellas. It was a broad conception, but impracticable in selfish Greece.

Cimon was by birth and association an aristocrat, though

his profuse benevolence and lavish public gifts so endeared him to the populace that only the combination of fortunate circumstances with the baldest demagogism availed the democratic leaders to displace him. Because he refused to attack Macedonia they accused him of taking bribes. When this attempt failed and he favored sending aid to Sparta in her distress they played upon the envy of Athens to condemn his policy. Again he prevailed, but the guilty Spartans, who feared their fellow-Greeks, even bearing gifts, suspected a hostile purpose in the expedition and rudely dismissed it. Cimon returned to find his opponents in control of the popular assembly, himself and his policy repudiated, and the last surviving privileges of the aristocracy vanishing under a mass of extreme democratic innovations.

Two men, Ephialtes and Pericles, had accomplished the regeneration of the party of Themistocles and the overthrow of the Cimonian aristocrats. The career of Ephialtes was brilliant but brief. His prosecution of the wealthy and his hold upon the populace aroused bitter feeling which led to his assassination (462 B. C.). His colleague and successor, Pericles, was in many respects the finest product of Greece. Birth, wealth, and education ranked him with the aristocrats. His father was that Xanthippus who had prosecuted Miltiades for the descent on Paros and had commanded the Athenian ships at Mycale. His mother, Agariste, was an Alcmaeonid, a niece of the reforming statesman Clisthenes. Among his teachers was Anaxagoras, the Ionian philosopher, who dared to pry into the causes of natural phenomena and to teach men so. He learned music and rhetoric from the best masters of Greece, and was distinguished even at Athens for his love of the beautiful. To these finer Hellenic qualities he added a loftiness of character which lifted him above his fellows and made him their master. His personality was so impressive, his reputation so unspotted, and his policy so sagacious and so generally successful that the demos

supported him implicitly. He was repeatedly elected to the board of generals (*strategi*) who conducted the military and foreign affairs of the state, and on important occasions he seems to have been clothed with almost dictatorial authority. Thus Athens presents the paradoxical spectacle of a republic which from year to year for two decades freely intrusted its policy to one citizen. In his manly form and his richly modulated voice the older men were reminded of Pisistratus and his sons; but Pericles was no tyrant, and the vote of the assembly might at any time take back the power which it had given him. His character blended the integrity of Aristides, the sagacity of Themistocles, the success of Cimon with qualities which were all his own.

The council of the Areopagus, the aristocratic stronghold, which had conducted the affairs of the state since the Persian wars, was the first point of the democratic attack. In the absence of Cimon in Sparta Ephialtes, supported by Pericles, proposed and carried a law which stripped this body of all its power except the trial of cases of homicide. The general supervision which it had exercised upon legislation and over the private life of the people was abolished or transferred to the popular assembly. Whatever were the reforms which were then accomplished they were fiercely assailed by Cimon on his return. But his two antagonists had outbid him for the public favor. Cimon was ostracised, and the assassination of Ephialtes by the aristocrats left Pericles at the head of the popular party.

The foreign policy of Pericles departed from that of Cimon, which had been colored by his admiration for Sparta. He withdrew from the alliance which had existed since Xerxes's invasion, and made a treaty of friendship with Argos, the hostile neighbor of Sparta. Thessaly also joined Athens, and Megara, which had suffered much from the Corinthians, broke away from the old Peloponnesian league and threw herself into the arms of Athens. Galling as this defection must have been

to the Spartans, they could not remit the siege of Ithome to coerce the fractious state. Its acquisition gave Athens a port on the Gulf of Corinth and blocked the land-route from the south into Attica. Mistress of the Isthmus and of the sea, it would have been possible for Athens to blockade the Peloponnesus and land a force upon its coasts strong enough to obliterate the fragment of Sparta which the earthquake had spared ; but a new undertaking at that moment enlisted all her energies. She was exerting the utmost of her naval power to assist the Persian province of Egypt in its revolt from the Great King (459-453 B. C.). At the same time her eminence evoked the inevitable hostility of her neighbors. Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina attacked her in vain.

Those were great days, and a bit of sepulchral inscription which still exists declares the far-reaching energy of the state, whose citizens in that one year, the third of the eightieth Olympiad (458 B. C.), had died for their country in Cyprus, Egypt, Phenicia, Peloponnesus, Ægina, and Megara.

The better to secure her vantage-ground on the Isthmus the Athenians built parallel walls connecting the inland city of Megara with Nisæa, its eastern port. This device made Megara a coast city, readily provisioned and defended by the imperial fleet. Athens adopted the same plan, and commenced building "Long Walls" uniting her own fortifications with those of the Piræus and Phalerum (459-457 B. C.). With these the imperial city was as safe as an island. For all Attica might find refuge within the ramparts supported by the fleet. Their construction rekindled the opposition of the smoldering conservative party which had resisted Themistocles. Sparta, too, who was recovering from the exhausting siege of Ithome, viewed the new walls with the old alarm.

For the first time since Plataea a Peloponnesian army entered Middle Hellas. It came (457 B. C.) to the relief of little Doris—hungry Doris—hard pressed by the Phocians. It came by sea, crossing the Gulf of Corinth, but returning

it found Athens astir. A fleet blockaded the gulf, and all the available troops of Attica held the passes. Nicomedes, the Spartan regent and general, had a large and victorious army at his back, and he determined to make the most of his enforced sojourn. Lingered in Bœotia, which had been divided and weak since the Persian occupation, he set about filling the city governments with the friends of his country. Thebes, always a hater of Attica, was rejuvenated and placed at the head of a Bœotian league. Athens now had reason to regret the obstacles she had placed in the way of Nicomedes. But she collected all her allies, with men from Argos and Thessalian knights, and endeavored to dislodge him from Tanagra (457 B. C.). She failed, but the regent's losses were so heavy that he neglected his opportunity to capture Athens, only a day's march distant, and hastened homeward through Megaris, pillaging as he went.

Athens could not face the dangers of another year like this, at war with Sparta, with her own fortifications half constructed, and with the Bœotian league gathering strength on her border. Accordingly, Cimon, who had been recalled from exile, obtained a four months' truce from his old friends, the Spartans. Before its expiration Myronides defeated the Bœotians at Œenophyta (456 B. C.) and undid the work of Nicomedes. The dependents of Thebes became subjects of Athens. The Phocians, lately at odds with Sparta, and the Locrians of Opus, voluntarily attached themselves to the victor. For a brief period the city of Pericles not only ruled the Ægean but was obeyed by all the continental Hellenes from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ. The four months' truce had not expired when (January, 456 B. C.) the capitulation of Ægina, followed by its disarmament, humiliated her last maritime rival.

But for the drain of the Egyptian expedition Athens might now have massed her forces for the conquest of the Peloponnesus, but her ships were held fast in the Nile,

and re-enforcements must be sent. At home the war languished. The generals, on one occasion Pericles in person, descended upon exposed harbors, burning and plundering, but there was no system and no lasting success. Meanwhile the ponderous machinery of the Persian empire had turned out a fleet and an army for the reconquest of Egypt. An apprehension that this fleet might swoop down on Delos perhaps suggested that the treasury of the confederacy be transferred to Athens. Samos is said to have proposed the change. Pericles doubtless welcomed it, for it set the seal of authority upon the Athenian supremacy and made his city the visible capital of the empire. The money was removed (about 454 B. C.) undisturbed by the Persians, whose eye was single. They drove the Egyptians and Greeks away from Memphis, stamped out the rebellion, captured and crucified Inarus, and destroyed the greater part of the Athenian armament (453 B. C.).

The subjection of Egypt left the Persian fleet free to renew the war on the Greek islands. Athens foresaw the danger. Once more Cimon induced Sparta to sign a five years' truce (451 B. C.), and for the last time he conducted the fleet into Persian waters. He died (449 B. C.) on ship-board in the midst of a brilliant campaign at Cyprus. They buried the chivalrous and open-hearted sailor in Attic soil—the greatest name in Athenian naval annals.

Soon after Cimon's death the Athenians and Persians made an agreement—which seems not to have been a formal treaty—to respect each other's possessions. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, traveled to Susa and settled the terms with the king. We do not know them precisely. The Greeks sometimes boasted that Callias had set marks and bounds upon the Great King forbidding his ships to enter the *Ægean* or the *Bosporus* and his armies to come within three days' march of the Greek towns of *Ionia*. Whatever the terms of the "Peace of Callias" it is true that Athens forsook her

conquests in Cyprus and withdrew her aid from the Egyptian Amyrtæus, who was still at bay in the fens of the Delta, and that for a generation the Persians ceased to trouble Greece.

The land empire which Athens had acquired by the battle of Cænophyta (456 B. C.) lasted but a decade. The support which she every-where gave to democratic constitutions made the oligarchs her enemies. Sparta consistently favored the oligarchies. Early in 446 B. C. the dissatisfaction in Bœotia burst into war. The Athenian army of Tolmides was destroyed at Coronea, and all Middle Hellas renounced its allegiance. Eubœa seized the opportunity to revolt, and at the same time the Spartan King Plistoanax crossed the Isthmus into Attica. The energetic action of Pericles saved Athens. Bribing the Spartans to withdraw, he crushed the Eubœans into complete subjection.

From the Thermopylæ year (480 B. C.) to the suppression of the Eubœan revolt (445 B. C.) Athens had scarcely tasted peace. Under Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon she had fought the battles of Hellas against the Persians, and under Pericles she had made a determined but vain endeavor to acquire a land domain commensurate with her empire on the sea. The protracted struggle, marked by many successes, but by disasters in Egypt and Bœotia, had terribly diminished the Athenian citizen body, which seems never to have exceeded thirty thousand men. Pericles was ready for peace. Recent events convinced him that there could be no union of Hellas under Athens ; he was no less certain that the conflict with Sparta for the leadership was irrepressible. He could only hope to defer the deciding struggle until his country was in the best condition to fight it through. Accordingly, in 445 B. C. Athens made overtures to Sparta which resulted in a treaty of peace for thirty years. Athens relinquished all her conquests in Peloponnesus. The "thirty years' peace" which closed the Hellenic war left Athens ruler of the sea and Sparta supreme in main-land Greece.

CHAPTER XI.

TRIUMPHANT DEMOCRACY.

THE years of peace which followed the conclusion of the thirty years' truce were the most brilliant period in the history of Athens. Relieved at the same moment of the arduous duty of resisting the Persians while defending itself at home, the commonwealth was free to carry out its own domestic policy. The result of *Ænophyta* had killed the project of extending the authority of Athens over a land empire, and directed her statesmen more than ever to the cultivation of the maritime league of which she was the ruling city. Enriched by the tribute of her allies and the profits of a widely branching trade, she became a splendid capital, a center of authority, wealth, and intellectual power. Themistocles laid the foundation, Aristides and Cimon raised the walls, and Pericles added the cap-stone.

From the triumph of the democracy over Cimon and the aristocratic party in 462 B. C. until the outbreak of the war with Sparta (431 B. C.) the Athenian state was mightily dominated by the personality of one citizen who impressed himself deeply on its political, social, and intellectual life. Greek civilization culminated in the Athens of Pericles.

The democratic innovations were mainly two: (1) the increase in the authority and jurisdiction of the *demos* in the public assembly (*Ecclesia*) and law-courts (*Heliaæa*), and (2) the payment of citizens for the performance of certain public services. The first was brought about (462 B. C.) by stripping the aristocratic council of the Areopagus of its powers and turning them over to the people. The second

was mainly the work of Pericles, who introduced the payment of a small daily wage to the 6,000 (?) citizens who served as jurors, and who systematized the payment of sailors and soldiers.

The death of Ephialtes gave the popular party into the hands of Pericles, and the errors of the aristocrats confirmed him in his authority. They shared Cimon's high regard for Sparta, and in the fierce and losing struggle of Athens for the maintenance of democracies in Middle Hellas they were but lukewarm patriots. It was Pericles who purchased time from Plistoanax for the conquest of Eubœa, and the glory of those trying days was his alone. He straightway redoubled his efforts to secure the comfort and thereby the good-will of the populace by the establishment of colonies (cleruchies), by payments for public services, by state bounties, and by the establishment of games, plays, and festivals.

The cleruchies supplied landless Athenians with the best lands in conquered states and helped to guard the outlying portions of the empire. The most important were on Naxos, Imbros, Lemnos, Eubœa, and in the Chersonesus. In 445 Thurii, in southern Italy, was founded as a pan-Hellenic colony (not a cleruchy) under Athenian auspices, and in 437 B. C. Athens finally succeeded in building the city of Amphipolis for herself in Thrace on the finest site in the coveted valley of the Strymon.

The men of Marathon had been proud to serve their state in the field and in the city without pay. It was enough for the government to supply a portion of their equipment and to aid them in bearing the expenses of the war. But as wars grew frequent a considerable force must be kept under arms, and as the offices of the government were opened more and more to the poorer citizens it was necessary for the state to pay its soldiers, councilmen, and jurors; at a later period a slight compensation was allowed to the citizens for mere attendance upon the sessions of the assembly. The more

completely to erase property distinctions and to give the means of culture to all, the poorer citizens were supplied with entrance-money (*theoricon*) for the theater and festivals.

The funds for these payments were taken from the treasury of the league, the treasury which had once been at Delos, and in whose removal we have found evidence that Athens was being transformed from a presiding city to a despot. The remnant of the aristocratic party whom Thucydides, son of Melesias, rallied after the death of his kinsman, Cimon, protested against this diversion of the tribute money. They asserted that it should be sacredly preserved as a military fund, to be expended only for war against the Persians. Some said that Pericles, being of moderate means himself, introduced these public largesses in order to outdo the open-handed generosity of Cimon. Pericles replied that so long as Athens preserved the tributary states from foreign attacks and piratical depredation her financial management was above reproach. The allies got what they paid for; why complain because the economy of Athens left her something to spend upon herself? Still Thucydides persisted in his criticisms. In the hope of profiting by concerted action he massed his partisans in a certain quarter of the assembly, but the device disclosed their weakness and the people nick-named them "the few." Nevertheless in 444 B. C. he pushed forward the question of ostracism, hoping to raise an opposition sufficient to send Pericles from the city. But the people rallied in defense of their benefactor and exiled the aristocrat himself. His banishment disorganized his faction and strengthened the ascendancy of the democrats.

It was the aim of Pericles to produce in Athens a law-abiding community of equal citizens, trained to admire and love their city and to participate heartily and intelligently in its government. The popularization of the law courts and assembly was early accomplished by the payment of jurors

and members of the council. The same measure together with the payment of the sailors relieved all free Athenians of the fear of pauperism. It was a longer and more arduous task to make the capital the pride of its citizens.

The second occupation by the Persians (479 B. C.) had left Athens desolate. The old town to which Pisistratus and his sons had striven to give some show of beauty was laid in ruins. After Plataea the first duty of the citizens had been to fortify their homes. Under Themistocles's wise direction a widened circuit of strong walls was thrown around the old site, and the harbors of Piræus and Munychia were similarly protected. Later (459-457 B. C.) the upper city and the ports were connected by the two Long Walls, increased to three by Pericles, by the construction of the central parallel. Behind his twenty-one miles of defenses, the strongest in Greece, the Athenian was safe from any possible attack so long as his triremes ruled the sea. The city, however, rose from its ruins without symmetry or beauty. The streets were narrow, crooked, and rough; the houses were plain and low. His business as a juror, councilman, or assemblyman kept the Athenian forth, and he was more likely to pass his time in the market-place (*agora*) and public porticoes (*stoæ*) than at home with the women and slaves.

It was Cimon who began to adorn the new Athens with structures worthy of a capital. In his time the surface of the Acropolis was graded, a rampart was built around it, and the foundations were laid there for a noble temple to the city goddess. Below, in the city, fine structures were built for the council and the courts; a wealthy Alcmaeonid paid for the colonnade or portico whose decorative frescoes by Polygnotus gave it the name of the Painted Porch (*Pæcile*.) Cimon surrounded the gymnasium of the Academia with park-like gardens, and over the relics of Theseus which he brought back to Athens the state erected a temple. But it was


Pericles who decked the city with the masterpieces of the architect and sculptor. Outside the eastern wall he built the gymnasium, called the Lyceum; on the south-east slope of the Acropolis he carried toward completion the spacious dramatic theater of Dionysus; near by was his Odeum, a music-hall vaulted like the pavilion of Xerxes, and braced, so the story ran, with ship-masts from Salamis. These were noble edifices, but the best was reserved for the Acropolis, the site of the most ancient settlement and the most sacred shrines.

The Periclean buildings upon the Acropolis were the Parthenon, the so-called Erechtheum, and the grand approach called the Propylæa. The Parthenon, or temple of Athena Parthenos, the maiden goddess of Athens, was completed about 434 B. C. Pericles was superintendent of the undertaking with his friend, the sculptor Phidias, for artistic adviser, and Ictinus, who also planned the great temple of the mysteries at Eleusis, for architect. They produced a perfect building. The material was the fine-grained yellowish marble from the Pentelic quarries. The design was grandly simple. Upon a level platform 228 feet by 101 feet stood a rectangle of forty-six fluted Doric columns thirty-five feet high, supporting the gabled roof. Within the colonnade were the solid walls of the cella inclosing two rooms, the *hecatompedos*, or one hundred foot chamber of the goddess, where stood her statue molded in gold and ivory, by Phidias, and the *opisthodomos*,* or back-room, which was the treasury of the goddess. The apartment of the statue was perhaps lighted through the open roof. The exterior of the building was elaborately decorated with sculptures. In the triangular

*The revolutionary theory of Dr. Dörpfeld, which is adopted by Miss Harrison in her work on the Athenian mythology and monuments, is that (1) the front room was dark except for the light from the doors; (2) that the rear room was called the *parthenon*, or "maiden's chamber," and (3) that the state treasure was kept in the *opisthodomos*, or "rear-room," of another older Athena temple whose foundations are traceable near the Erechtheum. (See plan of Acropolis.)

THE ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS

ODEUM OF HEROD ATTICUS



PROPYLAEA
PT. OF WINGLESS VICTORY



ATHENA
STATUE

OLD TEMPLE
OF ATHENA

ERECHTHEUM

PARTHENON

THEATRE OF
DIONYSUS



space (pediment) of the eastern gable was a group of Olympian gods witnessing the birth of Athena. The western pediment depicted the mythical strife of Athena and Posidon for the possession of Attica. Under the cornice were ninety-two carved slabs (metopes), each bearing two figures, a centaur and a Lapith in conflict. Within the colonnade was the famous "frieze," a band of sculpture surrounding the temple wall and representing the several parts of the Panathenaic procession. Every-where was the perfection of grace and form, and even the parts which no eye could ever see were finished with an almost loving care.

The Parthenon has been called the palace and treasury of Athena; her home and shrine was the Erechtheum, a smaller and older temple near the northern rim of the rock. Here was kept her holy olive-tree, the serpent of Erechtheus, and the rude wooden idol which the remote ancestors of the Athenians had venerated. It was in the Ionic style of architecture, and the southern porch was upheld by beautiful female figures (caryatides) instead of columns. It is this porch which, with a plainer one on the north, is supposed to date from the age of Pericles. In front of these two temples stood the brazen colossus of Athena Promachus (the champion). The goddess was represented fully armed, and the polished tip of her spear was visible to seamen miles away. A part of the spoils of Marathon are said to have been devoted to the erection of this figure. She had yet another temple on the sacred rock, at its extreme south-western angle, where she was worshiped as Athena Nike, called also the Wingless Victory from the pleasing fiction that the honor which she had brought to Athens could not depart.

The most elaborate of the Periclean buildings was the Propylæa. It was a complicated structure of marble stairways, colonnades, and chambers, giving access to the Acropolis. Pericles is said to have expended nearly \$2,000,000 upon this uncompleted work between 437 and 432 B. C.

The beauty of Athens consisted in the architecture of her public buildings and the charm of her suburban gardens. The greater part of the residence section within the walls was remarkable only for the insignificance of its architecture and the disorder of the streets, arising from the conditions under which the city was rebuilt. The new port-town at the Piræus was, however, laid out with streets and broad avenues crossing at right angles. Special basins were set apart for the war-navy, with dock-yards and houses for the triremes. The broad northern portion of the bay was allotted to the merchant ships and was lined with wharves of stone. The shore was girt with government buildings, warehouses for the storage of goods, the corn-hall, where the state kept its reserve of grain, the merchant's exchange, an admiralty court-house, and other commercial structures. A semi-circle of boundary posts cut off this free-trade district from the rest of the city. The boundary seems also to have separated the sailors and taverns and miscellaneous crowds of the busy port from the dwellings of the merchant class, which clustered on the hill of Munychia, the Acropolis of the Piræus.

The material prosperity which the Persian war procured for Athens surpassed that of any city of Greece, but the same period of agitation resulted in an intellectual growth which led the whole world.

The intellectual awakening began among the Greeks of Asia Minor. Their situation brought them into earlier contact with the old civilization of the far East, and turned their minds to greater problems than those which engaged their more provincial and conservative kinsmen in Hellas. While Solon was prescribing a knowledge of music, grammar, and gymnastics as a well-rounded education for the youth of Attica, Thales and the philosophers of Ionia were beginning to put hard questions to Nature, to inquire into the reality of things and the cause of change. These thinkers discarded the old view that the gods were the source of all

things, and endeavored to search out the secret of the universe. Their early theories of nature seem childish enough now, but they were bold minds who dared to break the bonds of tradition with even these guesses at truth.

Pythagoras and the scholars of the West made the next advance. Later philosophers, prominent among them Anaxagoras, the tutor of Pericles, carried their speculations to the conclusion that a supreme intelligence made and maintained the universe.

Such inquiries were especially rife after the close of the Persian war, which had unsettled all the ancient modes of life and thought. As capital of the maritime confederacy, Athens attracted to herself the leading men in every department. Pericles, himself a convert to the modern modes of thought, encouraged these "free-thinking" scholars, whom orthodox Athenians of the old school could not but condemn; for these investigators set aside the most treasured traditions and myths in their search for truth.

Closely connected with the philosophers were the so-called sophists (professional wise men), who in these times were a feature of the intellectual life of Greece. They were men who took the new philosophical discoveries and theories and applied them practically to life. They came to Athens as teachers, taking pupils for money and drilling them in logic and in the principles of rhetoric, which had been worked out by the Sicilian Greeks. As emissaries of the new thought, their teachings undermined the ancient faith in the gods and substituted intellectual subtlety and skill in argument for the simple faith and frank nature of the Attic character before the Persian war.

Literary activity of the highest type distinguished the time, and Attic poetry developed an entirely new province for itself, the drama.

Passing mention has been made of the origin of the Greek tragedy and comedy in the rural songs and imitative dances

which were connected with the country worship of Dionysus. There was a temporary theater at Athens in the time of the Pisistratidæ, but it was not until after the Persian war that three poets, Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, perfected the tragic style.

The Attic tragedy was a religious exercise, performed in the open air theater of Dionysus on the slope of the Acropolis, during the annual festival of the god. The theme of the play was usually taken from the myths of the heroic age, from the legends of the Trojan war or of the Theban kings. Occasionally, as in the "Persians" of Æschylus, recent events were treated. But the treatment was always dignified and stately and raised above the common feelings and actions of mankind. Æschylus, who fought at Marathon, was especially devoted to the old order, and we may trace in his works his condemnation of the new ideas which were shaking the ancient reverence for religion. The justice of the gods is the burden of his mighty lines.

The dramas were presented under the patronage of the state, a rich citizen called a *choregus* being charged with the expense of fitting out the chorus. Twice a year at the Lenæa, in winter, and the Greater Dionysiac festival, in spring, several poets contested for the tragic prize. Thus in 469 B. C. the young Sophocles defeated Æschylus and entered upon a brilliant career. He brought a third actor to the stage—hitherto two men and the chorus had carried all the parts—and discarded the "trilogy," offering three separate plays instead of the three-part drama of the earlier poet. Though still concerning himself with lofty problems and ideal characters, Sophocles brought his persons nearer to the common level of mankind. As Æschylus was a veteran of Marathon, so Sophocles was a soldier and a general in the Athenian empire, and his poems gleam with the spirit of the Periclean Athens in contrast with the aristocratic and conservative color of his old-fashioned Cimonian rival.

Euripides, the last of the tragic trio, did his best work after Pericles had passed away. In his plays human passions prevail, and the heroes who still form the persons of the drama act and speak and feel like common mortals ; for Euripides was a creature of the new free-thinking school, who had emancipated themselves from tradition and dared to prove all things. This tendency, together with his use of the quibbling word-play of the Sophists, made him the laughing-stock of the orthodox old-school critics, who wrote the satires and comedies of the period ; but they do not blind us to his exquisite portrayal of our common sorrows and joys, which has won for him the epithet of " the human."

The Attic comedy, like the tragedy, grew out of the rustic Dionysiac festivals. Cratinas, the first famous comic author, flourished at Athens about the middle of the fifth century, and Aristophanes, his immortal successor, enlivened the community with his biting wit during the closing decades of the same century. The " Old Comedy," as the poetry of these writers is called, dealt with public men and measures, using ridicule, satire, and indecency with a license which moderns can scarcely understand. Gods and heroes, men and women, birds and frogs, were included in its cast. Pericles, Socrates, and Euripides were equally the target of its merciless attacks. The influence of the comedy was exerted against the innovations of the age and in support of the morality and simplicity of the fathers. In this function it did for Athens what the pulpit, the review, and political and social caricature seek to do for modern life.

The first artistic Greek prose was the creation of the age of Pericles, and if not written at Athens found there its inspiration and its highest appreciation. Herodotus, a native of Halicarnassus in Caria, was the first great prose author, and his account of the war between Greece and Persia, our chief authority upon those events, has named him "the Father of History." His travels, which covered most of the Eastern

world, took him to the Athens of Pericles, where he is said to have received a grant of money for his work. The *Histories* of Herodotus will never lose their interest.

The Athens of Pericles is linked indissolubly with the development of Greek art. In Greek philosophy and letters we find a starting-point for our own modes of thought and expression; beyond the achievements of Greek art we cannot advance. Phidias and the sculptors of his school proposed a standard which we have yet to reach.

The sources of Greek art have been sought in many and various springs. The Assyriologist traces the stream with confidence to Western Asia. The lover of Egypt finds the first Doric temple in the pillared tombs of Beni-Hasan, and in the frescoes and carvings of Egyptian temples discerns the beginnings of the paintings and sculptures of Greece. The problem is perhaps to be solved by acknowledging the influence of both nations. The early Greek sculptures are characterized by the same rigidity of limb and smirking vacuity of feature which stamp the earlier plastic essays of other Eastern peoples. The first Greek images of the gods were clumsy wooden figures, and no statue by Phidias or Praxiteles was half so holy as these venerable idols. Clay and terra-cotta next did service, before bronze-founding and marble-work were cultivated with some degree of skill in Samos and Chios. But the smirking almond-eyed, flat-footed, and unnatural types changed very slowly, and those broken statues and grave-marks at Athens which barely antedate the Persian invasion reproduce many of the Oriental peculiarities. When in the latter half of the sixth century it became customary to set up statues of the victors at Olympia plastic art received a new impetus. The artist gained grace and freedom of movement by representing the athlete engaged in the Olympian contests. In this field Myron, the creator of the Quoit-thrower (*Discobolus*), was a leader. Hageladas of Argos, who flourished 520-480 B. C., had not only Myron, but

Phidias, among his pupils. The former was noted for his life-like treatment of the human body in action, the latter for animating the marble.

Phidias was Athenian born, coming to manhood in the days of Salamis and Plataea, when every fiber of genius in Hellas tingled with the exultation of the first days of the liberation. Pericles was his close friend, and the two worked as one in all projects for the adornment of the city. The four thousand square feet of exquisite sculpture on the Parthenon were produced under his direction if not by his chisel. The colossal bronze Athena was his, and so was the chryselephantine figure of the lady of Athens which dwelt in the Parthenon. The spacious Zeus-temple at Olympia treasured his masterpiece, the sitting statue in gold and ivory representing "the father of gods and men"—one of the seven wonders of antiquity.

The population of Attica was many times as numerous as the citizen body. Yet history leaves us in almost total darkness concerning the condition of the aliens and the slaves and the women, even the wives and daughters of the ruling class. The citizens were the state, and almost their sole occupation was the conduct of its affairs. Trade was largely in the hands of the resident aliens, and most of the laborers were slaves.

Athens was friendly to foreigners, and her advantages as a market attracted many enterprising merchants from abroad. The payment of a slight poll-tax secured for these *metæci* the protection of the state. They had the privilege of its law courts, but were liable to war-taxes and to military duty. Individuals of this class might be admitted to some of the peculiar rights of citizenship.

The slaves are said to have outnumbered the Attic free-men four to one. They were white—taken mainly from the countries north of the Ægean, or born of enslaved mothers in Attica. They worked the mines, rowed the merchant ships,

cultivated the soil, did the housework, toiled in the shops and on the roads, relieving their masters of all arduous manual labor. Few men were so poor as to have no slaves; the rich possessed troops of them. The state, instead of employing citizens for its more servile tasks, owned its constables and its minor clerks and criers. The treatment of the slaves depended upon the character of the masters. Harshness and inhumanity were perhaps the exception.

The absorption of trade by the aliens and of industrial vocations by the slaves left the citizen class abundant leisure for the business of governing. The doles of state moneys for jury duty and other public services saved the simple Attic citizen from want and softened the distinctions of wealth and the strifes of labor and capital which have embittered the politics of other democracies. The Athenian boy was trained for the service of the state. A trusty slave (*pædagogus*) cared for his behavior, and went with him to the private school and the *gymnasium*. He learned music (lyre and flute), reading (Homer and the poets), writing, and arithmetic, and the Solonian law required his parent to teach him some profitable trade. The body was as precious as the mind, and owed equal service to the commonwealth. Therefore, the youth was trained in wrestling and boxing in the *palaestra*, and finished his education by a course of exercises in the *gymnasia*, which toughened his thews for war. At sixteen the lad became a cadet (*ephebus*), and after two years of drill was assigned to light guard duty. At twenty the boy was a man, and a citizen entitled to full rank in the assembly and the army.

Some six thousand of the citizens above the age of thirty were deputed for jury duty in the city courts (*Heliæa*), and were supported in idleness by the compensation. At least forty sessions of the assembly (*Ecclesia*) were held in the year, and the state compensated those present for their time. The five hundred members of the council were regularly paid.

The ancient voluntary service in the army had given place to a paid soldiery, and the same may be said of the way the fleet was manned. It was the policy of Pericles to avoid foreign wars; but to exhibit the strength of Athens, and overawe the "allies," he maintained a skilled naval force by fitting out a squadron of evolution, sixty triremes strong, for an annual cruise through the waters of the empire.

In addition to these services, to which the citizens generally were liable, the wealthier freemen were called upon to serve the common weal by the performance of special works or *liturgies*. The chief liturgies were those connected with the support of the theater, the gymnasia, and the navy. The citizen who was chosen *choregus* bore the expense of training and costuming the dramatic choruses for the Dionysiac festival. The *gymnasiarch* paid for the training of the gymnasts for the public games. The *trierarch* received the bare hull of a trireme from the authorities, manned and kept it in rig and repair for one year—the state supplying provisions and paying the crew. In prosperous times there seems to have been no shirking of these burdens, which were rather borne eagerly for the glory of the community. Rich citizens spent their money for the public good instead of lavishing it upon houses, furniture, and private luxury.

The Athenian house was the sleeping-place of the men, the abode of only the women and slaves. The master found his employment and enjoyment in the open air. When the active duties of citizenship did not engross his attention the cloudless skies tempted him to the market-place, the session of senate, assembly, or jury-courts, the public colonnades, the busy harbor, or the gymnasia. The interests of the state, of which each citizen was a vital part, afforded boundless themes for conversation, and the eye could scarcely rest upon an object which did not bespeak the grandeur of the democracy. Not only was the public architecture an eloquent

lesson in order and grace, but works of the highest art every-where met the gaze. Square posts capped with a head of Hermes, the god of luck in trade, stood at the doorways; porticoes decorated with mythological and historical paintings were common lounging-places; statues singly and in groups, telling of great men and noble deeds in the most universal of languages, ennobled the city squares. The gleaming marbles of the Propylæa led up to the heights of the citadel crowned with its perfect temples and overtopped by the gilded helm and spear of Athena, the protectress of the city at her feet. What art accomplished for Pericles he seems to have believed it would do for his people. That it did not raise them to his mental level we may be sure, but it is no less certain that it made them proud of the city which thus expressed the Hellenic genius in its sublimest form.

The exultation of the people in their new glory found its fullest vent in the quadrennial festival of the Panathenæa. It took place in the month Hecatombæon (July–August) in the third year of each Olympiad, and came down from a remote past. On the culminating day of the feast, after the contests in music and dancing, in athletic games and trireme races, with their prizes of crowns and garlands and painted jars of sacred olive-oil, the great procession was marshaled in the Outer Ceramicus, the old potter's-field on the north-west of the city. Thence it entered at the Dipylon gate and passed southward to the Propylæa of the Acropolis. Rank on rank marched priests with sacrificial animals, matrons, and maidens, young knights on horseback, Athenians grown old in the service of the state, warriors and victorious athletes, a delegation of resident aliens and envoys from friendly states and daughter-cities. Borne by many hands was a robe richly embroidered by the dames and maids of Attica. At the entrance of the Parthenon it was delivered to the priest of Athena. It was this procession and this solemn moment of the delivering of the *peplos* or robe which was represented

on the sculptured frieze of the Parthenon, the acme of Athenian art.

Only once was the era of peace disturbed. The sixty triremes patrolling the water-ways of the empire watched sharply for any sign of revolt, and any delay or denial of the tribute was promptly brought to book. In 440 B. C., however, the rebellion of Samos put the power of Athens to test. For nine months the federal empire trembled on the verge of dissolution; Persia and the Peloponnesians stood ready to profit by its partition. But the event brought new laurels to the government of Pericles.

Samos could not conquer single-handed, but her courage was sublime. Beaten in a sea-fight she withstood siege. Once her captains pierced the blockade and for two weeks kept it open. They turned to Sparta as their natural ally, and, as the Thasians had done before them, begged her to let loose the Peloponnesians upon Attica. A council of the league was held at Sparta and the question was solemnly discussed. All men foresaw that the two confederacies must settle their differences in a tremendous war. Should not the land states seize this opportunity to strike while the sea power was imperiled? Corinth said nay. She was the second state of Peloponnesus, and her wealth and numerous fleet gave her counsels weight. She argued that the Greek states should be free to deal with their own subject allies. The unruly temper of her own daughter-cities perhaps accounted for this attitude of Corinth. She prevailed. The Spartan league declined to interfere, and after nine heroic months Samos fell (439 B. C.). She lost her ships and her city walls, and had to defray half the expenses of the war. The revolt which promised so much was over, and again democracy was triumphant. Yet the serious debate at Sparta showed the flimsy nature of the peace and foretokened the coming struggle. Eight years later it was a quarrel between Athens and Corinth that precipitated the great war.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.—I. TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS.

THE truce by which Athens and Sparta bound themselves in 445 B. C. to keep the peace for thirty years and settle their disputes by arbitration broke down utterly within half that period. In 431 B. C. so many offenses had accumulated that both parties appealed to war.

The ultimate cause of the war is evident. Sparta and her allies in the Peloponnesus could not forever contemplate with equanimity, or, indeed, with safety, the steady growth of Athens, and there may well have arisen in the self-governing communities of the south a wholesome dread that they, too, would at the convenient season be compelled to bow to the triumphant democracy. Sparta at the head of the allied oligarchies of Peloponnesus must at some day bar the progress of Athens or let herself be trampled upon.

But the actual grounds of the war were manifold. One state and another of the Spartan alliance had a grievance against Athens. Bœotia hated her for many an old score, and because Bœotian Plataea preferred her friendship to that of Thebes. Ægina smarted from recent castigations and preferred to be back in the southern confederacy. Megaris fretted over the loss of her trade. It was Corinth, however, which had the best case against the tyrannizing town.

Corinth, the mistress of the Isthmus, continued to control the trade of the west Greeks, even after Athens had absorbed the commerce of the East. Her connections with Western Hellas, Magna Græcia (Italy), and Sicily, were richly profitable, and it is not strange that Athens, ambitious to extend her empire, clashed with her interests there. In

the "Hellenic" war Pericles had several times sent the fleets to the Corinthian Gulf, and, indeed, firmly planted an anti-Spartan stronghold in the city of Naupactus (456 B. C.). His Italian colony of Thurii (445 B. C.) indicated a similar hankering for relations with the West, and his dealings with Corecra supply convincing evidence of his policy.

Corecra, the modern Corfu, was the second naval power in Hellas. The island belonged to neither of the two great confederacies, and had kept aloof from Hellenic affairs to such a degree that she had not even dared to give effective aid to the anti-Persian alliance of 480 B. C. Originally a Corinthian colony, she had successfully maintained her independence by dint of much hard fighting, and had founded colonies of her own on the coast of Epirus to compete with the trading-posts of the mother-city in that region. A quarrel arising in regard to one of these colonies led to fresh hostilities in 435 B. C. Corinth was beaten in a naval engagement, and, vowing vengeance, spent the following year in collecting a fleet to chastise her rebellious offspring. Fearful of the event, Corecra appealed to Athens for assistance.

Envoys from Corecra and from Corinth laid the case before the Athenian Ecclesia. After much hesitation the assembly made a shifty compromise. Desiring the friendship of Corecra and the station in the west, yet reluctant to precipitate the war, they concluded a defensive alliance with the island and sent out Cimon's son, Lacedæmonius, with ten triremes, under orders not to fight unless attacked. He obeyed instructions, but when the Corinthian fleet defeated the Corcyræans at Sybota (432 B. C.) he was forced to take a hand in the engagement. Moreover, a squadron from Athens coming opportunely to his re-enforcement prevented the enemy from following up their victory. Corinth burned with rage when her prey slipped from her talons.

Meanwhile a fresh cause of offense was developing in the north. Potidæa, a Corinthian colony on the western prong

of the Chalcidic peninsula, paid tribute to Athens as a member of the Thracian district of the old Delian confederacy. The town revolted (432 B. C.) and Corinthian troops supported the rebellion. An Athenian army laid siege to Potidæa, thereby goading Corinth to new fury.

Corinth, though Dorian, had rubbed off the rudeness of her race by contact with the world. Her people, enterprising and progressive, lost all patience with the sluggish Spartans, who were their nominal leaders. They sent envoys to Sparta, to denounce the conduct of Athens and to beg that the whole force of the Peloponnesus be launched against that lawless city, which, they said, had disregarded sacred treaties, enslaved the cities of Hellas, and whose continuance menaced the liberty of all. "You do not know these Athenians"—Thucydides puts these words into the envoy's mouth; "they are revolutionary, equally quick to plan and to execute. They are impetuous; you are dilatory; they are always abroad, and you are always at home. For they hope to gain something by the venture; you fear to risk what you have already. Their bodies they devote to their country as though they belonged to other men; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. With them alone to hope is to have, for they lose no time in the execution of an idea. To do their duty is their only holiday, and inaction is more irksome than the most tedious endeavor. If a man should say of them, in fine, that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth." The same Spartan assembly heard the grievances of Megara and Ægina, and decided that the action of Athens had abrogated the "thirty years' treaty." Accordingly, the regular congress of the Peloponnesian allies was summoned to discuss the advisability of war.

Athens was not at ease. The firm control which Pericles had exercised in the government in the years of the peace was shaken by the prospect of approaching war. Several

elements in the state opposed his policy. The aristocratic party was not extinct, and its remnant hated the statesman who had overthrown Cimon and Thucydides and robbed the noble families of their last privileges. A section protested against his lavish expenditure of the public funds, and muttered darkly of "a new Pisistratus," and "the modern tyranny." The hostile factions, though motley enough, found a point of union in their common object of hatred, and their malevolence rained blow after blow upon Pericles.

They first struck at his friend the sculptor Phidias. Accused of embezzling the gold appropriated for the chryselephantine statue of Athena in the Parthenon, the artist proved his innocence by detaching the golden plates and weighing them before his foes. Then they cried "sacrilege," and charged him with engraving portraits of himself and Pericles upon the goddess's shield. Tradition says that he died in prison before the day set for his trial.

The persecution of Phidias was a sore blow to Pericles; perhaps the next struck even nearer home. It accused Anaxagoras, the statesman's philosophical instructor, of heresy most foul. He taught men to seek the explanation of phenomena in natural forces and to find a mighty intelligence ruling in all things. Such an enlightened mind was a shining mark for the defenders of the faith. They convicted him on a charge of impiety, but he seems to have escaped from his jailers, for he died in peace a few years later on the other side of the *Ægean*.

The third thrust sank into the statesman's heart. From his first marriage, which was not a happy one, he had sought refuge in an alliance with a brilliant and beautiful Ionian lady, Aspasia, who had come to Athens from Miletus when he was in the height of his career. If we may believe his enemies, especially the unscrupulous lampooners of the comic drama, she was a woman of licentious character, whose qualities of mind could not blind the virtuous to the looseness of her life.

Modern opinion is divided. The most hold that Aspasia was simply one of the many *Hetærae* ("companions") whom the wealth of Athens attracted from their homes in the luxurious Greek cities of Asia Minor. A few, albeit of high authority, deny the immorality of the lady's union with Pericles, asserting that the "marriage" was only irregular in so far that an Athenian might not legally marry a Milesian. Certain it is that in Aspasia he found a loving and companionable helpmeet. She shared his thoughts, and her sparkling converse drew the brightest minds of the community to her table. This was a new thing for Athens, where wives and daughters, however much respected, were left uneducated and were kept mewed up within the house-walls. There was loud outcry against the boldness and indecency of Aspasia's conduct. A formal indictment of irreligion and immorality was brought against her. Pericles pleaded her cause in person, and to the tears and prayers of the great man, generally so reserved and dignified, the citizen-court could not deny her innocence.

Amid all these sore trials the integrity of Pericles himself seems to have remained unimpeached. The people were not yet ready to believe the reckless slanders of his enemies. His voice was still the weightiest in the momentous debates which were distracting the assembly. For the war-cloud was black and lowering. The Peloponnesian congress of 432 B. C. pronounced for war, and slow-going Sparta was sluggishly carrying out its decree. To gain time for preparation she used diplomacy, making a series of impossible demands and closing with an "ultimatum." Athens must restore their independence to all Hellenic cities under her sway. This called for the abdication, if not the suicide, of the imperial city. Her reply was mild but firm, and both parties recognized the hopelessness of further negotiations. Yet before the formal declaration of war two minor cities yielded to the intensity of feeling and grappled.

The Platæans, who had stood by Athens at Marathon, and

whose part in the famous battle with Mardonius had made their territory hallowed ground, were at feud with Thebes, the leader of the Bœotian league, to which they naturally belonged, although for eighty years they had preferred to side with Athens. The Thebans thought to seize the city before the outbreak of the general war should make it a dangerous foe. One dark and rainy night when the guard was relaxed three hundred Thebans gained admittance to the city through the treason of the aristocratic faction (431 B. C.). The populace rallied and took them prisoners before the main army of Thebes could ford the swollen streams and reach the town. By promising to spare the lives of the captives the Plataeans bought a truce; but they butchered their prisoners as soon as the peril had passed, before a runner could come with the prudent message of Athens "to hold them fast as hostages for the good conduct of Thebes." Thus in treason, outrage, falsehood, and murder began the war which was to call forth all that was worst in the Hellenic character.

The character and resources of the combatants in the Peloponnesian war must be thoroughly understood. Athens, though possessing only Attica on the main-land, was mistress of a maritime empire which comprised most of the Ægean coasts and islands. She depended upon their annual tribute and upon the accumulated surplus of six thousand talents to pay the expenses of her fleet. Outside of her subject states her only allies were feeble Plataea, Coreyra, distraught with her own civil wars, and Acarnania. Her subject allies cared nothing for the war, and in each of them was a revolutionary oligarchic remnant which saw its only hope of power in the overthrow of Athens.

The Peloponnesian confederacy was organized on other principles and animated by another spirit. It was a league for war purposes only. Sparta was its leader or president, rather than its despot. She received no tribute from her allies, and seems to have refrained thus far from offensive interfer-

ence in their internal politics, though her hostility to democracy was undisguised. The allies had a voice in the federal council and contributed men and ships to the federal force. This war was undertaken at their urgent request and with a fairly united purpose to fight it through. They were rich in men, but poor in money and ships. The few thousand citizens of Sparta were reputed to be invincible campaigners, and they could assemble one hundred thousand fighting men of the allies. Bœotia, Locris, Phocis, and Megara were in close and active sympathy with the war, and it was hoped that the rich Dorian cities of Sicily and the watchful Persian satraps in Ionia would take advantage of the first Athenian disaster to share in the partition of the naval empire.

The first campaign (431 B. C.) prefigured the course of the war. The Spartan king Archidamus passed the Isthmus with twice as many men as Athens could muster. He found the Attic farms and villages silent and deserted. For Pericles had gathered all the people with their movable property within the circuit of the city walls. Their cattle they shipped to Eubœa and Salamis, and with their wives and children they encamped in the open spaces of Athens and Piræus, in the temple precincts and the public land between the Long Walls. Although the fortifications were devised to furnish such an asylum the crowding produced discomfort and discontent, and it taxed the genius of the statesman to hold in check the farmers who saw the smoke of their burning stacks and homesteads floating over the walls which penned them in. Archidamus courted a battle, but not a sally-port was opened save for short sharp sorties of the cavalry, and he must content himself with ravaging and plunder. The walls of Athens, many miles in circuit, were of a height and thickness which defied assault, and the grain-ships coming and going at the port of Piræus precluded any idea of starving out the town. To divert the attention of the citizens from their hardships and to make reprisals, Pericles dispatched a fleet to harry the

Peloponnesian coast. He also healed the “eyesore of the Piræus” by clearing Ægina of its hostile population. Sparta



made room for the exiles within her boundaries. Moreover, in the winter, when the invading forces returned to their

homes, the Athenians flung open their gates and wreaked on the fields and vineyards of Megara the savage vengeance which they would gladly have expended upon the more powerful foes who lay beyond their reach.

The first year of the war determined several points: that no land army which Peloponnesus could muster could conquer the Athenians so long as they were sheltered by their walls and victualed by their fleet; that, consequently, the struggle would be prolonged and exhausting; that so long as the naval policy of Pericles was followed Athens, with her better stored treasury, would win by wearing out the foe. Yet the drafts upon the Athenian treasury were heavy, and the people set aside in the Parthenon an emergency fund of one thousand talents, establishing the penalty of instant death for any one who should propose to use the money for any other purpose than to repel a naval attack upon the Piræus. One hundred picked triremes also were to be reserved for guard duty.

As usual, at the year's end the Athenian citizens who had fallen in battle received the honors of a public burial in the Outer Ceramicus. Here were monuments to the law-giver Solon, to the reformer Clisthenes, to the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogiton, to Ephialtes the martyr of the democracy, and to many knights and commoners who had died fighting for Athens on land or sea. A solemn procession did honor to their memory and gathered around the grave—in sight of the monuments of their ancestors, and in full view of the Acropolis with its temples and its towering goddess—to listen to a funeral eulogy. The orator of this year (431 B. C.) was Pericles, and his oration, as Thucydides records it, was his noblest public utterance. With an eloquence which was the grander for its lack of ornament he passed from the achievements of the noble dead whose monuments rose about him to the condition of the state which their sacrifices and labors founded and preserved. Theirs, he said, was a democracy

where the people ruled, but where merit was rewarded, "a state in which every one who *can* benefit the city *may* do so without let or hinderance." They had gained not only civic freedom and social equality, but were the happiest of communities, enlightened by art and elegance, by festivals and public games. These fallen citizens fell the victims of no iron discipline and were led on by no selfish aims. Their lives were a willing offering for the commonwealth.

"Let us who remain," he continued, "follow their example. I will not stir your hearts by speaking of the blessings which are secured to those who defeat their country's enemies, for we have other and higher reasons for our devotion. Look round on this glorious city, think of her mighty empire. Let the love of her beauty sink into your souls, and when you contemplate her greatness remember that it was by the daring deeds of her citizens, done in the cause of duty and honor, that she was raised to this glorious height. Even when their efforts failed they remained faithful to the death, giving their lives when nothing else was left to give."

The second year of the war (430 B. C.) began like the first. The Attic population, cooped within the city, allowed the Peloponnesians to devastate the farms and fruit-lands from the Isthmus to Sunium unmolested for forty days. Perhaps Archidamus would have stayed longer had not the rumor crept abroad that Apollo himself had taken up the cause of his Dorian people, and had smitten Athens with pestilence. The first of those deadly plagues which at long intervals have reaped a harvest of death in Europe, had fallen upon the crowded city. Egypt and Persia had already felt its stroke, when, in the sweltering heat of midsummer, a merchant-ship brought the infection to the crowded Piræus. It spread like wildfire among the inhabitants, racking them with pain, burning them with fever, and seldom sparing its victims. The scarcity of water and of proper shelter, together with the enforced idleness of the greater part of the

population, forced up the death-rate until—it is said—twenty-five out of every one hundred citizens were dead. The sailors of the fleet did not escape the disease, and the re-enforcements which were sent against Potidæa sowed its poisonous seeds in the trenches before that city and decimated the besieging army.

In misery and despair the sufferers turned upon Pericles. If he had allowed them to meet the Spartans in the open field, as their ancestors had met the Persians at Marathon, they might have avoided the distress into which his naval policy had plunged them. Utterly broken in spirit, they sued Sparta in vain for peace. To their clamors for his head Pericles replied in a famous speech, whose calmness and reason brought them back to a true perception of their condition and of the necessity of opposing with fortitude and steady valor the dangers which beset them.

It is said that the assembly had vented its wrath by laying a fine on Pericles, and the tradition may be true, but the statesman seems to have secured a re-election as general for the year 429 B. C., the last of his life. The pestilence had struck thickly around him, claiming his sister and his eldest sons. Perhaps the great man was not an unwilling victim when he too fell before it in the summer of 429 B. C. His dying words were not of his victories or the adornment of the city. "My real pride," he said, "is in this, that no citizen has clad himself in mourning through any act of mine." The words bespoke the nobility of his character, for in an age of selfishness, when most men used their power to aggrandize themselves, Pericles had pursued the highest good of the city as it was given him to see the right. Asking nothing for himself, doing nothing for his private profit, he had taught by lofty precept and pure example that the prosperity of the city lay in the freedom of the individual citizens and their devotion to the common good. It was because no mind so lofty, coupled with so firm a hand, inher-

ited his authority that the helm of the ship of state became the prize of personal ambition, and in the sordid struggles of the demagogues the beautiful fabric of the Periclean days was cast away.

Little is known of the closing months of Pericles's life, but they lay in a time of deep excitement at Athens. For about this time certain ill-starred Peloponnesian envoys bound to Susa to seek an alliance with the Great King fell into her cruel hands, and the generals who had granted too easy terms of surrender to Potidæa were censured by the assembly.

In the year 429 B. C. Archidamus turned aside from his customary invasion of Attica, crossed Cithæron into Bœotia, and laid siege to Platæa, which was held by less than six hundred men. The operations were pressed with all vigor, and though no aid reached the pent-up Platæans they stood out for two full years. In the middle of the second year two hundred and twenty of the more desperate spirits among them made a bold and fortunate dash for liberty. The remnant starved along until midsummer of 427 B. C., when the Spartan promise to punish "only the guilty" enticed them to surrender. But Spartan justice found guilt upon every man, and all were put to death. The city, which, fifty years before, had been consecrated as the battle monument of all Hellas, was laid level with the ground.

While the Peloponnesians were destroying Platæa the naval resources at Athens were being exerted to reduce the revolted island of Lesbos to submission. In Mitylene, the chief Lesbian city, the oligarchs inclined toward Sparta and hated the Athenian democracy. They had ships, treasure, and a strong position. Athens was far away, and a Persian satrap was near at hand. Sparta promised aid if her ships could elude the imperial cruisers. In the spring of 428 B. C. Athens got wind of the conspiracy and hurriedly sent a fleet against the island. Mitylene threw off the mask. She was joyously received into the Peloponnesian confederacy, whose

members immediately undertook to pour such a force into Attica that Athens could not spare a man for foreign war. But even bereft of Pericles the ruling city was alert and energetic. Holding one splendid fleet in her home waters she pounced upon the southern coast cities with a second, a third was on the west coast, while a fourth, under Paches, sailed eastward to the defiant isle. Mitylene was isolated by sea and land. The promised succors from Peloponnesus were not ready until 427 B. C., and when they did come sailing fearfully into the heart of the Athenian empire they were too late. An uprising of the city democrats had compelled the rulers to surrender seven days before, upon the pledge of Paches to harm no one except by express command of the Athenian assembly.


The Mityleneans barely escaped the fate of the Plataeans. Cleon, a leather-seller turned demagogue, persuaded the infuriated populace to decree their extermination, and it was only by the most vigorous action of the more prudent citizens that the cruel decision was recalled in time. But even in her mercy Athens executed more than a thousand Lesbians, and distributed the choicest lands of the island among three thousand of her own citizens.

Meantime the west had become a theater of naval operations. Her alliance with Coreyra and Zacynthus and her naval station at Naupactus gave Athens an ample basis for an assault upon the commerce of Corinth. In the third summer of the war (429 B. C.) the Athenian admiral, Phormio, gained a series of victories over Peloponnesian fleets which placed Athens in control of the Corinthian Gulf. In 427 B. C. Coreyra was torn by a fresh eruption of the ancient hatred between the nobles and the populace. Supported by Athens, the democrats overmastered the aristocrats in a seven days' carnival of blood and terror. In the same year and the next (427-426) the Athenian general, Demosthenes, was employed in Acarnania and Ætolia striving to erect in those states a

power to curb the influence of Corinth in the west. His energy won many battles but failed to effect his design.

The Corcyræans still needed support, and in 425 B. C. this restless Demosthenes had himself detailed for duty with a few triremes, which were dispatched to the aid of Eurymedon, the Athenian admiral of the west. The squadron had rounded Malea and Tænarum, and was rowing up the inhospitable Messenian coast,

when a head-wind drove it into the Bâÿ of Pylus for shelter. The cliff of Coryphasion (eight hundred feet high) overlooked the entrance to the harbor, before which the long and narrow island of Sphacteria lay like a breakwater. Storm-bound here for several days, the strategical value of the



SKETCH-MAP OF PYLUS.

point forced itself upon Demosthenes. A well-provisioned garrison could hold Coryphasion against ten times its number, and such a fortress would be a thorn in the side of Sparta. By his advice the cliff was fortified, and he was left to hold it with the crews of five ships. The rest passed on.

The seizure of Pylus astounded the Spartans. They quickly recalled the troops which had been ordered to invade Attica

and massed them against Demosthenes. The Peloponnesian fleet also was stationed in the bay. The defenders readily repelled the first assault, and before the Spartans could collect their siege-machines and renew the attack the Athenian squadron of the west entered the bay and defeated their navy.

The naval victory was of the utmost consequence, for it cut off from the main Peloponnesian army a detachment of four hundred and twenty Spartan citizen soldiers who were encamped on Sphaacteria. Escape seemed impossible, and the impending fate of so large a proportion of her citizens brought Sparta to her knees. To gain time for peace negotiations, she agreed to the terms of a humiliating truce, depositing her fleet of sixty war-vessels with the Athenians in return for the right of providing a daily ration for the beleaguered garrison of the islet. The advantageous offers of peace which her envoy made in the Athenian assembly received slight consideration, for the democracy was intoxicated with the near view of victory. All proposals for peace were drowned by the ranting clamor of Cleon.

The pestilence had not only paralyzed the one hand which had guided Athens so well, but it cut a wide swath through the ancient families whose prestige had survived the leveling reforms of the constitution. The new favorites of the democracy were ambitious self-seekers whose skill in harangue took the place of statesmanship like that of Themistocles and Aristides, and of military prowess like that of Xanthippus and Cimon. These glib talkers had recourse to the lowest means to establish their ascendancy. This Cleon, a blunt and brawny "friend of the people," had attached the needy citizens to his train by the passage of a law trebling the pay of jurymen—the only source of income of many a proud but landless Athenian. He now imposed intolerable conditions upon Sparta, and upon their rejection he denounced the envoys so roundly that they broke off their parley and departed.

Upon the termination of the truce hostilities at Sphacteria were renewed. Still the four hundred Spartans held out, and, as the siege was prolonged into the stormy season, the Athenians began to fear lest their prey should slip from their grasp. They vented their wrath on Cleon as the responsible author of their present difficulties, and when he sought to divert their anger from him to the soft-hearted aristocrats who were the generals of the year, one of the latter, the strategus Nicias, proposed that he, forsooth, whose tongue was so sharp to criticise others should himself undertake the capture of Sphacteria. The sarcasm of the suggestion caught the fancy of the throng. They thrust the honor upon him despite his protests, and scoffed at his audacious promise to kill or capture the Spartan garrison within three weeks.

Enlisting the trusty Demosthenes for a colleague, with a few hundred bowmen Cleon betook himself to Pylus. Abandoning as futile the project of starving the Spartans to surrender, he landed an overwhelming force upon the island, the burning of whose forests had deprived its defenders of their cover. In the pitched battle which ensued his archers, fighting at a distance, were secure from the deadly sword and spear of Sparta, and from the crushing impact of the Spartan phalanx. Driven back finally by heavy losses behind their fortification, the Spartans found that even there they were exposed to sharp-shooting from a crag above them. Utterly dismayed by this discovery, they held up their shields in token of surrender. Of the two hundred and ninety-two who gave themselves alive into Cleon's hands one hundred and twenty were true-born Spartan citizens.

Cleon returned with his prisoners within the promised period, and was hailed as a hero. No honor was too rich for the fickle populace to lavish upon the citizen-general who had captured scores of the countrymen of Leonidas. The captives were held as hostages against a renewal of the invasions of Attica.

With Cleon's captured hoplites under lock and key Athens felt confident of her ability to bring the war speedily to a satisfactory close. Sparta was confined to the Peloponnesus by the threat that another invasion of Attica would bring swift death upon the hostages. She was harassed even within her own peninsula. Athens had manned the new castle at Pylus with Messenian exiles from Naupactus, who reveled in the plunder of the neighboring Spartan farms, and received constant accessions from deserting helots. Nicias, with a fleet and army, captured the isle of Cythera (424 B. C.), a few miles off the Laconian coast. The Athenians also gained a foothold at Nisæa, the port of Megara, and near Træzen, on the southern shore of the Saronic Gulf, where they could observe and check the action of Corinth. These were the links in a menacing chain of naval stations which was being drawn about the Peloponnesus.

The events of the first seven years of the war had shaken the military reputation of Sparta. She had won no decisive battle by land or by sea, and the surrender of one hundred and twenty of her "invincible" citizens tempted her enemies to say that the Athenian freemen were an overmatch for the famous war-machine which the precepts of Lycurgus had constructed in the Dorian state. The Spartan generals had missed nearly every opportunity to win advantage. They were brave enough in battle, but had only slowness, dullness, and indecision with which to oppose the dash and brilliancy of such Athenians as Phormio and Demosthenes. One man among them, however, was marked in a high degree by these most un-Spartan traits. This was Brasidas, a general who combined with the stubborn courage of a Leonidas the variety of resource of a Themistocles. In the first summer of the war (431 B. C.) this young officer had distinguished himself by throwing relief into a besieged Messenian city. Two years later he had manned the hulks of the Megaran navy and raided Salamis almost under the eye of Athens. Had his ad-

vice been taken (427 B. C.) Corcyra might have been saved to the league. A severe wound, received in the first attempt to dislodge the Athenians at Pylus (425 B. C.), kept his body quiet for a few months, and perhaps gave him time to plan a way for Sparta out of all her troubles.

Brasidas saw, what other statesmen must have perceived, that Athens owed her perennial strength to the streams of tribute money which fed her treasury. Choke these springs and she must weaken. So far the problem was easily grasped. But how was Sparta, with but a handful of triremes, to attack the mistress of the seas. Her attempt to succor the revolted Lesbians had already ended in a fiasco. Yet there was one joint in the Athenian panoply. The rich Thracian tribute district was mainly composed of cities lying on the north coast of the *Ægean*. Brasidas conceived the startling project of leading a Peloponnesian force overland through friendly Middle Hellas and half-hostile Thessaly to this rich district, which supplied Athens with ship-timber and naval stores, metals and grain, as well as a heavy annual tribute. Sparta was lukewarm in the matter, but eventually consented to allow Brasidas to try his fortune in those regions with a few hundred soldiers of the helots and one thousand Peloponnesian infantry. Delayed for a brief space by a call to aid Megara in repelling an Athenian attack, he quickly passed northward, and before Athens was well aware of his purposes he was among the Athenian tribute cities.

While Athens frittered away her time and strength in an ill-advised *Bœotian* expedition, which ended in defeat at Delium, (424 B. C.), Brasidas was going straight toward his goal. He found the friendship of the Macedonian king, *Perdiccas*, profitless and the Athenian allies reluctant to revolt. Though isolated and liable to annihilation by a fleet which might at any time descend upon his slender forces, he was undismayed. Entering the city of *Acanthus*, alone, he stated his mission to the assembled citizens. He

was come, he said, as the agent of Sparta to liberate the Hellenes of the North. Should they secede from Athens, he promised to uphold them in their independence. But should they refuse to join in this crusade of freedom he must unwillingly resort to force. It was the season of the vintage, and the Acanthians, though they had no serious grievance against Athens, were loath to see their vineyards ravaged. They voted to accept the proposition and leave the Athenian league. The neighboring towns, Stagirus and Argilus, speedily followed their example.

While Athens was brooding over the disaster at Delium ships from the north brought news that Brasidas had won over three tributary cities without the loss of a single man and would soon attack Amphipolis and Eïon, the twin cities in the valley of the Strymon. The former colony commanded the trade routes down the river and along the coast. Its fall would carry with it the whole Thracian domain of Athens. There was pressing need for the immediate exertion of that energy which Pericles had proudly attributed to the democracy in his funeral oration. But the democracy was despondent over its losses, and bewildered by the wrangling of the demagogical Cleon and the easy-going aristocrat Nicias. No re-enforcements were sent, and even the meager forces on that station were blunderingly handled. When Brasidas surprised Amphipolis half the Athenian squadron, under Thucydides, the son of Olorus, was leagues away, covering Thasos and the gold coast. The rich and populous city capitulated (424 B. C.) upon the mild terms of the wily Spartan, but before he could slip down the river to Eïon the arrival of Thucydides had closed that city's gates in his face.

Athens stood aghast at her loss. No such calamity had befallen the state since the formation of the federal empire. Thucydides was sent (or went voluntarily) into exile, where he composed his monumental history of the Peloponnesian War. Yet the fall of Amphipolis did not arouse the Athe-

nians to recapture the city. Indeed, recent reverses had dampened the warlike ardor which glowed so fervently after the affair at Pylus. Cleon was forced into the background, and the moderate party, which included the remnant of the aristocratic families, came into power and gave a kind reception to the proposals for peace which were beginning to come from Sparta. The *Acharnians* and *Knights* of Aristophanes, which were played at this time, show the peace preferences of the citizens and the aristocratic hatred of Cleon.

The exploits of Brasidas had not made him a hero at Sparta. The citizens wished to make peace with Athens and so to recover their relatives who were held as hostages. So general was the desire that in the spring of 423 B. C. a preliminary truce was actually signed. The two states bound themselves to keep the peace for a twelve-month, each retaining its own conquests until a permanent treaty should adjust the details of the settlement.

The truce was well received at Athens, though Cleon, whose interests were best served by a disturbed condition of affairs, protested against it as a proof of the incompetence and cowardice of the aristocrats. But the next news from Thrace caused a fresh upheaval. Tidings came that Brasidas had continued to make conquests of allied towns after the armistice was proclaimed. In a fever of rage at Spartan perfidy the assembly adopted Cleon's motion to send a strong force thither. Nicias and Niceratus were sent with fifty triremes with instructions to show no mercy to the faithless Chalcidian towns. Upon the expiration of the flimsy truce, Cleon again pressed a war measure through the assembly, providing for substantial re-enforcements for the commanders in the north. In some way Cleon himself was made general of the expedition. The leather-seller could scarcely have coveted a position which would pit his inexperience against the indomitable Brasidas, and it seems likely that now, as three years before, the high-born generals had retorted upon

his savage criticisms of their ill success by challenging him to take their places and do better if he could.

Brasidas collected his army behind the walls of Amphipolis. He had still the kernel of helots and Peloponnesians whom he had led northward on his bold march through Thesaly; to them he added volunteers from the liberated towns and a body of Thracian mercenaries hired with the diverted Athenian tribute. Sparta did nothing—could do nothing, perhaps—to help him, but his own confidence and zeal were better re-enforcements than a thousand disciplined warriors. On the other hand, the Athenian army, though of superior material, was led by a noisy braggart who owed his prominence to his political shrewdness and his ever-wagging tongue. Cleon dallied at Eion until the discontent of his men compelled him to act. With his entire army he marched along the ridge east of Amphipolis to a point which overlooked the streets of the city. He had only planned to reconnoiter in force, but when he faced his men about for a return to camp Brasidas hurled his troops upon the Athenian center and right. The left wing fled to Eion. Cleon's corpse was found among the heaps of Athenian slain, and one of the handful of Peloponnesians who fell was the heroic Brasidas. He died at Amphipolis conscious of his decisive victory, and the citizens pulled down the memorials of the Athenians who had colonized the city and henceforth honored the brilliant Spartan as their patron hero (421 B. C.).

The death of Brasidas and Cleon cleared the path for peace. In the spring of 421 B. C., ten years after the rainy night of the outrageous Theban assault on Plataea, the treaty was signed. Athens and Sparta agreed to live at peace with each other and each other's allies for fifty years. Prisoners of war were to be given up and all conquests restored. Hellas was to be as it was before the outbreak of hostilities. Mutual distrust and sharp practices, however, prevented the precise fulfillment of the terms of the treaty.

Ten years of war had disclosed flaws in the Athenian state. The people who ruled it were shifty and driven to and fro by waves of feeling. No man of intellect and integrity had arisen to guide the democracy as Pericles had guided it, and the state had shown signs of an alarming readiness to depart from its ideals and traditions and to venture into paths which might lead to glory or—the grave. For Hellas generally the war had seriously damaged the old reverence for Spartan valor and relaxed Sparta's hold upon her allies. To go deeper yet, the decade of deceit and disaster had done much to weaken the Hellenic sentiment, to heighten jealous and blood-thirsty passion, to destroy the finer nature of the Greeks and the sense of their common superiority over the outside barbarians. The so-called "Peace of Nicias" brought a cessation of hostilities, but no one could have expected that it would fulfill its term of a half-century, for the real cause of the war was left untouched.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.—II. TO THE END OF THE
SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

THE Peace of Nicias was thinly veiled war. A decade of bitter feeling could not be sweetened by a written agreement, and each party had been the victim of so much outrage and savagery that neither placed any confidence in the promises of the other. The treaty provided for the mutual exchange of prisoners and conquests. But Athens clung to Pylus and to her outposts near Corinth, and Sparta did not give back the Thracian cities, though she left them free to decide whom they would serve.

The Spartans were bent on two aims—the release of the citizens whom Athens held as hostages and the evacuation of Pylus. To secure these concessions she disregarded the interests of her old allies and made a separate and private treaty with Athens, in which the two great states took oath to stand by each other. Upon the signing of this instrument Athens gave up the hoplites whom she had held since the capture of Sphacteria. The minor Peloponnesian states considered the separate treaty as a base desertion of their cause, and Corinth had the spirit to organize a new league, of which the presidency was held by Argos. Sparta endeavored to counteract the Argive confederation by making a separate treaty with Bœotia, but the intrigue succeeded only in offending the Athenians and causing a revolution in the city which overset Nicias and the friends of peace.

In Alcibiades the war party had found a leader who overmatched Nicias in birth and Cleon in unscrupulous energy. This young man had been the talk of the town from his ear-

liest boyhood, when his father, Clinias, who had fallen at Coronea, left him a boy of five years, to the guardianship of his kinsman, Pericles. The child, beautiful, brilliant, wayward, was the father of the man. His physical beauty, mental acuteness, and reckless morals made him the master of the revels in his coterie of "bloods."

Alcibiades first posed in political affairs as the friend of Sparta, but that country preferred to deal with the older and more responsible Nicias, and the young man, vowing vengeance for the slight, espoused democracy, and took up the war policy which Cleon's death had deprived of a champion. Thus the exquisite "man about town" was transformed into a dangerous political leader whose desire to revenge his personal wrongs on Sparta and to win military glory could not endure the continuance of the peace.

Through the machinations of Alcibiades, Athens entered the Argive league (420 B. C.), which the minor states of Peloponnesus had compacted after the treaty of Nicias. The new alliance at once undertook to attach to itself the cities of Arcadia, so as to isolate Sparta. But the latter state collected all its available forces and defeated the army of the league (from which Athens had withheld her full support) with heavy loss at Mantinea (418 B. C.).

Sparta's victory at Mantinea was followed by the re-establishment of her supremacy in the Peloponnesus. Oligarchy replaced democracy in Argos, and the two states formed an alliance for fifty years. These occurrences set Athens in commotion. She was once more isolated, while her rival was stronger than ever. Again Alcibiades and Nicias confronted each other, and in the bitterness of their strife had recourse to ostracism. At the last moment, however, both factions combined to vote against a third man, a pestiferous political agitator, Hyperbolus.

Of the perplexing movements and counter-movements which characterized the relations of the states during this

remarkable peace we have mentioned but a few, sufficient, perhaps, to indicate the utter disunion which prevailed and the absence of any national Hellenic spirit. Sparta desired to redeem her losses; Athens aimed to strengthen herself and to undermine her enemy in view of the certain renewal of open war. The minor states served their own interests, backing and filling as one course or another promised best.

It was wise for Athens to prepare for future war, but it is easy at this distance to discern the folly of her methods. Simple prudence, if not the memory of Pericles's repeated admonitions, should have confined her efforts to the consolidation of the maritime power in which lay her advantage. Such success as she had achieved hitherto sprang from her control of the sea, and her very life depended upon the regular payment of the tribute. The heaviest blow at her empire had been the work of Brasidas among her Thracian allies. Until his work was undone and the seceded towns were subdued it was insanity to attempt further conquests or to waste time and money upon intrigues with natural allies of Sparta. Yet no adequate force was sent to Amphipolis, and the ambition of Alcibiades hurried the commonwealth into ruinous foreign projects, indefensible on grounds of honor or expediency.

Such, for example, was the Melian expedition of 416 B. C. Melos was one of the southern Cyclades, a Dorian island which had remained neutral in the late war. Athens set about its annexation. The Melians protested, asserting at once their independence and neutrality, but Athens, which could not spare a force sufficient to recapture Amphipolis, dispatched thirty-six triremes with a strong land army to chastise their "insolence." Siege, famine, treason, surrender, massacre, and slavery followed fast, ending in the extinction of a free Hellenic community. Athenian colonists were settled in the homes of the unoffending islanders whose only sin had been their love of a freedom which they were too weak to defend.

The calamities of the Sicilian expedition fell like a stroke of retributive justice upon the perpetrators of this high-handed outrage.

The island of Sicily—larger than the whole of Peloponnesus—had been the home of a simple pastoral people until the Phenicians from Carthage and the Greeks from Ionic Eubœa and Dorian Corinth began to fill it with a more advanced civilization. Greek cities sprang up at every favorable point of the eastern section of the island, while the west became the stronghold of Carthage. In the course of two centuries the Siceliots, or Sicilian Greeks, developed a strongly individual character. Under those genial skies, where harvests were sure, fleeces were heavy, and trade was remunerative, the dull Dorian blood leaped like Ionian.

The Siceliot cities kept pace with the best progress of the race in art, architecture, and letters, while in lavish luxury of life they far surpassed the meager scale of living which contented the children of continental Hellas. Under its tyrants, Gelo and Hiero, Syracuse became the chief city of the island. In politics their history runs in the true Greek channel. Each city endeavored to preserve its autonomy, and a united Siceliot state was as impossible as a Greek empire.

Athens had already meddled weakly in the Ionian and Dorian feuds in the islands, when in the year of the Melian massacre (416 B. C.) she was invited a second time to take sides in a Sicilian quarrel. Eggesta, a native town whose people had befriended the Ionians, sent envoys with a glowing proposition. Their splendid city, they said, was at war with Selinus, which had enlisted the full force of the Dorian towns with the evident purpose of sweeping the island of its non-Dorian settlements. Such a consolidated state as the Syracusans were determined to create in Sicily would be the natural ally of Sparta in the next war. By helping Eggesta Athens would insure her own future. Furthermore, the Eggesteans promised to bear the

costs of the campaign. So adroitly was the case presented that its opponents could not convince the people of its un-wisdom. The Ecclesia eagerly indorsed the project upon false and insufficient information, and assigned the chief command to a board of three generals—Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus.

The set of the popular current toward the Sicilian expedition seemed irresistible, but at a second session of the assembly, called to decide upon the details of the armament, Nicias ventured to declare the principles of the opposition and to urge a reconsideration of the first rash vote. The speaker was a man of wealth and family, a soldier personally brave but overcautious, and a statesman of influence among the more conservative and aristocratic citizens. He showed the risk which attended the dispatch of a considerable force to a far-away land while the Thracian towns remained in revolt and while Sparta was on the look-out for revenge. Such folly, he said, could only spring from the reckless ambition of a few young men, who hoped, through military successes, to win renown and mend the fortunes which their extravagance had broken.

Alcibiades made the convincing speech of the session. Surely the state that had not flinched before Persia need not fear the Siceliots, who were but mongrel Greeks prone to prey upon each other. It was the bounden duty of Athens not only to protect what the fathers had secured but to crown the city with new glories, and to this end he appealed to the energy of youth and the sage counsel of the old to make common cause.

In vain Nicias insisted upon the enormous outlay necessary to insure the success of the expedition; the war party asked him for figures, and when he named one hundred triremes and five thousand heavy armed soldiers (thinking thus to deter them), the people enthusiastically voted to carry out his suggestion to the letter and to make the arma-

ment worthy of the imperial city. With serious misgivings the conservative general took up the work of preparation. Not so the people, among whom the words of Alcibiades had spread the conviction that Athens was on the eve of an easy conquest of a land flowing with milk and honey.

One morning, when the preparations were nearly completed, the citizens were horrified by a deed of midnight sacrilege. Persons unknown passed through the city mutilating the sacred Hermæ which stood in the public places. The Athenians, a people in all things too superstitious, were panic-stricken. Had the Corinthians wrought the outrage in order to confound the attack upon their friends in Sicily? or had Athens a lawless and impious element capable of such nefarious deeds? The common people suspected the secret political clubs of the aristocrats, and the latter threw suspicion upon Alcibiades, the popular idol.

Investigation, with promise of high reward, failed to fix the guilt. Certain slaves, however, did testify that they had seen Alcibiades with some of his gay companions in a house in the Ceramicus making mock of the *Eleusinia*, the most sacred religious rites in Attica. The accused demanded to be put on his trial immediately, that the matter might be settled before the departure of the fleet, but his enemies, fearing his personal influence with the populace, who would be his judges, were powerful enough to postpone the hearing.

In the midsummer of 415 B. C. the grand armada, whose invincibility few dared to question, sailed out of the Piræus. Yet even in the presence of all that pomp and circumstance some men could not forget that the ships were freighted with the fears as well as the hopes of the city. The failure of this fleet would be disastrous, and even its success would bring burdensome responsibilities.

The fleet, which numbered 250 vessels of all classes, with fully 36,000 men, rounded the Peloponnesus in safety and put in at Corcyra. Thence in three squadrons, commanded

by the three generals, it crossed to Italy, where the Greek colonists looked with distrust upon the whole expedition, and coasted westward to the Straits of Messina. Here the generals were first confronted by the difficulties of their undertaking. Reconnoitering vessels reported that Egesta had but thirty talents in her treasury, and that the pledges by which she had won the ear of Athens were utterly worthless. Furthermore, the advent of the Athenians in Italy had wrought a change among the Siceliots. Island towns that had scouted the possibility of the invasion threw off their indifference and labored zealously to beat off the foe.

The three commanders held different views of their duty. Nicias, who dreaded the consequences of victory almost as much as defeat, held strictly to his orders, namely, to conclude peace between Egesta and Selinus, to restore if possible the ruined town of Leontini, which Egesta had befriended when suffering from Dorian attack, and then to return. This much could be accomplished with small risk, if with scant glory. This was not what Alcibiades had come for. Trusting in the power of persuasion which had served him at Athens and at Argos, he demanded that the smaller towns should be won over by diplomacy, while Syracuse and Selinus should be isolated and reduced by force. Lamachus, who had no private ends to care for, but was a plain, blunt soldier, advocated an immediate attack upon Syracuse. Ultimately Lamachus and Alcibiades combined against the cautious Nicias and adopted a plan of campaign which included the peaceful acquisition of the minor towns with the forcible seizure of Syracuse. Much time and money would be required for such a campaign, but this was not the consideration to deter Alcibiades when in search of his own fortune. But he had scarcely gained a foothold in Sicily at Catana when the dispatch-boat *Salaminia* arrived from Athens with a warrant for his arrest on the standing charge of sacrilegious mockery of the Eleusinia.


The misgivings which had troubled some minds at Athens when the fleet sailed out were not soothed by the events of the summer. Party spirit was hot and bitter; suspicions of treason were rife. The juries listened eagerly to informers, and many were prosecuted for imaginary offenses. The aristocrats nourished the suspicion that Alcibiades was of the stuff of which tyrants were made, and that he would utilize the fleet to make himself master of the city. Opinion was further influenced by hostile movements of Spartan troops until it was strong enough to demand the arrest of Alcibiades. The decree went forth, but it seems that his enemies had no desire to let him plead his cause before the populace; for the *Salaminia* was not to bring him back in irons, but to escort him in his own vessel. Alcibiades obeyed the summons and accompanied the state trireme as far as Thurii in Italy. There he disappeared, and when the court officers reported his flight the Athenians condemned him to death, confiscated his property, and pronounced the curse of a blasphemer and a traitor upon his head.

The removal of Alcibiades subtracted the genius from the Athenian armada. Of Nicias and Lamachus, who were left, the former, though honest and patriotic, was slow, overcautious, and grossly superstitious; the latter was a democratic soldier of fiery energy, better to execute than to plan. The hero of the common soldiers, the preacher of the crusade, the one man who had conceived and thus far carried on the undertaking, had been dragged off in disgrace. After half-hearted attacks upon several cities of the northern coast, which by their ill-success depressed the spirits of the fleet and encouraged the Sicilians, Nicias was compelled, by the dissatisfaction of his own men and the taunts of the enemy, to strike a blow at Syracuse, the leading city of the island.

The stress of danger had forced the democracy of Syracuse to intrust the defensive measures to Hermocrates, the man whose sagacity ten years before had united the islanders

against the first incursion of Athens. This great man filled the citizens with his own enthusiasm, induced them to submit to military discipline and to work like heroes upon the palisades and earth-works. The original Syracuse was built upon the small island of Ortygia, near the northern shore of a considerable bay, which was known as "the Great Harbor." In the prosperous time of the tyrants it had spread across the narrow channels to the main-land, where the houses and streets of the outer city rose on the terraced heights of Epipolæ. It had quite outgrown its natural limits, and with them that adaptation to defense for which the cities of the Greeks were notable. While the city was still in the confusion of preparation, Nicias, by stratagem, enticed the Syracusan army to attack his strong camp at Catana, while his vessels landed a large force unopposed on the southern rim of the Great Harbor. Next morning, on the return of the Syracusans from their fool's errand to his camp, he attacked them and gained a slight advantage, which the native cavalry prevented him from pursuing. He abandoned his position, and after a fruitless attack on Messina, which Alcibiades had traitorously forewarned of his intentions, established winter quarters and awaited reinforcements. The year of great hopes had ended without achievement, the treasury of the fleet was empty, Athens must pour more ships, money, and men into the greedy West.

The genial Sicilian winter brought no respite to the manful endeavors of the Syracusans. In order to render difficult the inevitable blockade, they constructed a wall from the Great Harbor across the plateau to the Bay of Thapsus and rammed stakes into the beach wherever the shallow water seemed to tempt a landing. Hermocrates himself appealed to the neighboring cities by threats and entreaties to ally themselves with Syracuse, while other envoys hurried over-seas to the mother-city, Corinth, and to Sparta, the champion of the Dorian blood, to save the greatest Dorian colony from Ionian ambition.



At Sparta the plea of Syracuse found an advocate in Alcibiades, who had found refuge among his country's enemies. With sublime effrontery he told the Spartans that he had always been their friend and the foe of democracy. He called to witness the kindness which he had shown to the hoplites captured at Pylus, and he assured them that unless they sent succor, and above all a well-trained general, Syracuse would be the beginning of a new Athenian empire, which would eventually absorb all the Greek lands, even the Peloponnesus. The beauty and eloquence of the traitor overcame his hearers' scruples against foreign war, and they detailed Gylippus, an experienced soldier of the Brasidas pattern, to conduct the defense of the city. Gylippus made all speed for Sicily, bidding Corinth send her fleet to his support.

In the early spring of 414 B. C. the entire Athenian force moved on Syracuse. The army landed at a point on the Bay of Thapsus and gained the heights of Epipolæ, overlooking the city. With a speed which evinced the experience of many campaigns they rapidly intrenched themselves, first at Labdalum, at the extremity of the triangular plateau, and then in a strong circular work, nearer the new Syracusan rampart. Following the fashion of the day in sieges, they next commenced two wing walls leading from this "circle-fort" to the Bay of Thapsus, on the north, and the Great Harbor, on the south, so as to surround the city on the land side. The defenders immediately built their first counter-wall, extending from their rampart across the course of the Athenian south wing to the brink of the precipice. A band of Athenian hoplites seized upon the work as soon as it was completed, tore it down, and used its materials for their own offensive operations. (See "Military Map of Syracuse.")

Baffled in their first attempt, the Syracusans next built a line of wall through the low ground from their rampart to the Anapus. This also intersected the southern wing-wall of Nicias and barred its course to the harbor. This, in turn, the

Athenians attacked and destroyed, but in the desperate fighting in the low ground Lamachus was killed. At the same time a sortie against the Athenian circle-fort failed.

The Athenian fleet was now brought from the Bay of Thapsus to the Great Harbor. The south wing wall was completed, and behind it Nicias, who had fallen ill with a painful disease, disembarked his stores and established his camp. The northern wing wall was carelessly left unfinished, and through its gap dashed Gylippus the Spartan, with three thousand men, whom he had gathered among the Sicilian towns for the relief of the exhausted city. The Syracusans had nearly lost hope. They had deposed Hermocrates in their terror at the gradual advance of the Athenian lines, and at the moment of Gylippus's arrival an influential party was on the point of negotiating for peace. The advent of Gylippus changed all that. He took over the entire conduct of the defense and soon turned the laugh on the Athenians, who had taunted the Syracusans for expecting salvation from one long-haired Spartan with his cloak and staff. Gylippus offered Nicias just five days in which to get out of Sicily with his host, and when the offer was scorned he undertook to drive them out. Taking in the military situation with a practiced eye, he determined that the Athenians should never complete the north wing wall. Accordingly, he directed all his efforts to that side of Epipolæ, first capturing the redoubt of Labdalum, then giving battle to the enemy on the heights. A first engagement went against him, but he gained ground enough in the second to push a third counter-work out from the new city wall to the cliff's edge on the north, intersecting the unfinished Athenian wing and effectually blocking all attempts of the invaders to cut off the land communication of Syracuse. To strengthen his position on Epipolæ the Spartan, whose own spirit lent sinews to his fellows, threw out a cross-wall in front of his new counter-work and defended it by bastions strongly manned. Having put hope in the place of

despair, and assured free passage in and out of the city, Gylippus went into the interior of the island to stir up a national feeling which should exterminate the army of Athens.

The altered demeanor of the besieged had its immediate effect on Nicias, who never failed to see the dark side of things. For greater safety he removed the greater part of his munitions from his camp to Plemmyrium at the harbor mouth, and sent dispatches to the home government begging reinforcements to avert disaster.

Athens was in no condition to grant his request. The depredations of her fleets upon the coast of Peloponnesus had renewed the war with Sparta while Alcibiades was suggesting plans for the destruction of his native city. Yet the democracy responded with prompt supplies and commissioned Demosthenes to lead a large armament to the relief of Nicias. In the spring of 413 B. C. this excellent general sailed for Sicily with seventy-three triremes, leaving the city under the menace of a Spartan garrison which King Agis had established at Decelea among the Attic hills within full view of the Athenian Acropolis. Before the arrival of Demosthenes Nicias had fallen into direful straits. What Gylippus had done for the military affairs of the Syracusans the Corinthians had done for their navy, and in the spring of 413 B. C. they were able to pit a considerable fleet against the Athenian triremes. They lost their first naval battle, but made amends by capturing the Athenian post at Plemmyrium with its valuable stores. This position gave the Syracusans the command of the entrance to the Great Harbor in which Nicias was securely penned. Besieger and besieged had changed places, and a series of sea-fights within the port had nearly brought an end to the Athenian fleet, when the opportune arrival of Demosthenes with a fleet and army restored the naval preponderance of Athens.

Demosthenes was a veteran campaigner, judicious and brave. His glance went straight to the weak spot in the Athenian

siege-plan. Unless the nominal blockade could be made effective the project must be abandoned, or, in plain terms, success or failure hinged upon the recapture of the heights of Epipolæ which Gylippus had wrested from Nicias and strongly fortified.

Under cover of darkness Demosthenes led his main army out of the harbor camp, and, hurrying along under the cliffs to the farthest point of Epipolæ, climbed to the plateau. He seized the Syracusan cross-wall and threw himself upon the forts behind it. But the first rush of victory carried him too far, and before he could occupy a defensible position Gylippus rallied the full force of Syracuse to fight for the imperiled city. The battle was fought on the barren ridge of Epipolæ by the faint light of the moon. In the excitement of the hour discipline, never rigid in an Ionian army, was relaxed, and in the confusion the Athenians mistook the Dorian war-songs of their rear-guard (men of Coreyra and Argos) for the cheers of Dorians of Syracuse, moving to outflank them. Panic fell upon the army, and after a wild combat, in which the Athenians more than once attacked their own allies, they broke and fled. The country was strange, and many perished by falling over the cliffs. Others wandered in the fields until they fell victims to Syracusan cavalry. The remnant in utter dismay straggled back to the harbor camp where Nicias lay sick and despondent.

The failure of the night attack left no alternative to the Athenians. Sicilian auxiliaries were pouring in through the city gates, and ships from the Peloponnesus were daily augmenting the Syracusan navy. Gylippus and Hermocrates, confident of success, were pressing matters to an end. After Athens had done her utmost for the expedition the only prudent course for her generals was to withdraw before it was too late. Their fleet still outnumbered that of Sicily, and they might yet retreat through the mouth of the Great Harbor before it should close upon them forever. Demos-

thenes demanded instant withdrawal, but Nicias, fearing to face the wrath of the Athenian assembly, refused to quit his post without orders from home. False assurances came from Syracuse that the city could not stand the strain of war much longer, but must soon yield from sheer exhaustion. So the fated army lingered on in its camp until in the late summer (413 B. C.) the miasma from the swamps about the Anapus added the terrors of fever to those of the sword. Nicias sent word to the supply station at Catana to forward no more provisions, for he would break camp and withdraw to more favorable quarters for the winter. All was made ready, but on the night before the departure (August 29) the shadow of the earth crept across the face of the full moon. Nicias, who was nothing if not orthodox, and who viewed as blasphemous such natural philosophy as Anaxagoras had taught to Pericles, was terrified beyond measure by the eclipse. The common soldiers shared his superstition, and the hard-headed Demosthenes was aghast at their acquiescence in the declaration of the soothsayers that the gods were angry and that the expedition must not move until the moon should again be full.

To delay for thrice nine days when minutes were precious was simply murderous. Gylippus, divining, or getting news from spies or traitors, that the Athenians were panic-stricken, gave orders for a combined attack upon them by sea and land. Though only partially successful he was able to put one more bar upon their prison by stretching a line of hulks bound together by stout chains across the harbor mouth from Ortygia to Plemmyrium. This movement aroused even the doleful Nicias. Behind him was the great island, daily growing more hostile; on one side was the fever morass, on the other a city full of active and triumphant foes. The only way of escape was by sea, and that was blockaded. It was determined to attack the barrier at once and stake all upon its destruction.

The last great sea-fight in the harbor of Syracuse took place on the 1st day of September. The one hundred and ten Athenian triremes, sadly fouled and weakened by long service in southern waters, were opposed by nearly as many Syracusan and Peloponnesian ships. To the Athenians victory meant a chance for life and liberty; the enemy saw in it the destruction of Athens, the terror of the Dorians and the one imperial power whose existence menaced those separate and petty city governments which the Greeks preferred to a united nation. Never was fiercer fighting than on that September day, but the mistress of the seas was baffled and beaten back to her camp. The sailors refused to renew the conflict on the morrow. All hope of escape by sea had to be abandoned, and the generals with heavy hearts made ready to lead their men overland to Catana, forty miles away. But even when this resolution was taken prompt action was lacking. The Syracusans spent the 2d of September in high revelry in honor of Heracles, the Dorian demigod in whose name they were conquering. But Nicias, instead of pushing immediately forward through the open roads, waited one day longer—one fatal day, for the 3rd of September found Gylippus aware of his intentions and guarding every defile on the route of the retreat.

Forty thousand men in the camp were able to take up their arms and burdens of food and baggage on that memorable morning. Thousands more, fever-sick or sorely wounded, lay forsaken, moaning in agony of body and mind as the melancholy column left the cantonments and headed into the hostile country. The dead from the great sea-fight lay unburied on the shore, and the smoke of the burning triremes hung gloomily over the desolate scene.

After four days of marching and fighting the Athenians were still in sight of Syracuse. Their efforts to force their way to Catana proved vain, and with terrible losses they turned southward toward the coast, hoping to evade pursuit

by a night march and to reach the shelter of some native city. But the blood-thirsty foe overtook the division of Demosthenes among some farm buildings before midday. He surrendered with six thousand men. Nicias enjoyed but a few hours' respite before he too had to yield to Gylippus at the river Asinarus. Only a few stragglers escaped to the friendly cities of the island.

Gylippus and the exultant Syracusans made merry over their captives, escorting the melancholy procession back to the city with taunts and jeers at the expense of Athens, and commemorating their victory with a festival which was long observed on the anniversary of the surrender of Nicias.

The Athenian generals had the word of their captor that the lives of the prisoners should be spared; but those who fell from the cliffs in the night assault, or those whose corpses lay unburied on the shore of the Great Harbor, or who had been pierced by arrows with Demosthenes in the olive orchard, or those who had been trampled to death in the bloody waters of Asinarus with Nicias—these were fortune's favorites in comparison with the men who survived surrender.

The savage citizens would not even spare the generals, whose lives Gylippus had begged in order that they might grace his own return to Sparta; but Nicias and Demosthenes—the timid one and the intrepid—being warned by Hermocrates of the death decree, died by their own hands before the arrival of the executioner. The greater number of the prisoners of war were condemned to a living death. Herded like cattle in the stone quarries which pitted the cliffs of Epipolæ, where the city rabble might stare and taunt and spit upon them, with no roof to shelter them from the southern sun or from the rains and frosty nights of autumn; without furniture or bedding, with a slave's half ration of barley and water—so they lived through September, October, and far into November of that distressful year.

Hundreds died of wounds, exposure, fever, and of heart-break; their bodies were left to curse the living. After seventy days, when prison fever threatened to spread from the prison-pen to the city, the quarries were opened, the Athenian citizens and Sicilian Greeks were sorted out. The rest were sold into slavery. After eight months of confinement the famished remnant was also sold, though it is said that some masters melted at the sight of so much misfortune and set their purchases free. Thucydides, the historian, himself an Athenian and a patriot, though in exile, wrote of this catastrophe: "Thus ended the greatest undertaking of this war [the Peloponnesian], and in my opinion the greatest in which the Greeks were ever concerned, the one most splendid for the conquerors and most disastrous for the conquered; for they suffered no common defeat, but were absolutely annihilated—army, fleet, and all—and of many thousands who went away only a handful ever saw their homes again."

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.—III. TO THE FALL OF ATHENS.

THE Athenian state never recovered from the disaster in Sicily. For the original outfit and subsequent relief of that expedition she threw away more than two hundred ships of war, her accumulated treasure and current income, and the lives of more than sixty thousand men. Mourning was in every home ; the private purse had suffered in the public calamity, the ship-houses and dock-yards were vacant, and the late sovereign of the seas was left without fleet, army, money, or experienced generals to enforce her authority over her own dominions. In a notch in the hills which formed the northern horizon could be seen the smoke of the Spartan camp-fires at Decelea, whence the Peloponnesian cavalry ravaged the Attic farms and vineyards, intercepted the supply-trains from Eubœa, and on occasion clattered up to the very gates of Athens. The Athenian slaves—the only class accustomed to hard labor—ran off by scores and hundreds to the enemy, leaving the citizens in miserable plight. Indeed, the enemy made no exertion to secure a victory which seemed sure to come speedily of its own accord.

The Spartans mistook the temper of Athens when they looked for a weak resistance and an early surrender. It was true that the blow which had prostrated the material resources of the state had at the same time shaken popular faith in the democratic constitution and encouraged the anti-Athenian faction in every city of the island empire. But the spirit of the Periclean day was not dead, and the old pride and love of freedom enabled the citizens to hold out strenuously against tremendous odds for nine years longer.

The depredations of an Athenian fleet on the Peloponnesian coast (413 B. C.) had marked the re-opening of hostilities in main-land Greece. Sparta immediately answered by taking the counsel of Alcibiades and putting a permanent garrison at Decelea, in the heart of Attica. The old subjects of Athens sprang to their opportunity. Eubœans and Lesbians came to King Agis at Decelea to ask his help in breaking away from their allegiance, while envoys of the oligarchical faction in Chios and Erythræ, in Ionia, presented the same appeal at Sparta. With the latter came Persian emissaries.

Although the Greek towns of Ionia had been tributary to Athens, and not to Persia, since the victories of Xanthippus and Cimon, their names had not been stricken from the royal tribute lists. Darius II., the new Persian king, being hard pressed for money, compelled the satraps within whose districts these cities nominally lay to advance their quota. This requisition bore heavily on Pharnabazus, the satrap of the Hellespontine cities, and on Tissaphernes, whose satrapy—on paper—still included the rich towns of Ionia. Persia had lost her pristine strength, and her satraps could not command sufficient military force to win the cities back from Athens. They applied, accordingly, to military Sparta, promising to pay well for the support of a fleet, to be used in breaking up the Athenian confederacy. Sparta, influenced by Alcibiades, promised to aid the Chian oligarchs in their proposed insurrection, and assured Tissaphernes that she would accept his promised subsidies.

After the first week of panic Athens settled down to a vigorous policy of resistance. By personal sacrifice, close economy, and tremendous energy she got together a considerable fleet. Suspecting the purpose of the Chian oligarchs, she required that state to send a part of its navy to Athens. With an improvised armament she intercepted the Peloponnesian vessels on their way to Chios and blockaded them in a cove on the southern coast of the Saronic Gulf.

The genius of Alcibiades shone out in the gloom which the news of this reverse brought upon the Spartans. Give him five ships, he said, and he would go alone to Chios and accomplish all that was necessary. His persuasive arts again prevailed. Before Athens could follow up her success Alcibiades had tempted Chios, Lesbos, and the chief cities of the Ionian coast into rebellion, and with Charideus, the Spartan admiral, had negotiated a treaty with Tissaphernes by which in return for money payments Sparta acknowledged the Great King's authority over all the possessions of his fathers—an agreement which, if strictly interpreted, abandoned all the Greek towns as far as the Corinthian Isthmus to the successor of Darius and Xerxes.

Viewing the dissolution of the empire as a mortal peril, Athens took up the emergency fund of a thousand talents which Pericles had laid away and expended it upon a fleet. Samos, faithful among the faithless, became the Athenian naval station from which constant but indecisive war was waged against the Spartans and Persians.

The winter of 412–411 B. C. was memorable for its political activity. The two fleets were quartered at Samos and Rhodes; Tissaphernes, with the Persian money-bags, was near by on the border of Ionia; Alcibiades was the leading figure. The slow progress of the war and the growing coldness of the satrap, as well as the jealousy of high officials in the Spartan fleet, made the Athenian an object of suspicion. To avoid assassination he fled from the camp and took refuge with Tissaphernes. The satrap received him cordially and listened kindly to his counsel, which was to the effect that Persia would be the gainer if Sparta and Athens should be allowed to wear each other out; for the complete triumph of Sparta would establish a Greek power more formidable than that of Athens. Following the same advice, probably, Tissaphernes reduced the pay of the Spartan sailors, finding it less expensive to bribe their admirals.

As soon as Alcibiades fell out of favor with the Spartans he began to scheme for his re-instatement in his native city. He persuaded the oligarchic party in the camp at Samos of his ability to transfer the friendship of Persia and the subsidies to the Athenian side. He fixed the condition that Athens must remodel her government on the oligarchic plan and rescind the decree passed against him in 415 B. C. Pisander, the agent of the oligarchs in the fleet, induced the Athenian assembly to send envoys to ascertain the terms upon which such an agreement might be reached. The embassy failed because Alcibiades was unable to sway Tissaphernes.

During Pisander's visit to Athens he had stirred up every foe of the democracy. While he was absent on the business of the embassy the secret aristocratic clubs and the young men of the first families, who despised the vulgar leaders of the public assembly, under the guidance of Antiphon and Theramenes prepared the way for a revolution. On his return Pisander and his fellow-conspirators went straight to their object. A popular assembly, convened outside the walls, provided for the appointment of a governing Council of Four Hundred, and decreed that all political power should be limited to a body of five thousand selected citizens (411 B.C.).

The constitution of Clisthenes was thus swept away, and the democracy which had made Athens great was superseded by the rule of a few hundred citizens of wealth and family. The "Four Hundred" immediately addressed themselves to the task of restoring order to the finances and to the re-establishment of peace with Sparta, who might be supposed to befriend the new government. But the oligarchs had not made allowance for the action of that large section of patriotic citizens who lay at Samos. Led by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, the fleet declared itself to be the genuine Athens and asserted its determination to restore the city democracy which Pisander and Antiphon had betrayed. Under the persuasion of Thrasybulus this floating Athens chose Alcibiades for its

commander, trusting in his power to divert the Persian subsidies into their treasury. The traitor accepted the trust.

The Four Hundred had counted upon the support of the fleet, whose resolute antagonism now threatened their destruction. Indeed, only the interposition of Alcibiades saved the city from siege and sack by its own citizens from Samos. In view of the ruling democratic sentiment in the forces the city democrats plucked up courage, and the endeavors of the oligarchs to come to an understanding with Sparta aroused all their dormant patriotism. Led by Theramenes, they tore down a fort at the Piræus which they believed was being prepared to receive a Peloponnesian garrison, and then demanded that the Four Hundred should select and publish the list of five thousand citizens who were to constitute the reformed Ecclesia. The loss of Eubœa made the new government still more odious.

Unsupported by the citizens, and torn by internal dissension, the oligarchs were deposed. Democracy was restored, though not in full measure. Membership in the assembly was restricted to those citizens whose means were sufficient for their own military equipment; all pay for assembly and jury duty was abolished; the recall of Alcibiades was decreed, and a commission was appointed to reconcile the democracy of the fleet to the new conditions in the capital. The rule of the Four Hundred lasted but four months, and though it was established upon murder and injustice its overturn was accompanied by singular moderation. Pisander reached a place of safety before his condemnation; Antiphon was executed despite the eloquence of his defense; scarcely another suffered death for participating in a revolution such as few Greek cities could have passed through without the stain of blood.

The war in the East continued to decline in energy. Tisaphernes paid less and less to the Spartans, and they transferred a portion of their fleet to the Hellespont in order to

co-operate with Pharnabazus in the reduction of the confederate cities and to intercept the corn fleets which plied between the Euxine and Piræus. The Athenians from Samos gave chase and won a series of partial victories (411 B. C.) which were capped by Alcibiades, who in the spring of 410 B. C. captured or destroyed the entire fleet of the Peloponnesians in the battle of Cyzicus. In the humiliation of defeat Sparta is said to have offered peace, but Athens, exultant over her victory and confident of the genius of the commander, declined the conditions and set about the recovery of the Hellespontine and Ionian cities (409-408 B. C.). Sparta's power of aggression was for the time paralyzed.

In this lull Alcibiades returned to Athens, the city of his birth. She might trace all her present woes to him—the garrison of King Agis at Decelea, the decaying naval power, the wounds of party strife still fresh and bloody—but she chose to receive him with all honor. To the unthinking he was a successful general, a brilliant and romantic hero, who told them that all his sufferings had been borne for love of his native land. To sober patriots it may have seemed well to use his talents while they might for the good of Athens. He was made general with such absolute power as had formerly been allowed to Pericles and Cimon, and after escorting the sacred procession to Eleusis on the *fête* day of Demeter, a procession which had not taken place since Agis came to Decelea, he departed for Ionia with the best men and ships which Athens could afford.

Both Sparta and Persia had intrusted their interests on the Asiatic coast to new men. The Spartan high-admiral Lysander was in his own way the equal of Brasidas and Gylippus. He was a man of towering ambition and a politician who saw farther and clearer than even Alcibiades. The alliance with Persia which the latter had first consummated Lysander made highly useful, and he also extended and systematized such intrigues with the Athenian allies as Alcibi-

ades had successfully carried on with Chios. From his head-quarters at Ephesus he went up to Sardis, where "the younger Cyrus," the royal son of King Darius II., had superseded the crafty Tissaphernes. Well furnished with funds, fond of the Greeks, and eager for military glory, the prince listened eagerly to Lysander's schemes for conquering Athens and gave him gold to raise the pay of his sailors.

The combination of the Persian purse with one of the best generals of Sparta at the head of a well-paid and enthusiastic fleet was dangerous to Alcibiades, who did not lack in ability, but who had to forage for food and beg or steal the pay of his sailors. While the commander was absent on one of these foraging expeditions his deputy, the incompetent Antiochus, trespassed upon a direct prohibition and dared Lysander to come out of Ephesus and fight him. The Spartans came and destroyed fifteen of the Athenian vessels. The news of this defeat coming to Athens when public feeling was wrought up by reports of Alcibiades's exactions from friendly cities caused a violent revulsion of feeling. The populace were so confident of the commander's ability that when he did not conquer they were quick to doubt his zeal. His black record of itself condemned him. The Ecclesia took away his command and gave it to the ten tribal generals. Alcibiades, traitor in turn to Athens, to Sparta, and to Persia, retired to his castle on the north shore of the Hellespont and let matters take their course (407 B. C.).

While Athens was changing commanders, the one-term policy of Sparta had replaced Lysander with Callicratidas. The former hindered his successor in every way, sowing distrust in the mind of Cyrus and dissension in the fleet. But Callicratidas, one of the noblest men whom Sparta ever produced, animated his men with somewhat of his own patriotic zeal. Gladly dispensing with Persian subsidies, he collected funds in other ways and succeeded in shutting up Conon with the Athenian ships in the harbor of Mitylene, in

Lesbos. A swift blockade-runner acquainted Athens with Conon's danger, and the city exerted every means to save him. The consecrated temple plate went to the melting-pot, and the cavalry were dismounted and assigned to marine duty. In an incredibly brief period Athens had dispatched one hundred and fifty poorly fitted triremes to Lesbos under the tribal generals. Callicratidas, leaving a third of his force to watch Mitylene, met the Athenians off the southern promontory of Lesbos near the islands of Arginusæ, from which the battle takes its name (?406 B. C.). The Spartan admiral perished in the first shock of collision, and before the day ended one third of his fleet had been destroyed. The Athenians were completely victorious, the siege was raised, and Sparta was again minded to sue for peace.

By their own unwise and inhuman action the Athenians deprived themselves of the best fruits of their victory; for when the generals reported that the storm which followed the great battle had prevented the rescue of the thousand or more citizen sailors on board their own disabled triremes a tumult arose in the assembly. The people accused the commanders of forsaking their fellow-countrymen in peril, and removed them from office, re-appointing Conon only, who had not been with the fleet. Six of the indicted generals ventured to appear in their own defense. No credit was given to their assertion that they had detailed Theramenes to take the sailors from the unseaworthy vessels, and they were hurriedly condemned to death by popular vote without a trial. Two had escaped, but the remaining six, including Pericles, the son of the statesman and Aspasia, were executed. This was their reward for a victory which preserved the state from immediate ruin.

The overthrow at Arginusæ and the failure of her fresh overtures for peace left Sparta no alternative but to throw as much energy into the prosecution of the war as Athens had contributed to its protraction. The remnant of Callicrat-

idas's armament was stranded at Chios, poorly commanded, unsupported from home or from Persia, and fain to rob the friendly Chians for its daily bread. The sailors demanded the re-appointment of Lysander as their admiral. Cyrus seconded the request, promising rich subsidies on this condition. Lysander's friends, the oligarchs in the Greek cities, emphasized the call. Sparta finally sent out Aracus as admiral; he was only the figure-head, for with him came Lysander himself, a secretary in name, but in fact commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian navy.

Cyrus was as good as his word, and poured his treasure into the war-chest of Lysander. New triremes were built and manned, the allies brought up their contingents, and in the spring of 405 B. C. the Spartan fleet again controlled the *Ægean*. Lysander sailed to Lampsacus, on the Hellespont, the route by which Athens obtained her grain supply from the Euxine. The Athenians took post at *Ægospotami* ("Goat's River") on the European side of the strait, but so lax were their precautions against attack that even Alcibiades came from his castle in the vicinity to remonstrate with the commanders. He was rudely rebuffed. The generals persisted for five days in a policy so reckless that it is hard to shield them from the charge of willful neglect. On the fifth day Lysander swooped down upon the fleet as it lay defenseless along the shore and bagged the whole of it—ships, sailors, soldiers—with the exception of a few vessels with which Conon escaped to Cyprus. The captives were put to the sword.

The disaster at *Ægospotami* was the crowning calamity of the war. Athens could only sit still and await her doom. Seven years of defeat and of more costly victories had at last stripped the city of ships, soldiers, money, and allies. Nothing but her walls were left for her defense, and even behind these starvation threatened to cut short her career, for King Agis at Decelea was master of Attica and Eubœa, and there was no one to send her relief.

Lysander made no haste to follow up his success. Famine was an ally who conquered by delay. He sent Gylippus, the saviour of Syracuse, to Sparta with fifteen sacks of captured silver, and went on reducing the Athenian towns along the Hellespont and Bosphorus. The garrisons were sent to Athens to add their mouths to the hungry herd within the walls. Every-where his emissaries went they were met with enthusiasm by the oligarchs. The democratic governments were put down and Spartan harmosts, or governors, placed at the head of aristocratic boards. The Athenian cleruchies were broken up, the lands restored to their former owners or assigned to Sparta, while the cleruchs were packed off to gnaw away upon the vanishing provisions of Athens. In the winter 405-404 B. C. all the strength of Peloponnesus converged upon the fated city. King Agis came from his nine years' camp at Decelea, King Pausanias led an army across the Isthmus, and Lysander blockaded the Piræus with a larger fleet than had ever left that now desolate harbor.

The Athenians had good reason to fear that their city would be wiped out as they had more than once swept away offending states, but they determined not to yield without a struggle. They filled up the harbor mouth, barred the gates, reduced the rations, and awaited the worst. The enemy, relying upon the efficiency of the blockade, did not venture an assault. Sparta had two busy friends within the town, the oligarchic party and the famine, who soon compelled the citizens to propose peace. Athens would keep her walls and harbor defenses, but would abandon all her foreign possessions and become the dependent of Sparta. The offer was rejected. Again the pressure of famine humbled the city. Theramenes was sent to sound Lysander (now besieging Samos) as to the acceptability of fresh terms. He returned after three months' absence to find the suffering frightful. He was straightway sent to Sparta with other envoys, with full power to define the conditions of capitulation.

A congress of the Peloponnesian league was held to determine the fate of Athens. There were not wanting delegates like those of Corinth and Thebes, who insisted that her haughtiness be punished by the demolition of her walls and the enslavement of her people. But Sparta, mindful of her own future necessities and the expediency of putting a curb on her allies, interposed to save her from annihilation, saying well that a city which had once been the bulwark of Greece against the barbarian must not be blotted out. Theramenes was informed that Athens might have peace by breaking down the Long Walls and the fortifications of the port, by joining the Peloponnesian league, by recalling the exiled oligarchs, and by restricting her navy to twelve triremes. The requirements reduced Athens from one of the great powers of the world to a weak Attic state, self-governing still, but with her foreign relations subject to the enemy which she had opposed for three quarters of a century. Yet there was no refuge from these conditions, and the Ecclesia ratified them, with regret indeed but without delay. Peace was proclaimed in April 404 B. C., almost precisely twenty-seven years since the Bœotian attack on Plataea, which had begun the war.

The treaty which Theramenes had negotiated stipulated for no constitutional changes. Only the recall of the oligarchic exiles pointed to the policy of Sparta. But the aristocratic party in the city were not satisfied with this concession. Theramenes, who had been a leader of the Four Hundred, and whose sincerity as a democrat was a sham, was plotting for an aristocratic revolution. Critias, a rich and high-born citizen, and a whilom pupil of Socrates, was equally eager for the overthrow of the democracy. The influential party which centered about these men used fair means and foul to rid the city of the popular leaders, and finally called upon Lysander to complete the work. He came with a fleet from Samos, which still held out, accused the Athenians of remissness in executing the treaty, tore down the walls to

the sound of music, and forced a new government upon the state, at the pain of instant dissolution. Thirty men—selected one third by the party of Critias, one third by Theramenes, and one third by the people—were constituted the governing board. A Spartan garrison was stationed on the Acropolis to overawe the masses. The war upon which the triumphant democracy had entered a generation previous left Athens a defenseless country town, under the rule of the “Thirty Tyrants.”

CHAPTER XV.

THE SPARTAN ASCENDENCY.

SPARTA succeeded to the empire which Athens had been forced to give up. The Dorian state had not won the victory alone, for besides the gold of Persia the ships and men of the Peloponnesian league had fought on her side, yet she secured for herself all the benefits of the war. In place of the democracies which Athens had maintained in the allied cities Lysander constituted *Decarchies*, or governing tens, choosing the members from the local aristocrats with whom he had intrigued for several years. In each of these new oligarchies Sparta stationed a harmost, who was practically a Spartan military governor. Thus she bound the cities to herself by a firmer but more galling bond than that of Athens.


This meddlesome policy of Sparta extended to Athens itself, and was shown in Lysander's approval of the commission of thirty which was instituted to settle the constitution, but which overthrew the popular assembly, packed the council with its own partisans, and, backed by a Spartan garrison on the Acropolis, ran a brief course of robbery and blood which has marked them for lasting infamy as "the Thirty Tyrants."

The Thirty, piloted by Critias, went so fast and far that their colleague, the turncoat Theramenes, who had led the revolt against the Four Hundred, dared not go their length. No man was safe from their confiscations and assassinations. Informers were ready for a small bribe to swear away the life or property of any citizen whose opinions they hated or whose wealth they coveted. To insure themselves against such an insurrection as had put an end to the Four Hundred the Thirty disarmed all the citizens except three thousand in

whom they could trust. It was enacted that no one in this picked body should be punished without legal trial. But the opposition of Theramenes grew so threatening that Critias struck his name from the list and ordered him to immediate execution.

The despots accelerated their own ruin. The best men of Athens fled over the Bœotian border and there plotted for the restoration of the democracy. Some hundreds of these exiles under Thrasybulus seized the frontier post of Phyle and held it securely against the forces of the oligarchs. Thence they advanced to the Piræus and, entering through the breaches in the wall, took up a strong position on the hill of Munychia. The force with which Critias attempted to dislodge them was repulsed, and Critias himself was killed. The opposing armies showed a tendency to fraternize, and the remnant of the Thirty, dreading such a reconciliation, took refuge in Eleusis, where the democrats had already been exterminated. They passed over the government of Athens to a commission of ten oligarchs like themselves, who had soon to appeal to Sparta for aid against Thrasybulus. The Spartans sent Lysander to the help of the tyrants whom he had created, but with him came King Pausanias (not to be confused with his ancestor the false victor of Plataea), who was already jealous of the general's personal influence in the empire. The king thwarted Lysander's plans, and on receiving the submission of both the Ten and Thrasybulus brought about the return of the exiles and the restoration of the old constitution after a half-year of tyranny. The democracy was generous in its victory. It broke up the tyrant's nest at Eleusis, and punished those of the Thirty and the Ten upon whom it could lay its hand, but their partisans were graciously included in a general amnesty (autumn, 403 B. C.).

When the summons went out to the allies of Sparta to send their quota of men to the army of Pausanias and Lysander two powerful states, Thebes and Corinth, withheld their aid.



ROUTE OF THE TEN THOUSAND

Their original demand for the destruction of Athens had been overruled, and the first year of Spartan empire now admonished them that they had contributed to the aggrandizement of an Hellenic state which was no less ambitious and far more despotic than that which they had combined to overthrow. Henceforth they hung back from the old leadership and only awaited a fit opportunity to renounce their allegiance altogether. The opportunity was not long delayed, and, strangely enough, it was at the instigation of Persia that the allies rebelled against Spartan domination.

The train of events which led to the rebellion in the Peloponnesian league began in Asia Minor, and includes one of the most remarkable episodes in Grecian history, the "return of the Ten Thousand." In 404 B. C., the year of the Thirty at Athens, Darius II., King of Persia, died, leaving two sons, Artaxerxes and Cyrus—that Cyrus who had proved his friendship for Lysander by such lavish gifts of gold. The younger prince, encouraged by his mother, Parysatis, aimed to succeed his father, and conceived the brilliant plan of achieving his purpose by means of a hired Greek army.

Cyrus worked steadily at his project for three years. The Greek states were full of practiced soldiers whom the peace had left in idleness, but who had too long lived on the pay and plunder of warfare to be satisfied with the drudgery of civil life. These quickly snapped at the prince's golden bait. Disarming the suspicion of the soldiers, as well as of his neighbor, the watchful satrap Tissaphernes, by professing a campaign against certain wild border tribes, Cyrus mustered thirteen thousand Greeks under Clearchus, a Spartan general, in addition to the one hundred thousand Asiatics of his own army. Among the cavalry was Xenophon, a young Athenian knight who had been attracted by the pleasing personality and flattering offers of Cyrus, and whose story of the expedition, the *Anabasis*, remains in witness of his ability with sword and pen.

In the spring of 401 B. C. the armament left Sardis. As they journeyed toward the east it became evident to the Greeks that they had been deceived as to their destination, but the tearful entreaties of Clearchus and the promise of increased pay overcame their discontent, and they pushed on through the abandoned passes of the south to the Euphrates River. This they followed for many days through the heart of the Persian empire until they were tempted to believe that Artaxerxes would yield all without resistance, when suddenly an immense Persian host led by the king in person confronted them at Cunaxa, not far from Babylon. Clearchus and his veterans on the right wing drove the barbarians before them as their ancestors had scattered them at Marathon and Plataea, but Cyrus himself was slain in a rash plunge among his brother's life-guards, and the object of the expedition fell with him.

The victorious Greeks were in great peril. Their barbarian comrades accepted the amnesty of Artaxerxes and forsook the blighted cause. The treachery of Tissaphernes robbed them of their generals. They were without money or provisions in a strange and hostile country. They were separated from the sea by a journey of many months. The passes which had been open to them marching eastward would be blocked before their return. It was already autumn, and winter would be upon them before they could reach a friendly settlement. Yet amid all these discouraging circumstances the "Ten Thousand Cyreans" displayed a dauntless courage. To preserve their lives and effect their safe return they organized a democratic community, elected new generals, Xenophon among them, and, fighting and foraging, set out northward along the river Tigris for the Hellenic colonies on the Euxine. Their route took them through a region untrodden by a Greek foot. They were tormented by enemies behind and before. Starvation and frost harassed them, yet they toiled on through eight dreary months until at last the blue

line of the distant Euxine gladdened the eyes of the vanguard. Xenophon, who led the rear column, heard the distant shouting and guessed that a fresh foe had been encountered, but the noise of the shouting grew louder, and as the general saw company after company break into a run and take up the cry as it reached the crest of the hill he thought there was serious work ahead. Putting spurs to his horse and calling the troops to follow, he dashed to their aid. Then quickly they distinguished the voices of the soldiers shouting, "Thalatta, Thalatta!" ("The sea, the sea!") Officers and men embraced each other with tears, and the soldiers built a great column of stone in memory of the blessed sight.

The Cyreans reached the sea-shore at Trapezus in the spring of B. C. 400, but the Greek towns under Spartan influence were afraid to offend Artaxerxes by giving them shelter. They drifted westward from city to city to Byzantium. Thence they entered the service of Sèuthes, a Thracian prince. Upon the breaking out of a fresh war between Persia and Sparta (399 B. C.) the remnant of them enlisted under Thibron for war against the Great King. Their invasion had impressed the Greeks with the decaying condition of the Persian empire, and their retreat had not only enriched literature with the masterly history of Xenophon, but has exhibited to us the Hellenic character when thrown upon its own resources.

The episode of the Ten Thousand is connected in time at least with the death of two famous Athenians, Alcibiades and Socrates. The former, whose genius equaled his treasons, was killed by the orders of the satrap Pharnabazus while on his way to Susa, possibly with the intent of warning Artaxerxes of the plots of Cyrus (404 B. C.). Socrates, the philosopher, whose life was devoted to the search of truth, was accused of introducing new gods, of disbelief in the state religion, and of corrupting the youth of Athens. The jury court condemned him to die by poison (399 B. C.),

but his great disciple, Plato, brought his unfinished work to perfection.

In 399 B. C. Sparta, with the help of the Ten Thousand, declared war against Persia and undertook the recovery of the Ionian cities. Her generals were unsuccessful until the lame King Agesilaus was placed in command. Lysander had secured the throne for him, hoping to be the power behind it, but the cripple-king proved to be the greatest of Spartan soldiers. He embarked on the eastern expedition with the bold design of carrying his conquests to Susa itself. The arrival of a king so brave, warlike, and incorruptible paralyzed the resistance of the satraps. Tissaphernes made a truce, but broke it in the hope of winning a battle which was actually a defeat. For this ill fortune he forfeited his head. His successor, Tithraustes, hired the Spartans to retire from his province to that of Pharnabazus, at the same time kindling a fire in their rear by sending money to Thebes and Corinth and urging those states to attack his foe at home. The attempt succeeded. Thebes revolted, and two armies were ordered to unite and crush her; Lysander entered Bœotia from the north and Pausanias from the south. But they failed to unite, and Lysander himself was killed by a sortie from Haliartus (395 B. C.). The Thebans, with an Athenian army under Thrasybulus, compelled Pausanias to withdraw without giving battle—a retreat which brought the sentence of death upon the king. The miscarriage of this double invasion fired the enemies of Sparta. Not only Thebes and Athens, but Argos, Eubœa, Acarnania, and Chalcidice, formed a league with Corinth for the destruction of Sparta. The Bœotian war became Corinthian, and an allied army from Corinth ventured upon an expedition bolder than any which had been essayed in Greece. They proposed to kill the hornets by burning the nest, and marched straight upon the unwalled city of Sparta, which had never known an attack. But they did not go far. It seems as if the very novelty of their deed abashed them,

for before they reached the Laconian boundary the Spartans sallied out and defeated them in front of the walls of Corinth (394 B. C.).

The situation of Sparta was serious enough. Lysander was dead. The allies on which the Peloponnesian league was founded were in hot revolt. The ephors stopped Agesilaus midway in his plans of Persian conquest and called him home. He left his fleet under the inexperienced Pisander and marched westward by the land route which Xerxes had taken through Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, and Middle Hellas. In Bœotia tidings reached him that Pisander had ventured to engage Conon, the Athenian refugee, who had found favor with Persia and a naval command, off the promontory of Cnidus, losing his life and more than half his ships, and with them forever the maritime empire which the mistress of Peloponnesus had won from Athens ten years before. But the king gave out good news to the soldiers and roused their spirits to meet the allied army which blocked their path at Coronea. After terrible slaughter, in which the Thebans displayed steadiness and valor unsurpassed by the best troops of Sparta, Agesilaus remained master of the field. But his position was so serious that he turned back from Bœotia, and passing down to the gulf by the way of Delphi, where he honored the god with a tithe of the rich spoils of Asia, he crossed by water to the Peloponnesus and thence passed overland to Lacedæmon.

For six years after the return of Agesilaus Sparta restricted herself to military operations in the neighborhood of the Isthmus, endeavoring with fluctuating fortune to control the road to Middle Hellas. Conon's victory off Cnidus had left her powerless to prevent the defection of her allies, which one by one unseated the Tens and harmosts with which Lysander had saddled them. Within the year (394 B. C.) nearly every post in Asia was lost to her.

Conon crossed the Ægean with his Persian fleet to attack the Peloponnesians in their own waters, but encountering no

opposition he assisted the exultant Athenians to utilize the happy opportunity to rebuild the harbor forts at the Piræus and the parallel Long Walls (393 B. C.) which Lysander had made useless. The satrap Pharnabazus authorized the work in order to raise up a counterpoise to Sparta. The Thebans labored with their old rivals for the same cause. Dearth of ships and a hostile force at the Isthmus prevented Agesilaus from interfering with Conon's undertaking. The work was carried on without interruption, and when it was done the Athenians began to build triremes and resume their place among naval states.

Sparta had recourse to diplomacy. She sent Antalcidas to persuade the Persians that Conon had basely used their ships and money for the good of Athens, the hereditary foe of the Great King. He further declared that Persia could not be safe until the Greek leagues were dissolved and each city stood by itself, with Sparta to guarantee their liberties. Though the satrap of the Ionian district was convinced, Artaxerxes was not, and it was not until three years later, when the course of events in Cyprus had involved Athens in hostilities toward Persia, that the arguments of the Spartan envoy were accepted as the principles of a treaty of peace.

In 387 B. C. envoys from the Greek states met at Sardis to consider the treaty which Antalcidas had negotiated. It was not an awe-inspiring sight, this synod of Greeks who had kept up the war thus far by means of Persian gold and who now appealed to Persia to take the settlement of the quarrel into her own hands. The terms were these:

“King Artaxerxes deems it just that the [Greek] cities in Asia should belong to him, and of the islands Clazomenæ and Cyprus; the remaining Hellenic states, on the other hand, both great and small, are to be independent, only Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros are, as of old, to belong to the Athenians. Whichsoever states shall not accept this peace, upon

them I shall, in conjunction with those who accept it, make war by land and sea with ships and money."

This agreement, the "Peace of Antalcidas," surrendered Cyprus and all the main-land colonies to Persia and guaranteed the independence of the other Greek states. At a convention held at Sparta a few months later, in order to put the treaty into effect, it became evident that this "independence" meant that each city should give up its allies and sign the treaty for itself alone, *except* Sparta. Thebes, for example, asserted her right to represent the league of Bœotian cities, and was only driven from her resolution by the march of Agesilaus toward her borders with an army. Thus by the aid of Persia, purchased by the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, Sparta broke up the several confederacies into their original weak and isolated members, above whom she towered as the first military power in Greece.

As soon as the peace had destroyed the combinations against her Sparta entered upon a course of aggressive despotism calculated to protect herself and overawe her rivals. Thebes, which had renounced her hegemony of the Bœotian towns only at the point of the spear, was acquiring a military and political energy which made her dangerous. Platæa was rebuilt, and a Spartan troop was stationed among its restored citizens as a check upon Theban ambition (386 B. C.). Nearer home Sparta required the Mantineans, who had time and again helped Argos to oppose her, to pull down their walls and break up their city into a group of villages (386-385 B. C.). Upon the heels of this piece of arrogance came the report that the cities of Chalcidice, the scene of Brasidas's activity, had, under the lead of Olynthus, formed a confederacy, which Athens and Thebes had been invited to enter.

One provision of the treaty of Antalcidas was aimed at such combinations as this Olynthian confederacy, which Sparta took vigorous measures to suppress. Two armies were sent overland to Chalcidice, and inasmuch as it was

considered dangerous to leave in their rear such an enemy as Thebes the commanders were bidden to do her such damage as they could in passing through her territories. Phœbidas, the leader of the second army, exceeded his instructions; for, aided by the treason of Leontiades and an opportune religious festival, he was able to seize the Cadínea (382 B. C.), the Theban citadel. Most of the patriotic citizens fled to Athens.

Meanwhile the attack upon the Chalcidian cities began in earnest and was prosecuted for three years. In 379 B. C. Olynthus was starved into submission, and the federal state which she had organized was parted between Sparta and Macedonia, which was year by year extending its limits and taking on the characteristics of a consolidated kingdom.

Few occurrences in history are more dramatic than the course of events which destroyed the empire of Sparta. Her apparently successful invasion of the rights of Thebes gave form and motion to forces which ended in her own downfall. Among the Thebans who refused to accept the new conditions were two young patriots, Epaminondas and Pelopidas. The former, who, though poor in purse, was the first citizen of his state in intellectual cultivation and power, remained in the city under the pro-Spartan oligarchy. The latter, an aristocrat whose nobility of mind led him to prefer exile and the cause of the people to his natural affiliations, fled to Athens. There a desperate plot was hatched for the liberation of Thebes. One snowy night in December, 379 B. C., Pelopidas, with eleven fellow-exiles disguised as hunters, left Athens, and entered their own city unsuspected. Their accomplice, Phyllidas, the secretary of the Theban generals, had invited his masters to banquet at his house that evening, promising them fine company. The liberators slew them as they sat at the tables, while Pelopidas, in another part of the city, was killing the traitor Leontiades. The citizens joined the conspirators, and the exiles flocked home from Athens,

Epaminondas lent his influence to the revolution. Two Athenian generals voluntarily disposed their troops so as to prevent Sparta from re-enforcing the garrison in the Cadmea. The Spartan commander thereupon evacuated the important post on condition that they might depart scathless.

The Thebans prepared vigorously to maintain their liberty. They raised Pelopidas and other chief conspirators to the head of the commonwealth, and determined to oppose Sparta, not merely in the name of Thebes, but as Bœotians, thus rallying the old confederation which the peace of Antalcidas had undone. To withstand the veteran infantry of Lacedæmon, and to form a bond of union among the Bœotian towns, Epaminondas organized one thousand volunteers from the young men of the country into a "Sacred Band." Friendship, honor, and patriotism knit these men together and made them such a regiment as had never yet been seen in Greece.

King Cleombrotus, who had come from Sparta too late to save the Cadmea, returned to the Peloponnesus in the spring of 378 B. C. without fighting a battle, though he left at Thespiæ a strong army of observation under Sphodrias. This officer attempted to do for Athens what Phœbidas had done for Thebes five years before, seize its citadel in time of peace. But his clumsy and ill-timed movement failed, and Athens straightway ranged herself on the side of Thebes. Sparta had now two foes instead of one, and even Agesilaus's military ability availed nothing against their city walls.

The evident decline in the military power of Sparta gave the Bœotian rebels more heart and suggested to Athens the possibility of reviving her own naval authority. She taxed herself heavily to equip a fleet, and many island states which had sour memories of Spartan tyranny contributed means for attacking the Peloponnesians by sea. The new naval confederation, of which Athens was the leading

member, quickly grew to seventy cities, but the association was altogether voluntary, and fear of the ascendancy of Athens impaired its permanence. It lasted long enough, however, to clear the Ægean of the Spartan navy and to build up an anti-Spartan party in the islands west of Hellas.

In 374 B. C., while Thebes was in the midst of her plans for the unification of Bœotia, Athens made peace with Sparta. She had gained much by the naval war, but was alarmed at the rise of her neighbor. Sparta, wearied with ineffectual war and scarcely able to control her allies, readily agreed to the peace which was essentially a renewal of the stipulation of Antalcidas "that all Greek states should be free and independent." This was aimed at Thebes and her Bœotian league. In the treaty congress, however, her envoy Epaminondas, in a speech of rare eloquence, refused to sign the document.

In 371 B. C. the Greek states made another effort to settle their differences and end the everlasting war. The peace congress, which met at Sparta, comprised the foremost men of Greece—Agesilaus, the crippled veteran who had once planned the conquest of Persia, Callistratus, the orator of Athens, and Epaminondas, who had the clearest head and the stoutest heart of all. This treaty, like its precursor, aimed at the dissolution of the Bœotian league which Thebes had been at such pains to consolidate. Each Greek community was to be independent, and each must sign the treaty for itself. The Theban envoy resisted the demand, claiming that his signature stood for a united Bœotia, and if each separate city were to be recognized, then the Laconian villages should sign as sovereign states. Neither argument nor threats availed to shake the resolution of Epaminondas, and in a fit of rage Agesilaus struck the name of Thebes from the signatory powers.

A single battle decided the question whether Sparta was to dictate terms to the other states. Epaminondas had foreseen the necessity of the struggle, and was not unprepared to meet

it. His precept and example roused in the Bœotians an unwonted spirit of freedom, and his innovations in the art of war gave them confidence in themselves. Three weeks after the stormy peace congress the two armies came together on the plain of Leuctra (371 B. C.). Cleombrotus, king and commander of the Peloponnesians, stretched out his forces in an array twelve files deep and long enough to outflank the opposing force. Epaminondas, with half the number of troops, employed tactics which he had already practiced in the minor wars. Instead of disposing his men in the ranks of equal depth he strengthened his left wing until it was fifty shields deep. At the order to charge this mass was driven like a wedge into the thin Lacedæmonian line, which it broke by sheer weight. Pelopidas, with the Sacred Band, dashed into the breach, adding to the confusion. Cleombrotus and more than half the Spartans with him were killed in the hand-to-hand fight which ensued. After the battle the request of the Peloponnesians for permission to bury their dead was granted on condition that the bodies of the Spartans should not be interred until their allies had collected the corpses of their slain, in order that the allies might perceive from the small number of their own dead that Sparta was the only object of Bœotian hostility.

The battle of Leuctra, like those of Marathon and Ægospotami, marks a turning-point in Grecian history. Marathon saved the land from the Persian; Ægospotami transferred the scepter from Athens to Sparta; Leuctra crushed the empire of Sparta and made Thebes the leading city of Greece.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PERIOD OF THEBAN GREATNESS.

Two inbred and opposing tendencies embroiled the Greek states in incessant jealousy and almost incessant war from the dawn of history until their final conquest by a foreign king. Each small community was as zealous for its own independence as it was to extend its authority over others. We have seen how two states, Sparta and Athens, emerged pre-eminent from the war with Persia, and how the naval power of the second for a time overshadowed the military prestige of the first. The Peloponnesian war was fought to prevent Athens from absorbing all the Hellenic communities; its first result was the forcible subjection of the greater number of those communities to the more odious yoke of Sparta. To the Athenian reign of law succeeded a reign of arms. Supported by Persia, Sparta broke up all existing leagues that she might the more easily control their isolated members. One of these members, the Bæotian city of Thebes, whose treatment had been unusually tyrannical, was at this juncture favored by the presence of an unselfish and sagacious statesman and a brilliant general, who together roused their countrymen against the despot and led them to successful battle. Leuctra put an end to Spartan supremacy and raised Thebes, during the life-time of Epaminondas, to the leading position among the Greek states. After his death the old poison worked with added venom, and the succeeding generation found these countries and peoples, which had resisted every effort to compress or combine them into one nation, easy prey to the Macedonian conquest.

Sparta set her teeth grimly at the news of her defeat at

Leuctra, the worst her arms had ever suffered. Relatives of the slain were forbidden to mourn. The survivors, who by the rule of Lycurgus should have been deprived of their political rights, went unpunished; they formed so large a proportion of the effective troops that, as Agesilaus said, it was better for the law "to slumber" for a time rather than to cut off one of the limbs of the state. To her subject allies the tidings brought joyful relief. Harmosts were expelled from citadels, garrisons were ordered to depart, and oligarchical governments gave way to democracies.

The countries of Middle Hellas hastened to make friendship with the victor, and Epaminondas made thorough work of the consolidation of Bœotia into a federal state. The time-honored amphictyonic council, which exercised a certain supervision over the Delphic temple and the worship of Apollo, ventured to inflict a heavy fine upon Sparta for the illegal act of Phœbidas. Athens was the only considerable state among the neighbors of Thebes which was averse to the new order of things in Bœotia.

The heart of Peloponnesus was occupied by numerous Arcadian tribes of warlike shepherds and herdsmen. The absence of a central government had weakened their opposition to Sparta, and she in turn had done her best to keep them poor and unorganized. Her prostration was their opportunity, and before she could prevent it (371 B. C.) they had restored their city of Mantinea. Old Agesilaus took the field against them, and the Arcadians, beating about for help, found it at Thebes.

In 370 B. C. Epaminondas led a Bœotian army into the Peloponnesus. Argives, Eleans, and Arcadians joined him. Mantinea was saved. But the Theban's plans were bold; he proposed to invade Laconia and capture Sparta itself, the city which did not know the sight of a hostile camp-fire. Penetrating Laconia from the north and following the left bank of the Eurotas, the invaders reached a point directly

opposite the city. Thousands of the pericæci deserted to their lines, but Agesilaus rallied the full strength of Spartan citizens with six thousand helots to hold the town. Thereupon Epaminondas relinquished the assault, and, proceeding down the valley, devastated the corn lands, burned the farm buildings, and destroyed Gytheum, the naval station on the gulf. Then crossing the Taygetus he entered Messenia, the western province of Sparta, and the most fertile portion of her domain. The descendants of the old Messenians were scattered over the Mediterranean as far as Sicily and the parts of Libya about Cyrene. From these distant lands Epaminondas now gathered citizens for a new city, Messene, to be built on Mount Ithome, the ancient citadel of Messenian independence. Guarded by the might of Thebes a populous city soon grew up on this commanding site, keeping watch over the plain, and re-establishing Taygetus as the western boundary of Sparta.

This was not the sole city which came to life at the touch of Thebes. The renewal of Mantinea was indeed traceable to her victory, but she was more directly concerned in the foundation of a new town which was to unite the Arcadian tribes which Sparta had so long governed through their divisions. Megalopolis ("the Great City") was laid out in Arcadia near the confluence of the Alpheus and Helisson. Within the oval circuit of its walls were settled people of many tribes, and the Arcadians vied with each other in providing the new-made capital with theater, market, council house, and the other public buildings of a well-appointed municipality. The adoption of a new constitution, by which the Arcadian states formed a federal league, placed another formidable check upon Sparta, which was now completely hemmed in by hostile states—Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia.

Epaminondas returned to Thebes, having prolonged his term of command four months beyond its legal limit. Yet the plain recital of the humiliations which he had heaped

upon Sparta secured his acquittal from the accusations of his opponents and his election as one of the new board of Bœotarchs. After a brief sojourn at home he led a second force into Peloponnesus, where Athens was now operating with an army. She had yielded to the piteous appeals of Sparta. By the terms of the new alliance the two cities were equal, the chief command of the allied forces being held by Spartan and Athenian officers alternately five days at a time.

Besides the aid of Athens, Sparta was now supported by Corinth, who was jealous of the new Bœotian power on the Corinthian Gulf, and by Syracuse in Sicily. The allied forces were concentrated in the passes of the Isthmus to prevent the re-entrance of the Bœotians. But the strategy and strength of Epaminondas effected a passage, and he was able to cut out so much work for the allies all summer in the northern Peloponnesus that they had no leisure to interfere with the city walls which were going up with all speed at Messene and Megalopolis. The populace, however, had learned to expect brilliant victories from their general, and not seeing any substantial fruits of the campaign they removed him from office. When next heard of he was serving his country in Thessaly as a common soldier.

While the communities of Middle Hellas and Peloponnesus became exhausted and demoralized by the wars of the hundred years succeeding the Persian invasion the northern countries preserved their native strength. Near the close of the fifth century Thessaly, the most extensive and naturally fertile of the Greek states, was mastered by a dynasty who gained their power by leading a popular rising against the ancient aristocratic families. Jason, whose capital was Phæræ, was the most brilliant of this line, a man of fine Hellenic education, of unrestrained ambition, and of eminent intellectual gifts. He saw in the mutual distrust of the Greek states an opportunity to put himself in the leading place among them. To this end he cultivated the friendship of

Thebes until after the battle of Leuctra, when he seemed on the verge of throwing off disguises and asserting his superiority. Having made sure of the pass of Thermopylæ, he announced his intention of attending the Pythian games at Delphi in the year 370 B. C. with a display of wealth and military resources which no other state or chieftain in Hellas could equal. It is probable that he meant to obtain the indorsement of Apollo and the amphictyony for his ambitious schemes, but his assassination just before the festival put an end to his plans and to the greatness of Thessaly. The nobles revolted from his kinsman, Alexander of Phæræ, obtaining support from the king of Macedon.

The interference of Macedonia with Thessalian affairs touched Thebes, who was now concerned in the politics of every state from the Cambunians to Cape Tænarum. She sent Pelopidas (368 B. C.) to restore order in the north. He secured the independence of the revolted towns, made a treaty of alliance with Alexander, and brought Philip, brother of the Macedonian king, back to Thebes as a hostage. While on a second mission in northern Greece, Pelopidas, being almost unattended, was captured by the treacherous tyrant and thrown into prison. Here was fresh ground for war, and Thebes immediately attacked Alexander; but her army was wretchedly led, and was only saved from destruction by the men who mutinied and raised their comrade, Epaminondas, to his rightful place of general. His countrymen indorsed his restoration, and his promptness and skill soon brought the traitor to terms and compelled him to surrender his precious captive.

The Arcadians in the first flush of their independence were impatient of Theban restraint and eager to conduct their own affairs. They quarreled with Elis about their boundary line and inflicted damage upon the Spartans wherever opportunity offered. In 368 B. C. Prince Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, led an army of Lacedæmonians and Celtic mer-

cenaries into Arcadia. Being surrounded and brought to bay by Arcadians, Argives, and Messenians, they cut their way out to liberty without the loss of a single Spartan citizen, an achievement which gave to this battle the name of "the Tearless Victory."

The success of Thebes in her several undertakings had been remarkable, but she seemed unable to insure the permanence of the arrangements she had made. To give authority to her work she was obliged to do as Sparta had done, and obtain the indorsement of the Great King. This was the more necessary because the renewal of his financial support would at any moment put it in the power of Sparta or Athens to equip a force which might undo all that had thus far been accomplished. Accordingly, in 367 B. C., Pelopidas presented the claims of Thebes at Susa, and, notwithstanding the active competition of the Athenian and Spartan ambassadors, the soldier-diplomate obtained all that he desired. A decree of Artaxerxes commanded the Greeks to respect the treaty of Antalcidas; Arcadia must let Elis alone, Sparta must not molest Messene, and Athens must dismantle her navy. But the Greek states refused to obey the mandate, and Thebes had a third time to use an army to bring peace to Peloponnesus.

Five years of Theban victories, the statesmanship of Epaminondas, and the august mandate of the Great King did not bring peace and order into Greek affairs. By joining forces, Athens and Sparta together prevented Thebes from making her ascendancy complete, and the persistent tendency toward local independence bore fruit in kaleidoscopic changes. The states made and broke alliances as their momentary interests demanded, until the meagerly reported story of their relations reached a snarl which has not yet been satisfactorily disentangled. In the confusion we find Athens, incensed by the Bœotian annexation of Oropus, making a sudden and unprovoked attack on Corinth, which missed its aim but induced

the latter city to make peace with Thebes. In disregard of the Persian rescript, Athens kept a fleet in the Ægean under Timotheus, who won back Samos, added many towns to the new confederacy (see p. 259), and even made a futile effort to regain the prized Amphipolis. Epaminondas was tempted by these movements to a maritime policy, and something had been done toward building a Bœotian navy, when the critical condition of Peloponnesian affairs again compelled him to exert his full power by land. The Arcadian league, which Thebes had cemented as a wall against Sparta, had fallen apart, and a considerable faction, headed by Mantinea, had joined the Spartans.

In 362 B. C. Epaminondas led all the troops he could collect from Middle Hellas into Peloponnesus for a decisive campaign. Pelopidas, the friend of years and the generous and brave colleague, was not among the generals. He had fallen at Cynocephalæ a few years before in an injudicious attack upon the rebellious Thessalian Alexander.

Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians swelled the army of Epaminondas to more than thirty thousand men, with whom he occupied the friendly town of Tegea, an excellent base for an attack on the enemy's post at Mantinea, or upon Laconia itself. While the Mantineans, whom Agesilaus had re-enforced with the last reserve of Sparta, were hourly expecting battle, the Theban adroitly left the city by its southern gate and before dawn was far on the road to Sparta, now apparently his easy victim. But through that critical night a deserter brought the astounding news to Agesilaus, who immediately set out with all his men to protect their capital, sending a fleet courier ahead to warn his son, Archidamus, of the city's peril. Old men and women and children labored to prepare their dwellings for defense. Epaminondas found the streets barricaded, and before he could penetrate far into the town Agesilaus arrived with his desperate men. The surprise had failed, and the Theban leader showed his fertility

of resource by adopting a new plan and abandoning a victory which must have been obtained at terrible cost. Without delay he drew off his troops and marched them back that night upon Mantinea, believing its walls to be for the time defenseless. But the opportune arrival of an army from Athens foiled him and saved the city. Strategy having failed, the Thebans and their allies again fell back upon Tegea.

Upon the return of the Spartans the anti-Theban army in Mantinea was swollen to somewhat over twenty thousand, considerably less than that in Tegea. Epaminondas soon left the gates of Tegea and advanced toward the hostile town, where the foe were drawn up to meet him. But while yet at a considerable distance he swerved aside and made as if to encamp, a simple maneuver which deceived his opponents, who relaxed their own discipline. Having formed his dispositions as at Leuctra, with a wedge of Bœotia's bravest on the left wing, opposite the flower of Sparta and Mantinea, he gave the word to advance. The cavalry first came in collision, the spirited Thebans brushing aside the shabby horse which tried to oppose them. But the battle was to be no mere cavalry skirmish, and at sight of the charging Bœotians the motley array of the Spartan alliance was hurriedly formed in a long and slender line across the plain to cover the city. Valor alone could not check the physical force of the mighty heave with which the solid Theban column struck the enemy's right. A friend of Sparta said that the famous wedge cut through their line as the beak of a war-ship parts the waves. But in the moment of victory the commander-in-chief went down with a Spartan spear in his breast. No Pelopidas remained to cheer his comrades on to victory, and as man after man missed his leader hand and foot were stayed. The pursuit ceased, and the enemy recovered some fragments from a defeat which in another hour would have become disaster. His friends brought Epaminondas to a craggy lookout,

which commanded the field, the broken shaft still fast in his wound. After the first shock had passed the great man recovered his consciousness for a brief space. When they brought his shield to him out of the conflict he smiled his pleasure; but he knew that he must die. When he was told that his two lieutenants had also perished he bade the survivors use their victory to make peace. His last words were to bid them draw the shattered spear from his breast, and a few minutes later the greatest of Bæotians was gone.

Epaminondas stands quite by himself among Greek statesmen. Within a few years he elevated a weak and subject city to the primacy of Greece, reformed her government, beautified her with public buildings, fostered art and letters, founded a navy, and developed a body of troops and a system of tactics which twice defeated the Spartans, a nation whose profession was war and whose military system was reputed to be perfection. Untouched by that selfish ambition from which few of the ablest Greeks were free, he was not even devoted, like Pericles, solely to the aggrandizement of his own city. No Grecian was his foe, and his many and brilliant wars were fought in the hope of establishing a free Hellenic nation in which the love of local independence might be consistent with peace and order.

Peace followed the death of the Bæotian hero. No one could continue the work which had been too arduous for him. The other states were weary and dispirited, and, although Sparta stubbornly refused to lay down her arms while Messenia remained unconquered, the battle of Mantinea was practically the end of the war. It also marked the close of Theban supremacy.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE DECLINE AND FALL.

FOR nearly a century and a half after the repulse of the Persians no foreign power threatened the states of main-land Hellas. It is true, indeed, that the Greeks did so lose their high disdain of the Great King that by the treaty of Antalcidas they admitted him as the guarantor of their mutual relations, and utilized his ships and money in the adjustment of their interstate wars; but the Persian monarch was in no real sense their ruler, nor were they his subjects. When they did submit it was to Macedonia, a nation not wholly diverse from themselves, and their conqueror, Philip, was a Greek by cultivation, and claimed to be a Greek by blood.

Macedonia was the nearest neighbor of Greece upon the north. Its population was at the kernel related to the Greeks; and, so far as we know, its language was similar to the older or *Æolic* Greek. Inhabiting a land of towering mountains, broad plains, and majestic rivers, the people became strong in body and warlike in spirit, though, having no outlet upon that sea of culture, the *Ægean*, they lagged far behind their southern kindred in all those greater qualities which distinguished the Hellenes. Their political progress ended with monarchy, where Greece began. The royal family of Macedonia traced its descent from the ancient *Heraclid* kings of *Argos*, and in the fifth century *Alexander*, called *Philhellen*, the "lover of Greece," proved his pedigree to the satisfaction of the stewards of *Olympia*, and was allowed to compete in the games of all Hellas. His successors generally pursued his policy; by force and intrigue they got a foot-hold on the *Ægean* coast among the Greek colonies which had formerly

shut them in ; at the same time, taking advantage of the distresses of the Peloponnesian war, they invited the foremost artists, poets, and teachers of Hellas to reside and labor among them.

Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, was the Macedonian conqueror of Greece. A younger son of one of the philhellenic kings, it was his fortune to be delivered to Thebes as a hostage and for three of his most impressionable years (368-365 B. C.) to reside in the city which Pelopidas had liberated and Epaminondas was making great. He came to Thebes a Macedonian youth, strong, brave, and ambitious; he returned to the north as a young man, convinced of the superiority of Hellenic culture and the rottenness of the Hellenic state. He knew the feebleness of Greece as no other foreigner knew it, the decline of patriotism, the bitterness of jealousies, the impossibility of concerted action, the corruptibility of its leaders, the incompetence of its generals. At the focus of Greece, where fortune had placed him, he saw his opportunity to succeed in a conquest which had baffled the hosts of Xerxes, and from the day of his accession to the Macedonian throne (?359 B. C.), in his twenty-third year, he went on cautiously but steadily, by guile and by force, to the consummation at Chæronea.

The young monarch first put an end to the party strife which had divided his state. He then took up the Macedonian army, altered and improved conditions of service and the organization, introduced the reformed tactics of Epaminondas, adding to the effectiveness of the solid phalanx by arming the men with pikes so long that those of the third rank bristled over the heads of the front line. In a series of wars with neighboring barbarians he exercised and proved this force, while extending his authority and establishing safe boundaries. From this important work he turned his attention to the Greek cities of the north coast of the Ægean, the Hellenic colonies which lay between his

dominions and the Thermaic Gulf, Olynthus and the towns of Chalcidice, and finally Amphipolis, which barred his passage eastward to the Thracian gold-fields. His operations on this coast admonished a few acute minds that Greece herself was imperiled.

Greece was in sorry plight. The peace which followed Mantinea was variously utilized. Sparta, unable to regain her old prestige in Peloponnesus, seems to have farmed out her military machinery to still more needy states. The octogenarian Agesilaus fought his last battles on Egyptian sands for hire, but died a victor on the homeward voyage (361 B. C.). No Bœotian could wear the mantle of Epaminondas or wield Pelopidas's sword, and Thebes abandoned her high purposes and plans of Hellenic union to bicker with her neighbors, Athens and Phocis.

The democratic constitution of Athens, which had been restored after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, was still in force, and the popular orators through the assembly ruled the city. The fickleness and irresponsibility of the populace, which had been so painfully evident during the Peloponnesian War, were gradually accomplishing the ruin of the state. The growth of the second naval confederacy (378 B. C.), of which Athens was the leader, though not the dictator as before, encouraged her to aspire to a renewal of her maritime empire. But the decay of civic enthusiasm kept her citizens at home, and there was no longer any tribute money to support a fleet. Her expeditions, manned by mercenaries, who had often to resort to the plunder of friendly cities to obtain their own pay, were little better than free-booting raids, and her best commanders, if unsuccessful, were liable to imprisonment, fine, exile, or death at the hands of the excitable assembly. Yet even against these odds the generals of the democracy won back nearly the whole of lost Eubœa and regained the mastery of the north shore of the Hellespont (358 B. C.).

The successes in Eubœa and the Thracian Chersonesus mark the greatest extent of the second Athenian confederacy. Philip's maneuvers against the Greek towns in his region were already beginning, and the confederacy itself was falling to pieces. Cos, Rhodes, Chios, and, most important of all, Byzantium, seceded from the naval league (357 B. C.) and defied the half-hearted attempts to compel their submission. After two years this revolt of the allies, called the "Social War," resulted in the independence of the rebels, the exhaustion of Athens, and the exile, death, or retirement of the best of the Athenian generals.

While the Social War bound the hands of Athens, Philip was at his busiest. Amphipolis, the key city of the Strymon valley and the Thracian gold coast, begged Athens to save her from his clutches, but the wily monarch, professing friendship, promised to yield the valuable post to Athens as soon as he had punished its insolence. So saying, he took and kept the town. Olynthus, anticipating a similar fate, made the same appeal, but again the bribed orators persuaded the people that Philip was their friend. Thus forsaken, Olynthus turned to Philip, who gladly accepted her alliance (356 B. C.). By such tactics he gradually acquired nearly all the Greek towns between him and the sea.

Events in Greece were already ripening to the king's taste. Thebes, always anxious for a quarrel with her neighbor, Phocis, accused that state of trespass upon the consecrated fields belonging to Apollo at Delphi. The amphictyons condemned the Phocians to pay a heavy fine, but Philomelus and Onomarchus aroused their countrymen to resist the decree. Trusting for help to the hostility of Sparta, who was under the ban of Delphi for sacrilege, and to Athenian enmity toward all things Theban, Philomelus seized the Delphian temple, which, with its treasuries, contained an accumulation of gold and silver coin and bullion valued at ten thousand talents. A fierce "Sacred War" followed

(356-346 B. C.), Thebes, Thessaly, and the minor states of Middle Hellas uniting to punish the Phocians. But Philomelus, and after his death (354 B. C.) Onomarchus, borrowed from the hoard to maintain an army of hired troops, which he handled with such energy and skill as to paralyze all attacks, and even to take the offensive by invading Thessaly. There they encountered Philip of Macedon, who, having arranged the affairs of his own kingdom, had given quick heed to a call from the hard-pressed Thessalians. After a series of successes the Phocians were defeated with tremendous slaughter (352 B. C.).

Philip's victory with its immediate corollaries made him king and master of Thessaly, the avenger of Apollo, and the benefactor of the states which were waging the Sacred War. He had thus passed the outer line of Greek defenses, and stood a victor and ostensibly a friend at the gate-way of Middle Hellas. Another step would have placed him in the heart of Greece. But the Phocian remnant had Delphian money yet to spend for soldiers, and while they were rallying to withstand an invasion Athens by a vigorous move worthy of the ancient days planted a strong force at Thermopylæ.

Philip was checkmated for once, but with the marvelous sagacity which distinguished all he did he made no attempt to force the pass. Biding a more convenient season to penetrate Greece, he betook himself to the opposite extremity of his kingdom, and leaving garrisons in Thessaly conducted his main army into Thrace.

There was in Athens a large and influential party, led by such able speakers as Æschines, which insisted that Philip was the proper ally of the city; but there was one voice which always opposed this view, and late and early at all seasons warned the people that the Macedonian was a despot laying plans to enslave them. This implacable foe of Philip was the orator Demosthenes.

With exquisite rhetorical art Demosthenes combined a

clearness of political vision and a strength and force of character which were rare in the Athens of the fourth century. He quickly foresaw that the subjection of Greece was the goal of Philip's ambition, and he threw all his faculties into the work of arousing his indifferent countrymen to a sense of their danger and the necessity of providing means to avert it. As early as 354 B. C. his oration on the naval reform pointed so clearly at the Macedonian that it was dubbed a "Philippic," and the king soon discovered that this private citizen, who had a pure conscience and a free voice, was the chief obstacle to his supremacy in Hellas.

Although nominally at war with Philip since his seizure of Amphipolis, the Athenians made no exertion. Their demagogical leader, Eubulus, and their most popular commander, the "honest" Phocion (forty-five times elected general), fortified them in their apathy. The citizens were unwilling to do their duty as soldiers, and the state had no money for the hire of mercenaries. The state lay supinely, sometimes shuddering at the doom foretold by that prophetic voice, but apparently unwilling and incapable of rising in its ancient might and gathering all Greece to avert the impending catastrophe.

In 352 B. C. envoys of Olynthus came to Athens seeking aid against Philip. A few years previous this city had formed a friendly alliance with the Macedonian, but it now appeared that he was bent on its complete subjection. Olynthus, at the head of a league of thirty Greek cities, was the last foreign stronghold from which the Greeks could attack Philip. Demosthenes declared to his countrymen in his "Olynthiac" orations that if this opportunity were allowed to pass unheeded the king would speedily carry the war to their own gates. Nor could Philip be combated without a complete renovation in the conduct of the war. The citizens must make heavy sacrifices. They must take the field in person, and the money lavished on the public

festivals must be expended on the fleets and armies. The assembly made a treaty of alliance with Olynthus, but followed it up so half-heartedly that when Philip applied himself to the conquest of the offending city he was met with but weak resistance. Treason opened the gates of Olynthus to him, and with fetter, fire, and sword he desolated the once thriving town (348 B. C.). All Chalcidice with its mineral wealth went to swell the area of his realm, which now extended from the few Athenian cities on the Hellespont to the Phocian posts about Thermopylæ.

Philip might slaughter Thracian barbarians in battle and sack the Greek colonial towns, but he had no wish for such a vulgar triumph over Greece itself. It was his ambition to be freely received as lord of Hellas. For he recognized better than any mere barbarian the intellectual superiority of the Hellenes. It was not the blood of their citizens or the plunder of the cities which he sought, but to be acknowledged master of this center of the world's civilization. He must therefore come among them as a friend and ally, avoiding any harshness which should array them against him, posing as a Greek, and feeding the feuds and jealousies which confused all concert of action.

The fall of Olynthus left Philip free to pursue his designs on Hellas. He was already the accepted general of the Thesalians against the Phocians in that Sacred War which had not yet exhausted the treasure of Delphi, and Thebes in Middle Hellas had despaired of crushing Phocis without his help. But how should he pass Thermopylæ? His first approach (352 B. C.) had been blocked by Athens, and he dared not attempt to repeat by force a passage which would compel every true Greek to liken him to the Persian invader. The hands of Athens must be tied.

Athens was terror-struck by the destruction of the Olynthian cities. All the horrors of immediate capture which Demosthenes had drawn seemed real now, and Philip was

expected to seize the Hellespontine cities, and then fall on the Piræus. The defenses were put in order, and Athenian orators traveled through Peloponnesus, seeking to combine the states for the final struggle. But the king had no taste for a death-grip. He wanted time to complete his Thracian operations, and peace to unbar Thermopylæ. Instead of cherishing anger for the part Athens had taken with Olynthus, he showed favor to such Athenian citizens as fell in his way, and allowed it to become known that he desired peace.

Early in 346 B. C., on motion of Philocrates, an embassy of eleven Athenians, including Demosthenes and Æschines, was sent to Pella, the royal residence, to discuss the grounds for a treaty. The Attic orators found the king a gracious, polished diplomat, their equal in education, their master in astuteness. He laughed at their demand that he should give up Amphipolis, but he promised to make peace on the basis that each party should retain whatever possessions it should have at the date of the treaty's ratification—a provision of which Philip, who was winning ground every day, reaped all the advantage. Æschines and Philocrates returned from Macedonia firm partisans of the king, and advocated immediate approval of the treaty, stipulating, moreover, that Phocis should not be mentioned in the list of the allies who were to share its benefits. Demosthenes favored peace, for he saw no hope for Athens in a hastily declared war, but he opposed the added clause, demanding that all the allies should have the right to the treaty privileges. The insinuating eloquence of Æschines triumphed. The Ecclesia approved the treaty, with the odious anti-Phocian amendment, and dispatched the same eleven envoys to secure the signature of Philip to the document.

Since the treaty declared that each party should retain whatever conquests it had made up to the date of ratification, it was Philip's concern to postpone that date, for his armies were near the Hellespont, rapidly gathering in the Thracian

towns of that region, the last foot-hold of Athens outside of Hellas. Bribery was undoubtedly at work among the envoys, for, despite the impatience of Demosthenes, the party lingered eight days in the city, and waited seven weeks at Pella before seeing the king. Even then Philip put off the ratification to suit his own convenience, and, compelling the attendance of the envoys, marched into Thessaly. At Pheræ he ratified the treaty and allowed the envoys to depart.

Feeling ran high when the envoys reached Athens. Demosthenes told the senate that the treacherous delays of his colleagues and Philip's perfidy had robbed the treaty of its good and made it as disastrous as a defeat. It had extended Macedonia in Thrace to the edge of the Athenian possessions, and had enabled the cunning monarch to march unobstructed within striking distance of Thermopylæ. Demosthenes swayed the senate, but the populace would not hear him. Æschines, who had first addressed them, had convinced them of Philip's hearty friendship, had promised the restoration of their lost possessions, and had hinted mysteriously that the king's mission to Greece was to chastise Thebes, their ancient enemy. The report of the majority was applauded, and Demosthenes was denounced as a disturber and false prophet. His prophecy was too true.

The Phocian chiefs, Phaÿllus and Phalæcus, who had succeeded Onomarchus, were still unconquered. Though the temple treasure was running low it still sufficed to support and arm eight thousand mercenary soldiers. Thebes suffered sadly from their depredations, and begged Philip, who had already once defeated the profaners of Apollo's shrine, to reappear once more and finish the work. The peace of Philocrates deprived the Phocians of Athenian support. Single handed they could not cope with their enemies. Nor did they make the attempt; upon the approach of Philip's army, Phalæcus surrendered on condition that he might quit Hellas with his mercenaries (July, 346 B. C.).

The Sacred War closed with the surrender of Phalæcus. Thermopylæ, the gate of Middle Hellas, swung open, and Philip entered the country in triumph, as the accredited champion of the Greek religion. The Phocian towns submitted without resistance, and their fate came up before the council of amphictyons. Phocis was degraded from the list of Delphian states, and her two votes in the amphictyonic council were given to Philip, a new and emphatic indorsement of his right to be counted as a Greek. The Phocians were disarmed and dispersed in villages, and a burdensome indemnity imposed to refund the wasted temple treasure.

In Philip's decisive movements after the departure of the envoys Athens read the story of her own humiliation. Demosthenes had spoken the truth, and Æschines was a liar. The Macedonian and his paid agents had devised that treaty and delayed its ratification with the single intent of smoothing Philip's path into Greece. The isolation of Phocis, the rapid advance upon Thermopylæ, every thing was clear now, and the Athenians were tossed by alternate waves of indignation and dread. Although a member of the amphictyonic council, Athens took no part in the honors showered on Philip, and stood aloof from the festivities with which the other Greeks disguised their submission. Yet Demosthenes, by his great oration "On the Peace," quieted her throbbing war-pulse and kept the city from flinging away her life in a hopeless struggle with Philip at the head of the amphictyonic army. Athens refused to give any occasion for war, and Philip, content with his present degree of success, withdrew to await another favorable opportunity to enter Greece.

Demosthenes's famous argument for the maintenance of the peace of Philocrates was at heart a declaration of war. He held Athens back from fighting because she was without allies and unprepared, but he made no secret of his belief that under cover of the peace the city should fit itself for the irrepressible conflict.

A considerable element in Athens had no desire to oppose Philip. Some had been won over by his gifts of gold and lands and slaves; others had so smothered the ancient Hellenic spirit of freedom that they preferred the tranquillity of submission, with the profits of uninterrupted commerce and expensive festivals, to the personal sacrifices and crushing economies of war; and the aged orator Isocrates was not without supporters in his advocacy of a voluntary union with Hellas under Philip for a national war with Persia. Demosthenes did not falter among these weak-hearts and false-hearts. A few choice spirits, ardent young orators who were impressed by his nobility, gathered about him and formed a nucleus of a patriotic party. In the revulsion of feeling which overcame the populace after the exposure of Philip's duplicity this party impeached the faithless envoys who had negotiated the delusive peace, and other citizens who were suspected of treason. Philocrates was sentenced to die, and Æschines owed his acquittal (343 B. C.) after a protracted trial to his brilliant oratory.

In quest of allies Demosthenes traveled among the Peloponnesians, whom Philip had promised to protect against Sparta. But the Macedonian influence was too powerful to be overborne by mere words. Yet the patriotic agitation drew from the king a vigorous protest. It was unjust, he said, for Athens to foment hostility against him in a time of peace. He continued, however, to extend his own authority at the expense of Greece, until (342 B. C.) Diopithes, commanding for Athens in the Thracian Chersonesus, attempted reprisals, invading Macedonian possessions and taking plunder. Philip's partisans at Athens denounced these acts as shameful, drawing from Demosthenes a fresh "Philippic," which was a scathing review of the king's career of aggression and a noble appeal to the Athenians to make a final stand for the liberties of Greece.

The words and example of Demosthenes carried the popu-

lace with him. Diopithes was not censured, and Athens made fresh endeavors to put herself at the head of an Hellenic national league for the national defense. Byzantium, the ruling city of the Bosporus, Chalceis in Eubœa, Achæa, Acarnania, Megara, and Corinth within a few months ranged themselves under her leadership (341-340 B. C.).

The actual rupture of the empty peace of Philocrates resulted from the progress of events in Thrace. Throughout his reign Philip's generals had continually extended the boundaries of Macedonia toward the Euxine, incorporating the more or less savage tribes of the interior and wherever possible mastering the Greek colonies of the coast. The powerful cities of Perinthus, on the Propontis, and Byzantium, at the southern end of the Bosporus, were still free. If once lord of these fortresses he might close the narrow seas to the grain fleets which fed Athens. In 340 B. C. he laid siege to Perinthus, but the timely arrival of Persian auxiliaries relieved the garrison. Baffled here, he turned upon Byzantium, a few leagues farther west, which was commanded by Leon, a pupil of the Athenian philosopher, Plato.

In answer to Philip's repeated insults Athens had at last declared war, and now that she was awakened to the probable consequences of the fall of Byzantium she spared no efforts to aid the town. Philip drove the siege with tremendous energy, but the inhabitants stuck to their post of danger until the Athenian Chares drove away the blockading squadron and the arrival of Phocion with a great federal fleet compelled Philip to abandon the siege (339 B. C.).

Now that Athens had spoken out with her old voice not even the unconquerable Philip had been able to gainsay her. Her success gave credit to Demosthenes, and the people vied with each other to do him honor. Their highest token of approval was the adoption of the reform legislation which he had advocated for a dozen years. The navy and the means for its support were thoroughly reorganized and the reve-

nues which had been distributed among the people for entertainments, processions, and dramatic shows were temporarily devoted to the purposes of the war. One man's eloquence, backed by high principles, unflinching moral courage, and unabated zeal, had apparently revived the heroism of the Attic population and made them worthy of their glorious past.

From Byzantium Philip led his army against the native Thracians. The war with Athens, now openly declared, was a serious problem for him to consider. Fresh from his repulse at Perinthus and Byzantium he could not hope for an easy conquest of a city protected by massive walls and supported by a powerful fleet. Nor, in the excited condition of the Greek mind, would it be wise for him to lead a hostile army against the city, which was vindicating its right to be called the champion of Hellenic freedom. Again Philip had recourse to diplomacy and intrigue that he might re-appear in Greece as a welcome guest. The outbreak of another Sacred War was his opportunity.

Twice a year delegates from the amphictyonic states met to discuss the affairs of Delphi. At the spring meeting of the year 339 B. C. the representatives of Amphissa, a Locrian town on the southern slope of Parnassus, accused Athens of unfraternal conduct. She had removed certain ancient inscriptions in the temple commemorative of the defeat of Persians and Thebans at Plataea (479 B. C.). Æschines, the Athenian delegate, hurled back the fiery retort that the Amphissans themselves were the fouler offenders, for they had cultivated the plain of Cirrha, which had been consecrated to Apollo at the close of the first "Sacred War" (see page 114). From where he stood the orator pointed to the signs of flagrant trespass on the plain below, and denounced the sacrilege with such effect that next day the councilors led a volunteer force down the mountain to wipe out the disgraceful blot. They succeeded, but came in bloody conflict with

the Amphissans. Thus Æschines, who had long been in Philip's pay, was the cause of a new civil outbreak, for at a special meeting, at which neither Athens nor Thebes was represented, the amphictyons pronounced sentence upon the Locrians of Amphissa, and in the autumn (339 B. C.) charged their colleague, King Philip, as general of the forces, to execute the judgment.

Philip hastened to obey. With the promptness which was one secret of his success in war he marched southward through Thessaly, and then, instead of taking the nearest route through Doris toward Amphissa, he dashed through Thermopylæ and entered Phocis. Here he seized and began to fortify Elatea, a strong position which commanded the valley of Cephissus, the straight and easy road to Thebes and Athens.

The king's unwarranted occupation of Elatea warned all patriots that this time he had come into Greece to stay. At Athens the party which had honestly insisted upon the benevolence of his designs was dumb in the presence of the news. Indeed, all Athens was stunned, and in the assembly which met to take immediate action the magistrates sat silent. It was with a sad consciousness of the correctness of his spurned forebodings that Demosthenes broke the spell. He had foreseen the consequences of Æschines's rash words at Delphi, and had accused him of bringing war into Attica, but he boldly faced the danger, and his countrymen now hung on his words and followed his counsel. They determined on resistance and chose a committee of safety under the presidency of Demosthenes to conduct the war.

The activity of Demosthenes in that last winter was extraordinary, holding the city to its best of high endeavor, and kindling the same fire of liberty in other souls. The Peloponnesus generally refused to take arms against the king, but Corinth, Megara, Eubœa, Achæa, and some of the western islands promised aid, and the zealous eloquence of

the patriot-orator gained an unexpected ally. Thebes, the life-long foe of Athens, listened to Demosthenes and nobly joined the cause of freedom.

Athenians and Thebans labored with one heart to expel the king. In the winter they sent mercenaries to strengthen Amphissa against Philip's attacks, and encouraged the scattered Phocian villagers to rebuild their cities. They quartered an army of observation on the northern frontier of Bœotia, and whetted the valor of their troops by skirmishes with outposts and foraging parties from the camp at Elatea.

In the spring the genius of Philip began to be seen. He outwitted or bought over the mercenary auxiliaries of Amphissa and inflicted a terrible vengeance upon the sacrilegious town. Then turning eastward he lured the allies from their strong position and compelled them to give battle on the plain of Chæronea, just within the Bœotian boundary. The two armies were equal in numbers, but the soldiers of Philip were under a skillful commander who had schooled them for years in the hardy seminary of war. The Greeks, on the contrary, were the hasty levy of half a dozen states, brave men and able soldiers, but this was their first campaign together, and none of the many generals could compare with Philip in military experience. Theogenes, a veteran of Epaminondas's school, led the Bœotians; Stratocles was chief among the Attic generals; Demosthenes carried the shield and spear of a common soldier.

Little can be said of the course of the battle. The impetuous charge of the Athenians seemed to have gained ground at the first onset, but the success soon passed. The king had given the horse in charge that day to his son Alexander, a youth of eighteen, and had assigned to him the most arduous duty—the assault of the right wing, where the Thebans of the Sacred Band held the post of honor. The regiment of heroes fought until there were no more to fight, and the horsemen swept over them to join the king on the left and crush

the remnant of the Greeks. The Macedonian victory was complete.

When Thebes lost her army at Chæronea her last hope fled. Philip could not pardon what he was pleased to call her rebellion; her subject cities were taken from her, and a Macedonian garrison was stationed in her Cadmea. The Athenians were in a better position. Their system of fortifications, with the long walls, harbor castles, and fleets, would enable them to endure a siege, and for this they prepared in all haste under the guidance of Demosthenes and the military command of Phocion. But Philip, who had no desire to subject himself to the drudgery and risks of a siege, again showed himself friendly, and through his partisans in the city offered easy terms of peace. The details were quickly determined: Athens was to retain her constitution and laws, to suffer no foreign garrison, but to give up the Chersonesus and acknowledge the sovereignty of Philip by joining the Hellenic league which he was forming. This Peace of Demades (so called from the name of its proposer) was duly approved (338 B. C.). Before the close of the year delegates from the principal Greek states, except Sparta, which still resisted proudly but feebly, met in congress at Corinth, and formally accepted the constitution of the new Greek league, of which Macedonia was a member and Philip was really king.

The battle of Chæronea was in truth the end of Grecian independence, but Philip contrived to soothe the feelings of the conquered people by recognizing the autonomy of their several states and representing himself rather as the common leader of a free confederation than as a victorious king, and his partisans were ever declaring that he, the greatest of Hellenes, had simply succeeded in creating that Hellenic national union for which Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had striven successively and without success.

In conformity with the king's will the confederacy de-

clared a national war upon the king of Persia, and appointed Philip to the command of the federal army. Immense military preparations for the invasion of Asia were undertaken, but before their completion the king was assassinated in Macedonia by Pausanias, a young noble to whom he had denied justice. Philip had reigned twenty-four years, and died in the forty-seventh year of his age.

The history of Greece as an independent group of states closes with the battle of Chæronea. From 338 B. C. until 1827 A. D. the history of the Greek lands is merged in that of the foreign nations which ruled them, Macedonia, Rome, and New Rome (Byzantium), Venice, and the Turk. We must condense into a few paragraphs the most prominent events of these two thousand years.

Philip's son, Alexander the Great (336-323 B. C.), conquered the Persian empire and all Eastern Asia with an army of Greeks and Macedonians. After his death his vast domain broke up into a number of kingdoms under dynasties founded by his generals. These conquests and kingdoms extended certain superficial marks of Greek civilization, including the language and architecture, over the eastern world.

Greece proper remained subject to the Macedonian monarchs until the Romans destroyed that kingdom, though two federal leagues, the Achæan and Ætolian respectively south and north of the Gulf of Corinth, made brave efforts to protect themselves from Macedon and Rome. In 146 B. C. the Consul Mummius destroyed Corinth, and probably from that time dates the organization of Greece into the Roman province of Achaia.

About the middle of the first century A. D., the apostle Paul founded Christianity in Corinth (which Julius Cæsar had restored), and the new faith made rapid progress among

the common people of the cities. When Constantine the Great (306-337 A. D.) removed the imperial capital from the Tiber to the Bosphorus, to the old colony of Byzantium—since called New Rome or Constantinopolis—the realm became exposed to influences which eventually resulted in the formation of two empires, the Roman or Western, and the Byzantine or Eastern. The latter gradually exchanged Roman institutions for Greek. The temporal separation carried with it the schism of the Church, the Roman Catholic under its pope, and the Eastern or Greek Catholic under its several patriarchs. Greece shared the fortunes of the Eastern empire and her churches observed the Greek ritual. The northern barbarians who overran the west—the Gauls and Goths—were successfully repulsed from Greece, but Slavonic people from the Balkan region filtered down among the Hellenes and corrupted the purity of the ancient blood. In the last weak years of the Eastern empire crusaders from the west and the merchant-princes of Venice established themselves about the Corinthian Gulf and clung there after the Ottoman Turks had taken Constantinople (1453 A. D.). In one of these struggles a Venetian bomb exploding in the Parthenon, then used for a powder-house by the Turkish garrison of the Acropolis, wrecked that gem of the Periclean era.

For a century from 1718 A. D. Greece had almost no history. The Mohammedan Turks ruled the country with a heavy hand. But the spirit of the French Revolution touched the subject people with hope. Their war of independence which broke out in 1820 lasted until 1827. The Greeks displayed a heroism which recalled the exploits of their greatest days. Enthusiastic “philhellenes” from Western Europe and America, Lord Byron and Dr. Howe among others, gave their services to the struggling rebels. The combined English, French, and Russian fleet destroyed the Turkish navy at Navarino (1827) in an engagement which began in a blunder. In 1828

the Greeks got themselves a president, Capodistrias, and after his assassination (1831) invited Otho, a Bavarian prince, to be their king, the Western Powers which had helped drive out the Turks uniting to guarantee the independence of the kingdom. In 1862 the Greeks drove out the German, and after some rebuffs England induced a Danish prince to be crowned as George I., King of the Hellenes, and the kingdom has been hopeful and prosperous under his enlightened rule.

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